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2008 is the 20th anniversary of the ‘Barunga Statement’, which 
was presented in June 1988 to Prime Minister RJL Hawke at the 
Barunga festival. The Barunga Statement calls for Aboriginal self-
management, a national system of land rights, compensation for loss 
of lands, respect for Aboriginal identity, an end to discrimination 
and the granting of full civil, economic, social and cultural rights for 
Indigenous Australians.
The Barunga Statement painting combined several clan designs from 
Yolngu country in northeastern Arnhem Land on the left with a large 
design featuring traditional Central Desert iconography on the right.  
It visually affirmed the unified demands of the Aboriginal people of 
the Northern Territory and the Land Councils that represented the 
interests of those who had already attained the first measure of self-
management promised by the Land Rights Act (NT) 1976.
The Barunga Statement 
We, the Indigenous owners and occupiers of Australia, call on the Australian Government and people to recognise our rights: 
to self-determination and self-management, including the freedom to pursue our own economic, social, religious and cultural  •
development;
to permanent control and enjoyment of our ancestral lands; •
to compensation for the loss of use of our lands, there having been no extinction of original title; •
to protection of and control of access to our sacred sites, sacred objects, artefacts, designs, knowledge and works of art; •
to the return of the remains of our ancestors for burial in accordance with our traditions; •
to respect for and promotion of our Aboriginal identity, including the cultural, linguistic, religious and historical aspects, and including  •
the right to be educated in our own languages and in our own culture and history;
in accordance with the universal declaration of human rights, the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights,  •
the international covenant on civil and political rights, and the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination, rights to life, liberty, security of person, food, clothing, housing, medical care, education and employment opportunities, 
necessary social services and other basic rights. 
We call on the Commonwealth to pass laws providing: 
a national elected Aboriginal and Islander organisation to oversee Aboriginal and Islander affairs; •
a national system of land rights; •
a police and justice system which recognises our customary laws and frees us from discrimination and any activity which may threaten  •
our identity or security, interfere with our freedom of expression or association, or otherwise prevent our full enjoyment and exercise of 
universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
We call on the Australian Government to support Aborigines in the development of an international declaration of principles for indigenous 
rights, leading to an international covenant.
And we call on the Commonwealth Parliament to negotiate with us a Treaty recognising our prior ownership, continued occupation and 
sovereignty and affirming our human rights and freedom.
The image and text of the Barunga Statement and the painting are reproduced courtesy of the Central Land Council, Northern Land 
Council, and the Buku Larrngay Mulka Art Centre. Australian Parliament House, where the Barunga Statement currently resides, provided 
copies of the image for use in this publication.  
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Budget 2008-09: Ministerial Statement on Closing the gap between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians 
 
The Hon Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs 
 
The Policy Challenge 
 
The Australian Government's reform agenda — both in Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander affairs and across governments — is to address the structural and 
systemic problems that are producing appalling outcomes for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. 
 
A generation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children — Australian 
children — is at stake. Time is fast running out. This fact is acknowledged by 
Indigenous elders and leaders, as well as by government… 
 
Indigenous Australians must be involved in developing and driving solutions. 
Actions like the National Apology are working to build the trust needed to work 
together on getting results. 
 
Our 'closing the gap' commitments require effective engagement with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at all levels. Government needs to 
involve Indigenous people in the design and delivery of programs locally and 
regionally, and share responsibility for outcomes. Solutions developed on the 
ground must be driven by the communities that will ultimately determine their 
success or failure… 
 
The Government went to the election with a commitment to set up a national 
representative body to provide an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander voice 
within government. We will soon begin formal discussions with Indigenous 
people about the role, status and composition of this body. 
 
May 2008 
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Note – Use of the terms ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’ 
 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner recognises the 
diversity of the cultures, languages, kinship structures and ways of life of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. There is not one cultural model that fits all 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples retain distinct cultural identities whether 
they live in urban, regional or remote areas of Australia. 
 
Throughout this issues paper, Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders are referred to as 
‘peoples’. This recognises that Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders have a collective, 
rather than purely individual, dimension to their livelihoods. 
 
Throughout this report, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are also referred 
to as ‘Indigenous peoples’. 
 
The use of the term ‘Indigenous’ has evolved through international law. It 
acknowledges a particular relationship of Aboriginal people to the territory from which 
they originate. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
explained the basis for recognising this relationship as follows: 
 
Indigenous or aboriginal peoples are so-called because they were living on their lands 
before settlers came from elsewhere; they are the descendants – according to one 
definition – of those who inhabited a country or a geographical region at the time when 
people of different cultures or ethnic origins arrived, the new arrivals later becoming 
dominant through conquest, occupation, settlement or other means… (I)ndigenous 
peoples have retained social, cultural, economic and political characteristics which are 
clearly distinct from those of the other segments of the national populations. 
 
Throughout human history, whenever dominant neighbouring peoples have expanded 
their territories or settlers from far away have acquired new lands by force, the cultures 
and livelihoods – even the existence – of indigenous peoples have been endangered. 
The threats to indigenous peoples’ cultures and lands, to their status and other legal 
rights as distinct groups and as citizens, do not always take the same forms as in 
previous times. Although some groups have been relatively successful, in most part of 
the world indigenous peoples are actively seeking recognition of their identities and 
ways of life.1 
 
The Social Justice Commissioner acknowledges that there are differing usages of the 
terms ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander’, ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘indigenous’ within 
government policies and documents. When referring to a government document or 
policy, we have maintained the government’s language to ensure consistency. 
 
                                                 
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact sheet No.9 (Rev.1), The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm.  
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Introduction 
 
Issues of Indigenous disadvantage and dysfunction are before our eyes more frequently 
and more prominently than ever before.  
 
Barely a day goes by without another chilling and heartbreaking story of abuse, 
violence or neglect; or of demonstrations of the impact of entrenched poverty and 
despair among our communities.  
 
Without proper engagement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, 
(Indigenous peoples) governments will struggle in their efforts to make lasting progress 
in improving the conditions of Indigenous people and in our communities.  
 
A National Indigenous Representative Body is a fundamental component of any future 
action if we are to achieve positive change.  
 
At present, there is not a transparent, rigorous process for engaging with Indigenous 
peoples in determining the policy settings and to hold governments accountable for 
their performance. 
 
The new Australian Government has acknowledged the importance of addressing this. 
In the Apology speech, the Prime Minister stated that: 
 
Our challenge for the future is to embrace a new partnership between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians. The core of this partnership for the future is closing the 
gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians on life expectancy, 
educational achievement and employment opportunities. This new partnership on 
closing the gap will set concrete targets for the future. 
 
In furtherance of this commitment, in March 2008 the Australian Government and 
federal Opposition also signed a Statement of Intent to work in partnership with 
Indigenous people and their representative organisations to achieve equality in health 
status and life expectancy between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and 
non-Indigenous Australians by the year 2030. This statement provides bipartisan 
support to: 
 
• develop a comprehensive, long-term plan of action, that is targeted to need, 
evidence-based and capable of addressing the existing inequities in health 
services, in order to achieve equality of health status and life expectancy 
between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and non- Indigenous 
Australians by 2030.  
• ensure the full participation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and 
their representative bodies in all aspects of addressing their health needs.  
• respect and promote the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples... and 
• measure, monitor, and report on our joint efforts, in accordance with 
benchmarks and targets, to ensure that we are progressively realising our shared 
ambitions.  
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These are welcome commitments and ‘first steps’ to a new partnership in Indigenous 
affairs.  
 
It is now time for us to flesh out these commitments to ensure the full participation and 
input of Indigenous peoples into government decision making at the national level.  
 
And this, ultimately, is what the discussion about a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body is about.  
 
It is about our place at the table in making the decisions that impact on our 
communities, on our men, our women and our children.  
 
It is about creating a genuine partnership with government and across society:  
 
 With shared ambition, so we are all working towards the same goals and not at 
cross purposes.  
 
 With mutual respect, so we are part of the solutions to the needs of our 
communities instead of being treated solely as the problem.  
 
 With joint responsibility, so that we can proceed with an honesty and an 
integrity where both governments and Indigenous people accept that we each 
have a role to play, and where we each accept our responsibilities to achieve the 
change needed to ensure that our children have an equal life chance to those of 
other Australians.  
 
 With respect for human rights, that affirms our basic dignity as human beings 
and provides objective, transparent standards against which to measure our joint 
efforts. 
 
To this end, in 2007 I initiated research to identify the key considerations that will need 
to be addressed in establishing a new National Indigenous Representative Body.2  
 
This paper sets out the findings of that research. It addresses a series of issues for 
consideration in the process of establishing a new National Indigenous Representative 
Body. Namely: 
 
• First, what lessons can be learned from mechanisms for representing Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples at the national, State/ Territory or regional 
level that have previously existed or that are currently in place?  
• Second, what lessons can be learned from mechanisms for representing 
Indigenous peoples that have been established in other countries? 
                                                 
2 This research was in accordance with the following commitment that I made in the Social Justice Report 2006: 
‘The Social Justice Commissioner will work with Indigenous organisations and communities to identify sustainable 
options for establishing a national Indigenous representative body. The Commissioner will conduct research and 
consultations with non-government organisations domestically and internationally to establish existing models for 
representative structures that might be able to be adapted to the cultural situation of Indigenous Australians, as well 
as methods for expediting the establishment of such a body given the urgent and compelling need for such a 
representative body.’ Quoted in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2006, Social 
Justice Report 2006, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney.  
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• And third, what options are there for ensuring that a National Indigenous 
Representative Body is sustainable? 
 
The research does not substitute for broad-based consultation with Indigenous 
communities. Indeed, the research does not state a preference for a particular model for 
a National Indigenous Representative Body – it merely identifies the many and varied 
issues that need to be considered in the formulation of the new Body.  
 
The paper raises challenges for both the federal government and for Indigenous people.  
 
For the government, it will be of critical importance that you articulate what you are not 
prepared to support in a new National Indigenous Representative Body.  
 
I encourage the Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs to articulate what the government sees as the major benefits of a national 
representative body and accordingly, what roles the government hopes it will fulfill.  
 
I am not suggesting that the government should be prescriptive and close off debates 
that may need to be had. But ultimately, we need to minimise the differences between 
what the Indigenous community expects of its representative body and what 
government is prepared to support.  
 
If we don’t ‘close this gap’ between the expectations of government and the Indigenous 
community, then a new body may face the same credibility difficulties that have beset 
previous representative bodies. This will limit the ability for the representative body to 
have influence with government. It may limit the representative body’s ability to be an 
effective agent for change for the Indigenous community.  
 
The responsibilities of a new National Indigenous Representative Body are two way – 
to government and to Indigenous people. 
 
And for Indigenous people, the challenges that exist in establishing a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body are many.  
 
We should resist the temptation to slip back into old habits. This is not about reviving 
ATSIC. The ATSIC Review of 2003 did not recommend the abolition of ATSIC but 
instead proposed a restructure and close adherence to a series of key principles. I am 
confident that Indigenous people will draw on the lessons from the ATSIC Review 
while also looking beyond the ATSIC model when setting out their hopes and 
expectations for a new National Indigenous Representative Body.  
 
I consider that perhaps the greatest problem that ATSIC faced was that it was ‘blamed’ 
for the lack of progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage, despite the simple fact 
that it had few responsibilities for service delivery that could contribute to achieving 
this goal. This was a key finding of the ATSIC Review in 2003.  
 
I see significant benefits for a new National Indigenous Representative Body to not 
exercise the service delivery responsibilities of government. As for all other 
Australians, let government be responsible for delivering services to Indigenous 
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citizens. We don’t want to take the blame for second class treatment by government 
anymore. 
 
Let the new Representative Body set the vision for our people’s future, provide the 
guidance to achieving this and advocate for understanding for the consequences that 
flow from our status as the First Peoples of this nation. 
 
A new National Indigenous Representative Body will also have to operate in a vastly 
changed environment from when ATSIC existed. This is one with: 
 
 concrete commitments from government to closing the gap, with a partnership 
approach at the centre of this process; 
 a renewed focus on reconciliation, following from the National Apology to the 
stolen generations; 
 a whole of government system for delivering services to Indigenous people 
where the primary responsibility resides with mainstream government 
departments; and 
 significant environmental challenges facing all Australians, and where the 
traditional knowledge, practices and land use of Indigenous peoples will have a 
significant role to play in preserving the quality of life of all Australians. 
 
A new National Indigenous Representative Body will also be created within the context 
of rapid advances internationally in the recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples 
– developments which the new Australian government has indicated it supports and 
respects.   
 
It is essential that as Indigenous peoples we have a seat at the table and are involved in 
the big debates that affect our communities. It is not credible to suggest that we should 
not have such involvement.  
 
My hope is that we can, in partnership with government, develop a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body that engages with different sections of the pan-
Aboriginal and/ or Torres Strait Islander community – be it women, men, our youth and 
children, communities in different geographical locations, traditional owners or stolen 
generations members.  
 
And I hope that a representative body will operate in such a way as to inspire and 
support our people, while also holding governments accountable for their efforts, so we 
may ultimately enjoy equal life chances to all other Australians.  
 
The first step on this road is mutual respect and a partnership. A National Indigenous 
Representative Body is an essential component of achieving the long overdue 
commitments to closing the gap.  
 
Tom Calma 
 
(signature) 
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 Section 1: National Indigenous Representative Bodies in 
Australia – A History  
 
Indigenous Australians have often organised themselves in an attempt to effect political 
and social change. Many Indigenous organisations were created as a result of this, 
particularly over the past century. These organisations were independent of government 
and were often defined by their specific objectives. Such organisations became focused 
on particular campaigns rather than systemic issues of Indigenous representation.  
 
When the federal government became heavily involved in Indigenous affairs following 
the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, more focus was given to how 
Indigenous peoples could be represented within the mechanisms of government.  
 
Text Box 1 below provides an overview of developments relating to national 
Indigenous representative bodies in Australia over the past fifty years. 
 
This section will make brief mention of the activities of the Federal Council for the 
Advancement of Aborigines & Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) and then focus on 
the three organisations that have been involved in national Indigenous representation:  
 
• the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC);  
• the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC); and  
• the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).  
 
This section describes their structure as well as the problems and challenges that were 
faced by these organisations during their lifetime. It is fair to say that each new body 
learnt from the lessons of its predecessor. Many concrete outcomes emerged, not the 
least of which was the capacity building and advocacy development that emerged 
amongst the Indigenous polity. This is available to be tapped again in a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body.  
 
Text Box 1 – Overview of national Indigenous representative and advocacy bodies 
in Australia 
 
1957 Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines & Torres Strait Islanders 
(FCAATSI) established independently of government. 
1973  National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC) established. Begins 
national consultations on electoral structure.  
1975 Hiatt commissioned to review NACC, reports 1976. O’Donoghue submits 
minority report.  
            Coombs begins own review as part of the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration, also commissions Rowley to report on NACC. 
1977 National Aboriginal Conference (NAC) established.  
1983  Coombs commissioned to review the NAC. Reports in 1984. 
1984 NAC abolished. O’Donoghue begins national consultation on a replacement 
body. 
1986 O’Donoghue reports on consultations in An Aboriginal and Islander 
Consultative Organisation Report.  
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1988 Aboriginal Affairs Minister Gerry Hand launches widespread national 
consultation around his discussion paper Foundations for the Future.  
1988 Senate Select Committee investigates proposed Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Bill, suggests over 40 amendments most of which are incorporated. 
Subsequently over 90 amendments made to Bill during its passage through 
parliament.  
1989  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) established. 
1993 ATSIC internal review conducted under s26 of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth).  
1996 Coalition government elected, special audit of ATSIC undertaken. 
1997 ATSIC Board commissions review of ATSIC’s functions, establishes steering 
committee, conducts national consultations, recommends over 30 changes to the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth).  
2003  Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS) established to split 
ATSIC’s administrative functions from its representative functions. 
2003  Minister Ruddock commissions Hannaford Review of ATSIC’s roles and 
functions. Review recommends internal separation of administrative and 
representative functions and greater involvement of Regional Councils in 
national structure. 
2004  Prime Minister and Minister Vanstone announce abolition of ATSIC. National 
Indigenous Council (NIC) established, with 14 members appointed by 
government as experts, with a purely advisory function (i.e. no representative 
role).  
2005  Senate Select Committee inquiry into ATSIC Amendment Bill 2004 which 
abolishes ATSIC. 
2007 Labor shadow Minister Macklin announces Labor Party platform at the 
44
th
Australian Labor Party National Conference to establish a new National 
Indigenous Representative body. 
2007  Following the election of the Rudd Government, Minister Macklin decides not 
to reappoint NIC members. On expiry of term, the NIC is abolished. 
2008 Prime Minister Rudd calls for a new partnership with Indigenous peoples to 
underpin policy development in his Apology speech to Parliament in February 
2008.  
2008 In March 2008, the Government signs a Statement of Intent with the Indigenous 
health sector for a new partnership to close the gap in life expectancy within a 
generation. 
2008 Australian Government allocates funds for commencement of consultations 
with Indigenous peoples on the establishment of a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body 
 
 
The Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) 
 
Founded in 1957, in its early years the Federal Council for the Advancement of 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) was a successful alliance of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous organisations.  
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Its main purpose was to agitate for civil and political rights, the rights of citizenship, 
equality of pay and conditions, universal education and the retention of existing reserve 
lands in Aboriginal hands.3This led to significant involvement by trade unions. It was 
able to leverage widespread community support following the 1967 referendum into a 
groundswell of acceptance for the principle of land rights.  
 
Its membership base was in organisations rather than individuals. Its 1975 constitution 
allowed for two categories of member organisations. Category ‘A’ organisations were 
required to agree to the five basic principles of FCAATSI and were exclusively 
concerned with Aboriginal affairs, or had a standing committee so concerned.  
 
Category ‘B’ organisations were those that supported the objectives of FCAATSI but 
could not qualify for category ‘A’ membership. Category ‘A’ organisations could send 
up to five delegates to the Annual General Meeting. Category ‘B’ organisations could 
send two. Voting for the Executive was limited to the Aboriginal delegates of these 
organisations, but nomination and election to the Executive committee was open to 
non-Indigenous peoples.4   
 
Debate over the principle of Aboriginal control of the Executive split the Council at its 
1970 annual meeting.5 Debate continued at least until the 1977 meeting, when a 
revision to its Constitution was proposed, but by that time it representative functions 
had been taken over by the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC). 
 
Many of the principles of both equality and particular Indigenous rights that FCAATSI 
fought for have been widely recognised, with attention now turning to their effective 
implementation.  
 
In the period since FCAATSI existed, the principle of self-determination has supported 
national bodies being comprised exclusively of Indigenous members. There are, 
however, existing organisations which are Indigenous/non-Indigenous alliances. 
Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR) works with an Indigenous 
Reference Group. Reconciliation Australia (RA), a not-for-profit corporation, has 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people on the Board. Nevertheless, they are widely 
perceived as non-Indigenous organisations. Their effectiveness could perhaps be 
enhanced by the existence of a National Indigenous Representative Body that could act 
as an external point of reference for their programs.  
 
National Indigenous Representative Bodies in Australia, 1972 – 2008 
 
1) National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC), 1972 - 1977  
 
The NACC was the first unified national Indigenous organisation that represented 
Indigenous views. Prior to the NACC, the Federal Council for the Advancement of 
                                                 
3 Hiatt, LR et al. 1976, National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 
Parliamentary Paper 343/1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra. p9.  
4 Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, 1977, Minutes and 
Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference (incorporates 1975 Constitution), 9 and 16 April, 
Canberra, unpublished proceedings. 
5 Read, P 1990, “Cheeky, Insolent and Anti-White”: the FCAATSI Split of Easter 1970’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 36/1 
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Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) had evolved as the major 
organisation promoting Indigenous interests from the 1950s. While FCAATSI played a 
central role in the success of the 1967 referendum, its leadership was largely non-
Indigenous.6 Following the election of the Whitlam government the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, Gordon Bryant, created the NACC. 
 
Structure  
 
The NACC was an advisory body made up of 41 nationally elected Aboriginal people 
who advised the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on Aboriginal policy.7 It was 
envisaged that the structure of the NACC would be detailed by the first elected 
representatives of the body. There appears to have been little structural development of 
the organisation before it first met.  
 
The Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), under the leadership of Charles Perkins, 
held 16 regional consultations to promote the idea of the NACC and to mobilise the 
Indigenous population to vote in the subsequent NACC elections. To a large extent 
these consultations were successful, with approximately 78% of Indigenous peoples 
voting in November 1983.8 The constitution developed by the NACC gave it executive, 
or policy-making, and administrative powers, contrary to the government’s desire that it 
remain simply advisory. Throughout its short life, the NACC remained organisationally 
under-developed. 
 
Autonomy, Resilience and Vulnerability 
 
The NACC was ultimately vulnerable for a variety of reasons.9 It is helpful to 
categorise these reasons as both internal and external.  
 
Regarding external vulnerabilities, firstly there were major tensions between the 
NACC, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) and the Minister. Minister Bryant 
often gave preference to the advice of NACC over that of the DAA. This led to hostility 
between the DAA and the NACC. This situation reversed when Minister Bryant was 
replaced by Senator Jim Cavanagh as Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. No clear 
relationship between all stakeholders appears to have been clearly articulated.  
 
Secondly, the NACC desired greater independence and did not wish to simply act as an 
advisory body. Without the support of the government in this aim for autonomy, the 
public were unsupportive of such a move.  
 
Regarding internal vulnerabilities, firstly the NACC was unable to develop a coherent 
organisational structure that could deliver for its constituents. This situation was almost 
certainly at least partly due to the under-resourcing of the organisation by government. 
                                                 
6 Weaver, SM 1983, ‘Australian Aboriginal Policy: Aboriginal Pressure Groups or Government Advisory 
Bodies Part 1’, Oceania, Vol. 54 No. 1. p1.  
7 Ibid. p3. 
8 Ibid. p6 
9 Hiatt, LR et al. 1976, National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 
Parliamentary Paper 343/1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra. pviii. And see generally 
Weaver, SM 1983, ‘Australian Aboriginal Policy: Aboriginal Pressure Groups or Government Advisory 
Bodies Part I’, Oceania, Vol 54. No. 1.   
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However, the limited capacity of the organisation was also due, in part, to the lack of 
clarity members had about their roles, the relative inexperience of the secretariat and a 
lack of focus by the members on internal structures rather than external advocacy.  
 
Furthermore, the NACC is seen to have lacked cohesion as an organisation. The elected 
members often failed to agree among themselves on issues of importance. A constant 
tension was seen to exist between the interests of Aboriginal people living in more rural 
and remote ‘traditional’ lifestyles and urban Aboriginal people. This tension was 
fuelled by the opinions of non-Indigenous advisors to the government at the time.10 
 
Ultimately, the NACC did not have the capacity to develop into an independent, 
agenda-setting policy organisation due to a lack of government support for such a 
function and the NACC’s unmet need to develop coherent policy position regarding its 
functions and structure. 
 
2) National Aboriginal Conference (NAC), 1977 - 1985  
 
Following the election of the Fraser government in 1975, the new Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, Ian Viner, established an inquiry into the role of the NACC. 
Reporting in 1976, the inquiry found that the NACC was restricted in its role due to the 
lack of clarity given by the previous government about its aims and functions and the 
desire of the NACC to be more than purely a consultative body.11 As a result, the 
NACC was effectively abolished, and the NAC was created in 1977, with the first 
elections held in November of that year.  
 
Structure  
 
The NAC was created as a government consultative body comprising 35 full-time 
salaried members. The NAC had state branches and territory branches and a national 
executive of 10 members. The Executive represented these branches and was chosen by 
the branch representatives rather than a broader national membership. An annual 
meeting of interested Indigenous constituents was held, to ensure that the elected 
representatives might be accountable to their constituents. None of the three tiers of the 
organisation were bound by any decisions of the others. Ultimately, the organisation 
was a further entrenchment of the government view that a national Indigenous 
representative body should be merely consultative in nature, without executive 
authority or guaranteed ministerial access.  
 
Autonomy, Resilience and Vulnerability 
 
The NAC, like the NACC, was unable to consistently develop coherent national policy 
positions on matters of national importance in Indigenous affairs. Successful 
positioning was often based on the efforts of particular executive members, a 
state/territory branch or other Indigenous organisations who were members of the 
NAC.  
 
                                                 
10 Weaver, SM 1983, ‘Australian Aboriginal Policy: Aboriginal Pressure Groups or Government 
Advisory Bodies Part I’, Oceania, Vol 54. No. 1. p7.  
11 Hiatt, LR et al. 1976, National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 
Parliamentary Paper 343/1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra. pviii.  
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The structure of the organisation as created by government also led to what has been 
characterised as an inherently cautious organisation.12 This was partly based on the fact 
that the government’s intention that the organisation not be controlled or heavily 
influenced by urban activists succeeded in limiting the voice of that constituency in the 
NAC. Tensions between the NAC and the bureaucracy remained as a legacy of the 
DAA’s relationship with the NACC, contributing to the destabilisation of the 
organisation.  
 
Two reports into a replacement structure for the NAC were commissioned following 
the election of the Hawke government in 1983. The O’Donoghue report concluded that 
the NAC produced “politicians” rather than advisors, had not adequately represented 
the diversity of Indigenous interests and had not realised coherent policy positions. 
Further, the body was unable to work with other Indigenous organisations or 
government departments.13 The report recommended that a more regionalised 
organisation be created to give greater voice to the broader Indigenous constituency.  
 
The other report, the 1984 Coombs report, suggested that a new organisation be based 
on regional representative structures and that it make provisions for the representation 
of existing Indigenous organisations. The Coombs report suggested that a new body 
should have significant responsibility over Indigenous expenditure.14 
 
3) The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), 1989 - 2005 
 
ATSIC was established following the Coombs and O’Donoghue reports on the 
principle that the new organisation should be built around regional mechanisms. In 
1986 the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gerry Hand, recommended that a new 
organisation replace the NAC. Following the introduction of enabling legislation, major 
consultations were conducted with the Indigenous community. This significantly 
changed the basis of the legislation and greatly regionalised its structure. The new 
organisation, ATSIC, was ultimately created in 1989 and began operation in 1990. 
 
Structure 
 
The ultimate structure of ATSIC resulted from various political compromises which 
were required to ensure the realisation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission Act 1989 (Cth). The Bill was significantly amended to address concerns 
from the Opposition and minor parties that ATSIC was not adequately accountable, 
either administratively or financially, to the public or the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs.15  
 
As a consequence, the Minister remained at the top of the legislative structure, and 
retained significant power over decisions made by elected representatives. 
                                                 
12 Weaver, SM, 1983, ‘Australian Aboriginal Policy: Aboriginal Pressure Groups or Government 
Advisory Bodies Part II’, Oceania, Vol 54. No. 2. p104 
13 O’Donoghue, L 1986, An Aboriginal and Islander Consultative Organisation, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra. p27. 
14 Coombs, HC 1984, The Role of National Aboriginal Conference, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra. p9.  
15 Ivanitz, M 2000, ‘The Demise of ATSIC? Accountability and the Coalition Government’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 59, No. 1. p4.  
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Consequently, there were inevitable tensions between ATSIC’s responsibilities to the 
Minister and its duties to Indigenous constituents. The organisation was given a broad 
mandate to formulate and implement programs for Indigenous peoples and to monitor 
the effectiveness of its own and other nominated programs.  
 
Further, ATSIC was empowered to develop policy proposals at all levels, to advise the 
Minister on all matters and to undertake research necessary to enable it to perform its 
functions. The Commission controlled and managed a budget to create and implement 
programs. For the first time, a national Indigenous representative body had the power to 
both advise government and to fund and deliver programs.  
 
Along with establishing unique functions, the Parliament created a unique 
organisational structure to deliver ATSIC’s mandate. Central to this structure was a 
separation of power between elected representative and administrative arms.  
 
The elected representative arm consisted of regional councils grouped into regional 
zones – including, for the first time, Torres Strait Islanders. In each zone, regional 
councillors would elect one of their own members to the national Board of 
Commissioners. The Board was legally responsible for determining financial priorities, 
developing budget estimates and reports, and ensuring the organisation acted in 
accordance with its powers.  
 
Regional Councils were given the power to formulate a regional plan for the 
improvement of the economic, cultural and social status of Indigenous peoples and to 
assist ATSIC and other bodies in its implementation. In addition, regional councils 
were tasked to prepare budgets for approval by the central organisation, and to act as a 
local advocate for the views of regional communities.  
 
The administrative arm was staffed by public servants and was given the task of 
implementing the policy and program priorities determined by the elected 
representatives.  
 
As the created structure was untested for a statutory authority, the legislation that 
created ATSIC was subject to regular review.   
 
ATSIC was given the power to review the operation of its own legislation and make 
recommendations for its amendment. Two reviews conducted in 1993 and 1998 raised 
somewhat similar concerns. Firstly, both highlighted shortfalls in the legislation itself, 
stating that while an object of the legislation was to coordinate the formulation and 
implementation of policies, ATSIC did not have the power to act in a specific co-
ordinating role, or enforce the cooperation of the Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments.16  
 
                                                 
16 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 1993, Review of the Operation of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth), Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra. p9. And Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 1998, Review of the Operation of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act (1989) Cth, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission, Woden ACT. p10.  
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Secondly, the reviews aimed to provide less onerous funding arrangements between 
ATSIC and State and Territory governments17 and increase government accountability 
through an annual monitoring and reporting function for ATSIC.18  
 
Unfortunately the majority of recommendations emanating from these reviews were 
never implemented.  
 
The Howard Government announced the first comprehensive external review of ATSIC 
in November 2002. In April 2003, it further announced a separation of powers between 
ATSIC’s policy making and service delivery roles as an interim measure to remove the 
potential for conflicts of interest in decision-making over funding. ATSIC was 
subsequently stripped of all resources and funding superfluous to administrative 
requirements ostensibly to free its elected arm to focus on larger policy issues and these 
were transferred to a new body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services 
(ATSIS).  
 
The Hannaford review produced its Report in November 2003. Among its terms of 
reference was consideration of the adequacy of representation and advocacy of 
Indigenous views, the role of Regional Councils in service and program delivery, and 
the establishment of a Ministerial veto power over ATSIC’s decisions.  
 
After wide national consultation the final Report, titled In the hands of the regions, 
recommended urgent structural reform enabling greater regional control and a 
permanent division of ATSIC’s administrative and elected representative roles (to be 
achieved through a single body - i.e. by reunifying ATSIS and ATSIC). The national 
body would then become responsible primarily for developing policy and reviewing a 
national plan, informed by regional plans and specifically-tasked national committees.  
 
The review team also recommended that ATSIC be given greater ability to develop 
more effective relationships with State and Territory governments through multilateral 
agreements.19 
 
The then Minister for Indigenous Affairs pledged to consider the issues which were 
raised in the Report and deliver a reform package in 2005. Before any of these 
recommendations could be considered, let alone implemented, the organisation was 
abolished.  
 
An overview of the findings of the Hannaford review of ATSIC is contained in Text 
Box 2 below. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 1993, Review of the Operation of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth), Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra. p16.  
18 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 1998, Review of the Operation of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth), Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission, Woden ACT. p10. 
19 Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs, Canberra. p14.  
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Text Box 2 – Overview of key findings and recommendations of the Hannaford 
review of ATSIC (2003) 
 
In the hands of the regions - a new ATSIC found that ATSIC was in urgent need of 
structural change.  
 
The report of the Review Team particularly emphasised the need to improve the 
connection between ATSIC's regional representative structures and national policy 
formulation processes. The Review Team state that:  
 
As it currently operates, the review panel sees ATSIC as a top down body. 
Few, if any, of its policy positions are initiated from community or regional 
levels. The regional operations of ATSIC are very much focused on program 
management. To fulfil its charter, engage its constituency and strengthen its 
credibility, ATSIC must go back to the people. The representative structure 
must allow for full expression of local, regional and State/Territory based 
views through regional councils and their views should be the pivot of the 
national voice.  
 
In terms of capacity building, this identifies a challenge to develop a 'cultural match' 
between the structures of ATSIC and Indigenous peoples at the local level to ensure 
that ATSIC is representative and participative.  
 
Significantly, the Review Team note that public perceptions of how ATSIC have 
performed have been burdened by unrealistic expectations, with the organisation 
blamed for failures which lie outside its control. They also noted that ATSIC had also 
not lived up to unrealistic expectations of what it can achieve:  
 
ATSIC was intended to be a supplementary funding body and was never 
intended, or funded, to be the provider of all programs and services to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Its establishment did not absolve 
mainstream agencies from their responsibility to meet their obligations to 
Indigenous citizens. The hopes pinned on the organisation - that it could and 
would effect instant change were not realistic 
 
They state that these unrealistic expectations have also operated to shield 
governments from being accountable, and that ‘this avoidance of accountability and 
responsibility must be overcome with the new ATSIC.’  
 
The Review Team recommends a revised structure for ATSIC that includes the 
following features:  
 
• The retention of ATSIC's 35 Regional Councils;  
• The replacement of the ATSIC Board, which is currently constituted of 18 
zone commissioners, with two new structures - a national body and a national 
executive;  
• The new 'national body' would be the governing body of ATSIC and 
determine ATSIC policy, primarily through the development of a national plan 
which would be drawn from ATSIC Regional Council plans and ultimately 
form the basis of the policies and programs of all governments;  
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• The 'national body' would meet at least twice every four years;  
• The new 'national body' would have 38 members and be comprised of the 35 
elected Regional Council chairs, the chair of the Torres Strait Islander 
Advisory Body and the chair and deputy chair of the new 'national executive';  
• The new 'national executive' would be delegated by the 'national body' the role 
of leading ATSIC and advocating on behalf of ATSIC on a day to day basis;  
• The new 'national executive' would have up to10 members, comprised of 8 
people elected by the 'national body' including a chair and deputy chair, as 
well as up to 2 people appointed by the Minister from elected regional 
councillors;  
• A series of national committees would be established to provide policy input 
to the 'national body' to ensure the incorporation of regional priorities into 
national planning, with membership drawn from the 'national body' and 
'national executive';  
• The Regional Council planning process would be accorded higher status in 
establishing ATSIC's priorities; and  
• The elected and administrative arms of ATSIC (and presently ATSIS) would 
be reunified in one organisation with a clear delineation of roles incorporated 
into the ATSIC Act.  
 
Overall, the ATSIC Review Team made 67 recommendations which broadly address 
issues of the relationship between ATSIC and Indigenous peoples, the federal 
government, the States and Territories, and between its elected and administrative 
arms. 
 
See further: www.atsicreview.gov.au/ATSIC%20Review%20report.pdf.  
 
Autonomy, Resilience and Vulnerability 
 
Since the demise of ATSIC, there has been much analysis of the problems experienced 
by the organisation and the weaknesses of its legislatively determined framework. Four 
organisational structural issues were identified:  
 
 Firstly, there was confusion surrounding ATSIC’s broad powers and functions.  
 Secondly, tension existed between policy development and program delivery.  
 Thirdly, the relationship between regional councils, the Board of 
Commissioners and the bureaucracy required clearer definition.  
 Fourthly, the Parliament failed to define the relationship between ATSIC and 
the different governments, or grant ATSIC the power to hold these governments 
accountable.  
 
i) Clarity about powers and functions 
 
While ATSIC was given a broad mandate, it did not capitalise on its functions and was 
simultaneously blamed for problems that were the responsibility of other agencies.  
 
ATSIC’s function of monitoring the effectiveness of programs required the “active 
cooperation and involvement” of Commonwealth, State and Territory governments, 
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who remained the major Indigenous service providers.20 The legislation that established 
ATSIC was silent on how this relationship was to be developed and failed to provide 
ATSIC with executive authority to require effective cooperation.  
 
Instead, public confusion existed, often fuelled by political rhetoric, about the nature 
and scope of the organisation’s powers. The Howard government often blamed the 
organisation for failing to make major progress in ending Indigenous disadvantage, 
even though ATSIC administered less than 50% of Indigenous-specific Commonwealth 
funding.21 Clearer legislative provisions to give fuller expression as to how ATSIC was 
to realistically achieve its mandate were required.  
 
ii) Tension between policy development and program delivery 
 
Confusion about ATSIC’s broad mandate led to a disproportionate focus on program 
delivery. As the organisation developed, it became increasingly difficult for it to 
negotiate its dual policy and program roles. Eventually, program delivery became the 
focus at the expense of policy development. As a result, the organisation became 
hostage to government grants and funding cycles, increasing financial accountability 
and constant cycles of reporting, audit and evaluation.22 
 
This occurred at the expense of policy development that could have actually informed 
governments as how to better run the majority of Indigenous programs. This effectively 
led to a failure to hold government accountable for program delivery.23  
 
The desired effective relationship transformed instead into one between the government 
as ‘funder’ and ATSIC as the ‘contracted service provider’.24 Under-resourcing of 
policy development led to a lack of Indigenous participation in government policy and 
program development. In 2003, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Philip Ruddock, 
split the administrative and funding arm from the representative arm of ATSIC in an 
attempt to resolve this problem. The abolition of ATSIC occurred soon after, so there 
was no effective evaluation of this separation.  
 
iii) Relationship between regional councils, the Board and the bureaucracy 
 
While it prescribed broad functions, the legislation governing ATSIC failed to define 
key relationships, leading to tension and conflict between these three key stakeholders. 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ATSIC was directly accountable to both the 
                                                 
20 Behrendt, L 2005, Briefing Paper No 5: National Representative Structures, Ngiya Institute for 
Indigenous Law, Policy and Practice, Sydney. p9.    
21 Altman, J 2004, ‘Practical Reconciliation and the New Mainstreaming: Will it Make a Difference to 
Indigenous Australians?’, Dialogue, Vol. 23 No. 2. p42.  
22 Behrendt, L 2005, Briefing Paper No 5: National Representative Structures, Ngiya Institute for 
Indigenous Law, Policy and Practice, Sydney. p9. And Sanders, W 1994 ‘Reconciling Public 
Accountability and Aboriginal Self-Discrimination/Self Management: Is ATSIC Succeeding?, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 53, No. 4. p480.  
23 Behrendt, L 2005, Briefing Paper No 5: National Representative Structures, Ngiya Institute for 
Indigenous Law, Policy and Practice, Sydney. p25. And Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, 
Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department 
of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, Canberra. p30.  
24 Westbury, N 2005, ‘Shifting Our Thinking – The Future Engagement between Governments and 
Indigenous Australians Post ATSIC’, Public Administration Today, Vol. 4. p27.   
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Board and the Minister. This limited the ability of the bureaucracy to support 
conflicting agendas between the Board and the government. Recommendations to 
change the structure of the organisation to allow the Board to appoint the CEO were 
ignored.  
 
Also, while the Act established the respective functions of the Board of Commissioners 
and the regional councils, it was to a large extent silent on the interrelationship between 
the two. While regional councils were given the capacity to advise on national funding 
priorities, in practical terms they became focused on program management.25 Instead, a 
top-down approach resulted regarding funding decisions and policy development, 
resulting inevitably in the centralisation of power in the national organisation.26 
Indigenous peoples were therefore less able to affect the processes of the organisation. 
 
iv) Relationship with governments 
 
ATSIC was further incapacitated by having limited power to compel the 
Commonwealth, State or Territory governments to act on its policy advice. While the 
organisation was given the task of monitoring the effectiveness of Indigenous 
programs, ATSIC had no executive authority to persuade governments to cooperate 
with its scrutiny. As the organisation focused on program delivery, various 
governments were able to escape criticisms about their own unproductive Indigenous 
policies and programs.27  
 
This was especially the case for State and Territory governments, who remained 
responsible for the majority of Indigenous expenditure. The Commonwealth 
government had the ongoing problem of holding other governments accountable for 
tied grants, leaving ATSIC unable to track government expenditure on Indigenous 
programs and forcing them to attempt to plug the gaps in State and Territory services 
through the capacity of the regional councils.28  
 
In a sense this relieved the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments from as 
stringent accountability as ATSIC necessarily focused more on program delivery. 
Consequently, ATSIC was hampered in its ability to contribute to long-term policy 
debate or innovative policy development. 
 
ATSIC’s focus on program delivery meant it could not contribute adequately to 
government policy formulation. Although ATSIC had a monitoring function, the 
organisation had no coercive power to hold governments accountable or guarantee that 
they would act on their advice. Consequently, various levels of government and within 
government acted without Indigenous involvement and were able to escape criticism 
for their own shortcomings in Indigenous affairs.  
 
                                                 
25 Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs, Canberra. p32.  
26 Wootten, H 2004, ‘Self Determination After ATSIC’, Dialogue, Vol. 23 No. 2. p20.  
27 Behrendt, L 2004, ‘Habeas Corpus’, Arena Magazine, Vol. 73, p26.  
28 Ivanitz, M 2000, ‘The Demise of ATSIC? Accountability and the Coalition Government’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 59, No. 1. pp8-9. 
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Lessons learnt from previously existing National Indigenous 
Representative Bodies 
 
The strengths and shortcomings of previous representative organisations created by 
government are complex and depend often on the political and social environment of 
the nation at any given time. However, there are some key and recurring factors as to 
why representative bodies have not been sustainable and have been hampered in their 
effective operation – often despite major investments by individuals, groups and 
Boards.  
 
Firstly, there has been a recurrent failure to adequately define the key relationships 
between governments, the representative body and other stakeholders in Indigenous 
affairs. In this regard there was a lack of clarity in the relationships between national 
representative bodies and State and Territory governmental structures. There were also 
inadequate links and processes between the national body and other regional structures 
and processes.  
 
Secondly, there has been a failure to clearly articulate and detail the functions of the 
representative body in accordance with the stated aspirations of Indigenous Australians. 
This has manifested as incoherent organisational structures that were unable to meet the 
multiple objectives of a representative body. There was a lack of clarity both internally 
within bodies and externally on the roles and functions of the body, and hence there 
arose competing and unmet expectations of representative bodies. This caused 
problems particularly where the representative body was not provided the authority and 
resources to fully undertake functions such as program delivery, but was nonetheless 
expected to fulfil these functions. There were also tensions that arose from having a 
single body being responsible for advocacy, policy development, program delivery and 
evaluation – which created conflicting responsibilities. The lack of clarity was 
accompanied by inadequate resourcing that limited the capacity of a representative 
body to fulfil its multiple objectives.  
 
Thirdly, past representative bodies have also been plagued by tensions arising from the 
need to represent a diversity of Indigenous interests, including interests of both urban 
and rural/ remote communities as well as interests of specific members of the 
community including, Indigenous women and youth. 
 
Finally, each organisation has to varying degrees been constrained by government and 
the bureaucracy in pursuing their own priorities as galvanised from the wishes of its 
Indigenous constituents. Underlying this has been a lack of government support for a 
strong independent agenda setting policy organisation, as opposed to a mere advisory 
body. Therefore, each organisation has been unable to act with sufficient independence 
from government, a core and repeatedly asserted desire of Indigenous peoples 
throughout Australia.  
 
These lessons learned from previous mechanisms for national Indigenous 
representation can help identify what issues need to be discussed when considering the 
scope of a new National Indigenous Representative Body, particularly in relation to the 
roles and functions of the body, its level of independence and its relationships with 
government at the national, State/ Territory and regional levels.  
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To assist in clarifying these issues, this paper reproduces at Text Box 2 the proposed 
principles and vision for a representative body as articulated by the 2003 Hannaford 
Review of ATSIC. Due to the abolition of ATSIC there was not an opportunity at the 
time to consider the usefulness of these principles assisting to define the key features of 
a new National Indigenous Representative Body.   
 
 
 25
Section 2: Current mechanisms for representing Indigenous 
peoples at the national, State/ Territory and regional levels  
 
Despite the absence of a National Indigenous Representative Body, there exists a range 
of organisations that advocate for the interests of Indigenous peoples. This includes 
through:  
 
• an extensive array of national peak bodies that represent the different sectoral 
interests of Indigenous service delivery organisations;  
• land councils, native title representative bodies and prescribed bodies corporate 
established through the native title and land rights and native title systems;  
• regional mechanisms for representing Indigenous people that exist in some parts 
of the country; and 
• mechanisms established by State or Territory governments to represent 
Indigenous peoples in policy making processes. 
 
Some of these organisations or mechanisms are representative of different communities 
or sectors of Indigenous peoples, whereas others base their advocacy on their service 
delivery role. 
 
This section of the paper identifies the key features of a range of different organisations 
and mechanisms that currently exist across Australia. While none of these organisations 
or mechanisms is capable of addressing the sheer breadth of issues required from a 
National Indigenous Representative Body, they do provide a substantial base on which 
to build.  
 
Each of these organisations or mechanisms, therefore, has a role to play either in 
contributing to the operations of, or through their relationship with, a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body.  
 
This section of the paper concludes by considering what issues are raised for the 
operation of a new National Indigenous Representative Body in light of these existing 
mechanisms, as well as in relation to the post-ATSIC arrangements for delivery of 
services to Indigenous peoples at the federal level, which have substantially changed 
the operating landscape for Indigenous Affairs. 
 
Any National Indigenous Representative Body will need to be alert to how it can 
effectively work with the regional and State/ Territory representative bodies, and the 
current administration arrangements in place for Indigenous affairs. 
 
National Indigenous Peak Bodies 
 
There exists an extensive array of national Indigenous peak bodies. A critical issue in 
the development of a new National Indigenous Representative Body will be deciding 
how these peak bodies will interact and inform the work and decision making of the 
new National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
Generally speaking, existing Indigenous peak bodies represent the different sectoral 
interests of Indigenous service delivery organisations. In other words, they deal with a 
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particular professional area or service delivery role. This differentiates the role of these 
peak bodies from those of a National Indigenous Representative Body. The National 
Body would need to consider all different perspectives in developing a clear vision of 
how to advance the overall wellbeing and priorities for indigenous peoples at a national 
level. 
 
Many of these peak bodies are also elected, some with direct representation from the 
community level. Peak Indigenous bodies offer significant expertise and experience 
that should be drawn on by the new National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
Text Box 3 below provides an overview of a number of existing national Indigenous 
peak bodies and how they are constituted.29 
 
Text Box 3 – Overview of existing National Indigenous Peak Bodies 
 
Organisation Function & Structure 
(purpose and elections/composition) 
Aboriginal 
Tourism Australia 
(ATA) 
Primary Objectives 
• Provide leadership and a focus for the development of Aboriginal 
tourism, consistent with Aboriginal economic, cultural and 
environmental values.  
• Promote cultural integrity and authenticity across the tourism industry 
and provides education on Indigenous protocols to the broader tourism 
industry. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• ATA is an industry organisation formed by Indigenous tourism operators 
with a national membership. It is a Company Limited by Guarantee 
registered under the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC). It is a not for profit and a non government organisation. 
 
Australian 
Indigenous 
Doctor’s 
Association 
(AIDA) 
Primary Objectives 
• Dedicated to the pursuit of leadership, partnership & scholarship in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health, education and workforce. 
• Advocate for improvements in Indigenous health in Australia and 
equitable health and life outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people 
• Encourage Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to work in 
medicine by supporting Indigenous students and doctors. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• A representative organisation for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
practitioners  
• A not-for-profit, non-government organisation  
 
                                                 
29 Please note: this list does not include state and territory level bodies, such as state-based education 
communities. 
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Organisation Function & Structure 
(purpose and elections/composition) 
 
 
Congress of 
Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander Nurses 
 
(CATSIN) 
 
Primary Objectives 
• Increase the recruitment and retention of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples into nursing.  
• Setting the agenda for, and advising on, a range of health related issues. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• CATSIN is a Professional Nursing Organisation that formally represents 
Indigenous nurses. It is an independent organisation with links to other 
professional bodies, and provides advice to these organisations. 
 
Federation for 
Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander Languages  
(FATSIL) 
Primary Objectives 
• Promote the maintenance, retrieval and revival of Indigenous languages, 
through the support of community based language programs. 
• Have Indigenous languages recognised as core elements in the 
development of all policy and legislation relevant to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people in Australia. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• FATSIL is the national peak body for community based language 
organisations 
• It acts in an advisory role on issues relating to Indigenous languages to 
government and relevant non-government agencies, and provides a 
communication network to support information sharing between all 
target groups involved with Indigenous languages in Australia. 
 
 
Indigenous APS 
Employees 
Network (IAPSEN) 
 
 
 
Primary Objective 
• Support Indigenous employees to share information and experiences and 
promote cultural awareness and respect in the wider APS.  
• Help Indigenous Australians improve their employment opportunities 
within the Australian Public Service. 
Structural Organisation 
• IAPSEN membership is open to any Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander employee of a Commonwealth Government Agency.  
• IAPSEN has networks in Townsville, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, 
Adelaide, Perth and the ACT.  
• The Chairs’ Forum brings together the Chairs of all the regional 
IAPSENs to exchange information, discuss regional issues and provide 
regional perspectives on Indigenous Employment in the APS. The 
IAPSEN Chairs usually meet bi-yearly.  
 
Indigenous 
Dentist’s 
Association of 
Australia 
(IDAA) 
 
 
Primary Objectives 
• Promote good oral health for Indigenous Australians and provides 
support for Indigenous dentists and dental students  
 
Structural Organisation 
• The Association receives no government funding and is entirely 
dependent upon donations 
National 
Aboriginal 
Community 
Controlled Health 
Organisation 
Primary Objectives 
• NACCHO represents local Aboriginal community controlled health 
organisations at a national level to ensure that Aboriginal people have 
greater access to effective health care across Australia.  
• NACCHO provide a coordinated holistic response from the community 
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(NACCHO) 
 
sector, advocating for culturally respectful and needs based approaches 
to improving health and well being outcomes through Aboriginal health 
organisations. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• A national peak Aboriginal health body representing Aboriginal 
Community Controlled Health Services throughout Australia. 
• Its membership is composed of member organisations of a State or 
Territory peak Aboriginal community controlled health body affiliated 
with NACCHO. 
• The Executive Committee is elected by the members at an AGM. 
 
National 
Aboriginal Justice 
Advisory 
Committee 
(NAJAC) 
 
Primary Objectives 
• To independently monitor the Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Governments’ responses to Recommendations of the Royal Commission 
Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. This would ensure a 
continued national focus on those Recommendations. 
• To address the over-representation of indigenous people in the criminal 
justice system through the development of justice plans by State and 
Territory Governments and the indigenous community. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• A representative body consisting of the Chairpersons of the AJACs from 
each State/Territory, and serviced by a secretariat to be supported by the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.  
 
Note: NAJAC was intended to consist of the Chair of each state and territory 
AJAC.  However, as a result of changes in the state and territory based AJACs in 
recent years, along with administrative changes in Indigenous affairs more 
broadly, the Australian Government is considering the establishment of a 
different type of expert advisory group in Indigenous law and justice.  The 
Government is proposing that it comprise a group of high profile experts in a 
variety of fields, able to comment across key issues relevant to Indigenous law 
and justice.  The Government is planning a consultation process to engage 
Indigenous Australians and organisations in the establishment of the peak 
advisory body in the near future. 
 
 
National 
Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander 
Ecumenical 
Commission 
(NATSIEC) 
Primary Objectives 
• Work with the churches for a fair deal for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians, and for the healing of our nation.  
• Provide a forum for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to 
speak and take action on issues of faith, mission and evangelism; of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander spirituality and theology; of social 
justice and land rights. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• NATSIEC is the peak ecumenical Indigenous body in Australia. 
• It is a part of the National Council of Churches and is comprised of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that represent a cross-
section of church-related Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups. 
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National Coalition 
of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander Social 
Workers 
Association 
(NCATSISWA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary Objective 
• Bring together Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander social workers as a 
professional body, to exchange information, ideas, and to network for 
the benefit of our communities. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• NCATSISWA is an independent and not for profit organisation that 
offers full memberships to indigenous people and associate non-
indigenous people as well as those from interested government and 
community organisations 
National 
Indigenous Higher 
Education Network 
(NIHEN) 
Primary Objectives 
• Achieve parity for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in 
higher education; provide a forum for the staff of the Indigenous higher 
education sector to pursue common goals and objectives for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• NIHEN is a cohort of professional bodies, established to provide a 
representative voice for Indigenous higher education knowledge 
networks. Membership of NIHEN is open to each of the Indigenous 
Higher Education Centres within Australian public Universities, the 
Indigenous Faculty and Schools of Aboriginal and Islander/Indigenous 
Australian Studies, Indigenous Research Centres of Excellence and the 
Bachelor Institute of Indigenous Education.   
National 
Indigenous 
Postgraduate 
Association 
Aboriginal 
Corporation 
(NIPAAC) 
Primary Objectives 
 
• Provide a network for Indigenous postgraduate students; Advocate for 
and to represent the interests of Indigenous postgraduate students at a 
national level; Promote research into Indigenous issues and the training 
of Indigenous researchers; Educate researchers on appropriate protocols 
when dealing with issues of cultural and social significance to 
Indigenous peoples. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• An association for Indigenous scholars and leaders since 1989. 
• Membership of NIPAAC is open to all indigenous-Australian 
postgraduate students, Elders and ex-postgraduate students. There is also 
non-voting membership for non-Indigenous Australian postgraduate 
students.  
• The Association is an incorporated Association under the Aboriginal 
Corporations Act 
National 
Indigenous Youth 
Movement of 
Australia 
(NIYMA) 
Primary objectives 
• Engage other young indigenous peoples with life.  
• Support young Indigenous peoples in life and career pursuits.  
• Celebrate all successes among the membership.  
• Promote self-awareness, healing and wellness among the membership 
and our communities.  
• Contribute to the revival of Indigenous cultural and spiritual values, 
beliefs and practices for today’s world.  
Structural Organisation 
• NIYMA is a not for profit organisation founded and run by Indigenous 
 30
Organisation Function & Structure 
(purpose and elections/composition) 
young people from the ages of 18-30 years of age. 
• NIYMA’s executive structure is comprised of 6 indigenous young 
people.  
 
National Native 
Title Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary Objectives 
• Committed to forging strong and collaborative partnerships with key 
stakeholders in native title as well as Indigenous affairs policy; 
• The main focus is on promoting the development of better solutions for 
resolving native title and securing adequate resources for Native Title 
Representative Bodies (NTRBs) and Native Title Service providers 
(NTSs); 
• Seeks to maximise the significant contribution that native title makes to 
achieving and improving the economic, social and cultural participation 
of Indigenous people. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• Comprised of Native Title Representative Bodies and Native Title 
Service providers across Australia; 
• Voluntary membership, incorporated as an autonomous public company; 
• Chief Executive Officers of NTRBs and NTSs participate in the Council, 
and elect a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson. 
 
National Sorry Day 
Committee 
(NSDC) 
Primary Objective 
• Work in unity with its members, the Stolen Generations, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities, government, social justice and 
community organisations, so that the 54 recommendations of the 
Bringing Them Home Report are finally achieved. 
 
Structural organisation 
• The NSDC is made up of a variety of indigenous and non-indigenous 
members, including members of the Stolen Generation networks. 
• Each State and Territory has established affiliated Sorry Day 
Committees/Networks. The names of these affiliated bodies today reflect 
the broad spectrum of groups that the National Sorry Day Committee 
membership consists of (i.e. Journey of Healing, Bringing Them Home, 
Sorry Day, Stolen Generations or Link Up).   
• The NSDC has a mandate from the Stolen Generations, through its 
affiliated Regional/ State/Territory bodies. 
• NSDC is presided over by an executive committee, comprised of 
indigenous and on-indigenous people. 
 
 
Ngalaya 
Aboriginal 
Corporation 
Primary objective 
• Comprised of Indigenous lawyers and law students nationally  
• Seeks to cooperate and collaborate to achieve an equality of justice 
for all Australians.  
• provide assistance to Indigenous law students and Indigenous law 
graduates  
• ensure Indigenous law students attain the same graduation and work 
place participation rates as those attained by other students.  
 
Structure 
• An Indigenous Corporation under the  Aboriginal Councils and 
Associations Act 1976. 
Positive 
Aboriginal Torres 
Strait Islander 
Network 
(PATSIN) 
Primary Objective 
• Work within Indigenous communities and with government and service 
providers to represent the interests of Indigenous Australians 
 
Structural organisation 
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 • A national membership-based network of Indigenous people living with 
HIV/AIDS.   
• The network is auspiced by National Association of people Living with 
HIV/AIDS 
Secretariat of 
National 
Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander Child Care 
(SNAICC) 
Primary Objective 
• Provide a strong voice for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
and families through a national body which represents Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander children’s services and promotes the rights, needs 
and aspirations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and 
families. 
 
Structural Organisation 
• A national non-government peak body in Australia representing the 
interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and families. 
• SNAICC operates from a membership base of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander community-based child care agencies, Aboriginal 
Children’s Services, family support services, foster care agencies, link 
up and family reunification services, family group homes, community 
groups and voluntary associations, long day care child care services, pre 
schools, early childhood education services and services for young 
people at risk. 
• SNAICC is governed by a National Executive made up of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander community-controlled children’s and families’ 
services. The National Executive is elected directly through postal ballot 
by SNAICC’s full members, who are Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander community-controlled children’s and families’ services, for a 
two year term. 
 
Stolen Generations 
Alliance 
 
 
 
Primary Objective 
• Work for healing, truth and justice 
 
Structural Organisation 
• Its members are comprised of indigenous and non-Indigenous people 
who have been active in the Journey of Healing, since the release of the 
Bringing  Them Home Report. 
• It has an executive comprised of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
members from all States and territories of Australia.  
 
 
Land Councils and Native Title Representative Bodies 
 
Nationwide, there are 17 Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs) and Native Title 
Services (NTSs), established under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). NTSs do not have a 
representative role. Many NTRBs emerged out of  local ‘land councils’, which were 
established under State and Territory land rights legislation which predated the native 
title system. Many of these land councils have a long history of representing Indigenous 
interests at a regional or State/Territory-wide level.  
 
The first land councils were established in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1976 (Cth) with a range of responsibilities to run land claims and 
manage existing land trusts by taking instruction from traditional owners on 
development issues. Since the introduction of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), these 
land councils effectively operate under two statutes and as a result have two sets of 
operational responsibilities.  
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New South Wales also has a land rights system, which is established under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). The NSW Aboriginal Land Council network 
operates as a two –tiered structure, comprising the peak statutory authority – the New 
South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) – and 121 Local Aboriginal Land 
Councils (LALCs).  The objectives of both NSWALC and the LALCs is generally to 
“improve, protect and foster the best interests of Aboriginal persons” within their 
respective jurisdictions. 
Both the NSWALC and LALCs are governed by elected Boards. The 9 Councillors that 
make up the NSWALC Board are elected to represent each of the regions that the 121 
LALCs are grouped into across the state. 
 
Although native title advocacy, agreements, claims and determinations are a central 
focus of NTRBs, NTSs and land councils under State and Territory land rights 
legislation, these bodies increasingly undertake roles in related areas of land 
management, community development and employment and training programs. Land 
management units have developed into significant resource centres receiving support 
from a range of government and non-government agencies to run programs from ranger 
groups to Indigenous ecological knowledge maintenance.  
 
The range of support services and programs, their structure and election procedures and 
the increased regionalisation of some land councils or NTRBs have contributed to 
imbuing these institutions with some degree of representativeness for Indigenous 
communities in certain parts of Australia.  
 
However, their legitimacy, authority, resources and effectiveness is not uniform. They 
are usually governed by a membership that has achieved land rights grants, or has 
achieved or asserts native title. They are not usually representative of those Indigenous 
groups that cannot demonstrate traditional ownership of areas covered by the land 
council or NTRB, nor do they always have close ties to existing Indigenous community 
service organisations. They are, nevertheless, important bodies in the wider landscape 
of Indigenous representation, particularly at the local and regional level.  
 
There are a further range of organisations that are beginning to operate through the 
native title system. These are Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBC). The prime object of 
prescribed bodies corporate is to hold the native title rights and interests granted by a 
determination of native title on trust or as an agent for native title holders. Once the 
determination is made a PBC is then registered on the National Native Title Register as 
a Registered Native Title Body Corporate (RNTBC). The primary roles of PBCs are to: 
 
• Protect and manage determined native title, in accordance with the native title 
holders’ wishes; and 
• Provide a legal entity through which native title holders can conduct business 
with government, and others, interested in accessing or regulating native title 
lands and waters. 
 
As at 30 June 2008, there were 57 RNTBCs, and 12 determinations of native title 
currently awaiting determination to become Registered Native Title Body Corporates. 
While funding support is limited for such bodies, and they are differently constituted, 
they are emerging as a new organisational structure that has representative 
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responsibilities in relation to traditional owners who have had their native title 
recognised. 
  
There are a further 12 determinations of native title currently awaiting determination of 
a Prescribed Body Corporate, to become the Registered Native Title Body Corporate. 
 
Regional Authorities – Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) 
 
The Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) began as an ATSIC Regional Council in 
1990 and became an independent statutory authority by amendment to the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) in 1994.  
 
It consists of two parts: a Board of 20 Indigenous elected members resident in the 
region and an Administration staffed by Australian government public servants headed 
by a General Manager appointed by the Minister for Indigenous Affairs.  
 
The Board includes 18 representatives from the island communities of the Torres Strait 
plus two more elected under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth), 
that replaced the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth). 
Considered to be the political arm of the TSRA, the Board determines budget 
allocations and policy, sometimes within the parameters of portfolios.  
 
Unified regional Indigenous governance structures have existed in the Torres Strait for 
decades.30 The TSRA is currently the principal Commonwealth agency co-ordinating 
Indigenous affairs in the region. Its predecessor was the Torres Strait Regional Council 
(TSRC) that existed in the late 1980s, and which drew its membership predominantly 
from another regional representative Islander body, the Island Co-ordinating Council31 
(ICC). The councils have powerful responsibilities under the Community Services 
(Torres Strait) Act 1984 (Qld) which establishes 17 Island Councils and the Local 
Government Act 1993 (Qld) which establishes the Torres Shire Council, both of which 
come together in the Island Coordinating Council (ICC).  
 
As well as being responsible for formulating, administering and monitoring the 
effectiveness of programs to individuals, councils and community organisations in key 
development areas (such as economic, employment and training, housing and 
environmental, social and cultural, policy co-ordination), the TSRA is the regional 
representative body for native title and land and sea management. It advises the 
Minister for Indigenous Affairs on matters relating to Torres Strait Islander and 
Aboriginal Affairs in the Torres Strait.  
 
The TSRA therefore combines representative, policy-making and administrative 
elements within the one body.  
 
The current functions of the TSRA include: 
 
                                                 
30 Sanders, W 2002, ‘Good Governance for Indigenous Communities and Regions: More diverse than 
unified, as much process as structure.’ Indigenous Governance Conference 3-5 April, Canberra. p5.  
31 Sanders, W 1995, ‘Reshaping governance in Torres Strait: the Torres Strait Regional Authority and 
beyond’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30 No. 3.  
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• Recognising and maintaining the special and unique Ailan Kastom of Torres 
Strait Islanders living in the Torres Strait; 
• Formulating and developing programs for Torres Strait Islanders and Aboriginal 
people living in the Torres Strait, and monitoring the effectiveness of its own 
and other bodies’ programs for them in the region;  
• Developing policy proposals to meet their national, State/ Territory and regional 
needs and priorities;  
• Assisting, advising and cooperating with their communities, organisations and 
individuals at these levels; 
• Advising the Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs on matters related to Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal affairs in the 
area;  
• Taking necessary action to protect sacred or significant Torres Strait Islander or 
Aboriginal cultural material and information; and  
• Collecting and publishing statistical information as requested by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth) 
s142A).  
 
Elections are held every four years. While voting is open to both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous residents, there are fewer of the latter in most island communities. All 
prospective candidates must, inter alia, reside for at least two years prior to an election 
within the ward they wish to represent and be Indigenous peoples. It should be noted 
that Torres Strait Islanders living in the Torres Strait are outnumbered by those resident 
on mainland Australia, who nonetheless share a “common sense of history and 
identity”.32  
 
Chairs of Community Councils contribute 17 Board members. One elected ICC 
member represents five constituencies on Thursday Island on the Board (Tamwoy, 
Rosehill, Aplin, Waiben and Quarantine [TRAWQ]) and the remaining two members 
represent Port Kennedy (Thursday Island), as well as Horn and Prince of Wales Islands.  
 
The Queensland government is currently amalgamating the Islander Councils into a 
single local government structure with the existing jurisdictions becoming the 
responsibility of Community Boards.33  
 
Regional Indigenous representative arrangements post-ATSIC (2005 - 
current)  
 
Following the abolition of ATSIC, the then Commonwealth government committed to 
the establishment of regional arrangements for the representation of Indigenous 
peoples. This was to be based on the negotiation of Regional Partnership Agreements 
(RPAs) and Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) with Indigenous communities, 
families or clans. The government had also committed to supporting the development 
of regional Indigenous representative structures in the place of ATSIC Regional 
Councils.  
                                                 
32 Arthur, W and Sanders, W 2001, ‘Autonomy rights in Torres Strait: From whom, for whom, for or 
over what?, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 215. p11.  
33 MacDonald, E 2007, ‘The Torres Strait Regional Authority: Is it the Answer to Regional Governance 
for Indigenous Peoples?, Australian Indigenous Law Reporter, Vol. 11 No. 3. pp43-54.  
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In 2005, consultations were undertaken nationally with Indigenous peoples on the type 
of representative structures that should be supported in each region. The outcomes of 
these consultations are discussed in the Social Justice Report 2005.34 It reveals a mix of 
different models that were proposed by Indigenous communities.  
 
Since 2005 however, only two such regional representative structures have been 
supported through the signing of RPAs or SRAs. These are:  
 
• the Ngaanyatjarra Council in Western Australia; and 
• the Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly in Northern New South Wales. 
 
The Social Justice Commissioner has identified the absence of regional representative 
arrangements (with the exception of these two arrangements) as the most significant 
problem with the operation of the post-ATSIC arrangements for Indigenous affairs. In 
the Social Justice Report 2006 he stated: 
 
Policy is being developed in a vacuum at the national level, with no connection to 
Indigenous experiences at the local and regional level … what this … demonstrate(s) is 
the lack of coherence between the different levels of service delivery and policy…  
 
In practice the new arrangements are a top down imposition – with policy set centrally 
and unilaterally by government, confirmed in bilateral processes with State and 
Territory governments (again without Indigenous input) and then applied to Indigenous 
peoples. The absence of regional mechanisms for engagement with Indigenous peoples 
is a critical problem…” 35  
 
a) Ngaanyatjarra Regional Partnership Agreement 
 
The Ngaanyatjarra Regional Partnership Agreement (RPA) in Western Australia was 
signed on 12 August 2005.36 The agreement relates to 12 discrete communities of the 
Ngaanyatjarra lands. It sets out strategic approaches and projects for joint action by 
government and the Ngaanyatjarra Council, a community organisation, in partnership 
with Ngaanyatjarra people and communities. The term of the RPA is until 30 June 
2008.  
 
The RPA is a statement of mutual intentions but does not create any legally binding 
obligations. The parties to the agreement are the Australian government, the Western 
Australian government, the Ngaanyatjarra Council and the Shire of Ngaanyatarraku.  
 
The objectives of the RPA include: 
 
• Establishing partnerships and sharing responsibility for achieving measurable 
and sustainable improvements for people living in Ngaanyatjarra lands;  
                                                 
34 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2005, Social Justice Report 2005, 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney.  
35 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2006, Social Justice Report 2006, 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney. p15.  
36 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2005, Social Justice Report 2005, 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney. pp118-120.  
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• Providing better coordinated and resourced programs and services to achieve 
improvements in priority areas;  
• Establishing mainstream programs and improving access to them;  
• Reducing inefficiencies; and 
• Developing a Strategic Investment Plan for the region. 
 
The Ngaanyatjarra principles that underlie the agreement include:  
 
• recognising existing capabilities and capacity; 
• maintaining control of Ngaanyatjarra affairs; 
• recognising the role of the Ngaanyatjarra Council and its capacity to drive 
planning and negotiation;  
• maintaining and strengthening traditional Ngaanyatjarra cultural and social 
values and connection to land; 
•  recognising need for change and innovation to improve living conditions; 
• wishing to live in communities on traditional country that have the best 
achievable standard of living and healthy and safe environment;  
• securing core infrastructure funding and developing all participating 
communities; and  
• supporting an education system that provides children with relevant and useful 
mainstream education while also reinforcing culture. 
 
The representation structures allowed for the Ngaanyatjarra Council to represent and 
consult those communities in the area that wished to be represented by the council, and 
facilitate the development of SRAs. The government agreed to support the Council in 
its representative role by actively engaging with the council and funding it to fulfil its 
role, and agreeing not to establish another representative arrangement for communities 
that have endorsed the council’s representative status. 
 
The intended outcomes of the RPA included improved regional capacity; establishment 
of structures to manage the RPA (i.e. Regional Partnership Committee and Agreement 
Coordinators Group to monitor and develop the partnership), reduced red tape, and 
development and implementation of the Ngaanyatjarra Strategic Investment Plan (20-
30 year vision). Progress for the RPA is to be monitored by all parties in accordance 
with agreed timeframes and indicators.  
 
b) Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly 
 
The Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly (MPRA) is the regional governance and 
engagement forum for 16 communities in the northwest region of New South Wales. It 
operates in the same geographic region as the previous ATSIC Murdi Paaki Regional 
Council. The Murdi Paaki region in NSW was also one of eight COAG whole of 
government trial sites since 2002.  
 
Community working parties (CWPs) exist in each of the 16 member communities. The 
CWPs operate under a Charter and Code of Conduct and have developed individual 
Community Action Plans.  
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On 22 August 2003, Murdi Paaki entered its first SRA with the Australian and NSW 
governments. Under the Agreement, the ATSIC Murdi Paaki Regional Council was 
acknowledged as the peak regional body and primary point of Indigenous community 
contact. The Murdi Paaki Community Working Parties (Working Parties) are 
acknowledged as the peak community bodies and primary points of Indigenous 
community contact in each community across the region.  
 
The Agreement incorporates the regional priorities identified by the community and 
establishes the responsibilities of all parties. Within Regional Priorities, specific 
priorities and agreed outcomes for each community in the region were agreed to be 
detailed in separate Shared Responsibility Agreements between the Community 
Working Parties and the governments.  
 
A subsequent agreement has been reached recognising the Murdi Paaki Regional 
Assembly as the principal regional Indigenous governance body (replacing the ATSIC 
Murdi Paaki Regional Council).  
 
The MPRA has currently entered into six regional agreements and 12 SRAs with the 
government.  
 
The Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly finalised a Regional Plan in 2006. This plan has 
used as its foundation the 16 Community Action Plans, and previous planning 
documents developed by the Murdi Paaki Regional Council.  
 
The Plan identifies 10 key areas where the Regional Assembly can enable initiatives, 
through its influence and representation of the Murdi Paaki region. They are: 
community governance, economic development, employment and enterprise 
development, housing and infrastructure, young people, health, law and justice, 
families, education and culture and well-being.  
 
The Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly has stated that its’ Chair and members will use 
the Plan to:  
 
 Convey community priorities as gathered and developed from the sixteen 
CWP’s Community Action Plans at the regional level. This plan will be used 
to coordinate partnership and funding initiatives from government agencies 
and non-government service providers that will benefit all communities. The 
Regional Plan will also be used by the Regional Assembly to influence the 
development of policies and programs that affect Indigenous peoples within 
the region.37  
 
c)  Post-ATSIC regional representation for Torres Strait Islanders on the 
mainland 
In the 2006 census count there were 29,515 Torres Strait Islanders and 17,813 persons 
of both Torres Strait islander and Aboriginal origin in Australia - a total of 47,328 
                                                 
37 Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly 2007, Regional Plan 2007, GHD Pty. Ltd., Brisbane. p8.  
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people. Of this only 15% were living in the Torres Strait.  Of the remaining proportion 
of Torres Strait Islanders who live on the mainland, 61% lived in Queensland.38 
The needs and interests of Torres Strait Islanders living on the mainland are distinct 
from those living in the Torres Strait. The Torres Strait Regional Authority represents 
the interests of those living in the Torres Strait Islander region (see the discussion of 
this regional authority above - ‘Regional Authorities - Torres Strait Regional Authority 
(TSRA)’). Under ATSIC the interests of Torres Strait Islanders living on the mainland 
were represented through the Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board (TSIAB). The 
TSIAB was responsible for advising the Government on issues specific to Torres Strait 
Islanders on the mainland.  
 
With the abolishment of ATSIC, the TSIAB was also abolished and the needs of 
mainland Torres Strait Islanders were expected to be met through the new federal 
service delivery arrangements.  This included mainland Torres Strait Islanders interests 
being addressed by the local Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs) through Shared 
Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) and other arrangements. The Office of Indigenous 
Policy Coordination (OIPC) absorbed the Office of Torres Strait Islander Affairs, but 
continued to fund the National Secretariat of Torres Strait Islander Organisations 
Limited (NSTSIOL), to represent mainland Torres Strait Islanders in dealings with 
government departments, statutory corporations and the Aboriginal community.   
The removal of distinct representative bodies for mainland Torres Strait Islanders has 
meant that the under-representation of their interests in the delivery of government 
programs and, policies and services has continued if not increased.  Since 2004 the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner has sought to assess 
the adequacy of arrangements for the participation and representation of mainland 
Torres Strait Islanders.   In the Social Justice Report 2005, the Commissioner noted that 
with the abolition of TSIAB the participation of mainland Torres Strait Islanders was 
no longer assured.39  The Commissioner reported that very few Torres Strait Island 
Corporations on the mainland had been involved in the new arrangements for service 
delivery, and that the bodies responsible for implementing them, namely the ICCs, had 
very limited understanding of the specific contexts and needs of mainland Torres Strait 
Islanders.40  
There is no indication that there have been any improvements to this situation more 
recently. There have been no SRAs or RPAs signed with mainland Torre Strait Islander 
Communities.  
 
This situation of the mainland Torres Strait Islanders highlights the need for 
diversity in Indigenous representative bodies. It demonstrates that, particularly 
                                                 
38 Australian Bureau of Statistics Website (available at: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/ProductsbyCatalogue/14E7A4A075D53A6CCA2569450007E46COpenDocument; 
and ABS Table: 4705.0 4705.0 Table 43, Census Counts, Indigenous Status-1991-2006 – available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4705.02006?OpenDocument) 
 
39 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 
2005, p127. 
40 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2005, HREOC, Sydney, 
2005, p129. 
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at the regional level, all Indigenous groups cannot be homogenised into a 
single representative body, but require distinct representative arrangements.  
 
State and Territory Government representative arrangements, post-
ATSIC (2005 – current)  
 
Following the abolition of ATSIC, several States and Territories sought to develop 
replacement regional models for Indigenous representation.41 The Western Australia 
and New South Wales governments both convened forums and embarked upon 
consultations with Indigenous peoples to identify options for representative bodies.42  
 
One example of an advanced regional model was the Kulari model of regional 
governance in the Kimberley region of WA. Involving three tiers of governance with an 
over-arching council, it involved the retention of the then-existing ATSIC Regional 
Councils. It included a level of community working parties to enable access, 
participation and capacity building at the grass roots level.43  
 
The NSW Government discussed options at the Our Future Our Voice Summit in 2004, 
on three models including a regional assembly model (based on the Murdi Paaki 
model), the Coalition of peak Aboriginal Bodies (building on existing organisations) 
and the Combined ATSIC/ Land Council model (where local land councils input to 
regional councils, which in turn input to State land councils).44  
 
The Northern Territory government considered a model of Regional Authorities under 
the ‘Overarching Agreement on Indigenous Affairs between the Commonwealth of 
Australia and the Northern Territory of Australia 2005-2010’, and the ‘Building 
Stronger Regions – Stronger Futures Strategy.’ This latter strategy was the first step in 
the current process of amalgamating existing community councils that is underway in 
the Northern Territory.45  
 
In 2005 Victoria established the Premier’s Aboriginal Advisory Council (PAAC), 
chaired by the Premier. Secretariat support for the PAAC is provided by Aboriginal 
Affairs Victoria. PAAC provides advice to the Government on strategic issues in 
Indigenous policy, and acts as a forum for Indigenous community perspectives to 
inform government direction and processes.  
 
PAAC supplements existing Indigenous consultative arrangements in other portfolios 
and broad-based community consultations on specific initiatives.46  
 
                                                 
41 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2005, Social Justice Report 2005, 
HREOC, Sydney. pp115-117.  
42 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2004, Social Justice Report 2004, 
HREOC, Sydney. p112.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2005, Social Justice Report 2005, 
HREOC, Sydney. p114.  
45 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2004, Social Justice Report 2004, 
HREOC Sydney, p115.  
46 Victoria Department of Premier and Cabinet website: Advisory Bodies (available at: 
http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/CA256D8000265E1A/page/Guidelines+and+Procedures-
Advisory+Bodies!OpenDocument&1=80-Guidelines+and+Procedures~&2=75-Advisory+Bodies~&3=~) 
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The South Australian government established an interim Aboriginal Advisory Council 
with the role to oversee the application of the ‘Doing it Right’ policy framework and 
report to the Premier. Members include the Minister, representatives from ATSIC State 
Council, leaders of land councils, other Aboriginal peak bodies and community 
leaders.47  
 
In 2008, following the recommendations of this Advisory Council, the government 
appointed a Commissioner for Aboriginal Engagement, Mr Klynton Wanganeen, and 
established a permanent South Australian Aboriginal Advisory Council.  
 
The Commissioner is a point of contact for Aboriginal people to express their concerns, 
which the Commissioner will identify to the government and work towards having 
resolved.  
 
The new permanent Advisory Council will provide the government with advice on 
existing programs and policies and help shape future policies and services relating to 
Aboriginal people, ensuring that Aboriginal views are part of government policy-
making. The Council will have ten members each appointed by the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation for a term of two years.48  
 
The Australian Capital Territory government announced the establishment of an elected 
representative body for Indigenous peoples in May 2008. Elections have now been held 
and seven members appointed for a three year term to advise the ACT government on 
Indigenous issues. Details of this new representative body are provided in Text Box 4 
below. 
 
Text Box 4 – ACT Government’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Elected 
Body (ATSIEB) - 200849  
 
As this paper was being finalised, elections had been concluded in the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) for members of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Elected Body (ATSIEB). The Territory’s Chief Minister has indicated his intention 
that this body fill the void for a democratically-elected Indigenous voice following the 
abolition of ATSIC 
 
The ATSIEB is established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Elected 
Body Act 2008 (ACT), which came into force on 15 May 2008 after a series of 
consultations about its structure with the local Indigenous community. These 
consultations were conducted in 2006 via the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Community Consultative Council.  
 
Eligibility requirements for both nominated members and voters are identical: only 
Indigenous peoples at least 18 years old and on, or entitled to be on, the ACT electoral 
                                                 
47 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commissioner 2005, Social Justice Report 2005, HREOC, 
Sydney, p116.  
48 Government of South Australia 2008, viewed 3rd June 2008 at 
http://www.ministers.sa.gov.au/news.php?id=2692. 
49 DCHS ACT, “Representative Arrangments for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People in the ACT” brochure, 
2008 (available at: http://www.dhcs.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/16305/brochure_7_December_2007.pdf); 
John Stanhope ,  Media Release,“Nominations Open Monday for Elected Body”, 26 May 2008 (available at: 
http://www.chiefminister.act.gov.au/media.asp?section=24&media=3808&id=3808&title=). 
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roll qualify. Nominees have the additional stipulation of not being under a sentence of 
imprisonment for one year or longer for an indictable offence. Importantly, voting is 
not compulsory.  
 
Voting was conducted between 16 and 21 June 2008 (inclusive), with the seven 
elected members of the Body announced in early July.   
 
Seven members are to be elected every three years, among them a Chair and Deputy 
Chair, and meetings will occur at least six times per year. Voting at meetings will be 
by majority consensus or, if equal, by a deciding vote from the presiding member (see 
ss22-25). A Chief Executive of a government agency may be invited to attend (s26). 
The first meeting is scheduled for July.  
 
The functions of the Elected Body are set out in section 8 of the Act as follows: 
 
1. To receive, and pass on to the Minister, the views of Aboriginal people and 
Torres Strait Islanders living in the ACT on issues of concern to them; 
2. To represent Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders living in the ACT 
and to act as an advocate for their interests; 
3. To foster community discussion about issues of concern to Aboriginal people 
and Torres Strait Islanders living in the ACT;  
4. To conduct regular forums for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders 
living in the ACT and report the outcomes of those forums to the Minister; 
5.  To conduct research and community consultation to assist ATSIEB in the 
exercise of its functions; 
6. To propose programs and design services for Aboriginal people and Torres 
Strait Islanders living in the ACT for consideration by the government and its 
agencies; 
7. To monitor and report on the effectiveness of programs conducted by 
government agencies for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders living 
in the ACT; 
8. To monitor and report on the accessibility by Aboriginal people and Torres 
Strait Islanders living in the ACT to programs and services conducted by 
government agencies for the general public; 
9. When asked by the Minister, to give the Minister information or advice about 
any matter stated by the Minister; 
10. When asked by a government agency or another person, and in consultation 
with the United Ngunnawal Elders Council, to recommend any reasonable 
action it considers necessary to protect Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
cultural material or information considered sacred or significant by Aboriginal 
people and Torres Strait Islanders living in the ACT; 
11. Any other function given to ATSIEB by the Minister; and 
12. Any other function given to ATSIEB under this Act or another territory law. 
 
The body reports to the ACT Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs and is mandated in s9 of the Act to consult with, and consider, the views of 
the United Ngunnawal Elders Council (UNEC) in the exercise of all its functions. It is 
also obliged by s11 to conduct a community forum at least twice per financial year on 
areas of interest to Indigenous residents, at which any Indigenous resident may 
participate. There is provision for timely, accessible and informed notice and 
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feedback prior to and during a forum (ss12-13).  
 
The ‘new arrangements’ for the administration of Indigenous affairs 
at the federal level post-ATSIC (2005- current) 
 
In the wake of the abolition of ATSIC and ATSIS in 2005, the federal government 
introduced a series of reforms to the administration of Indigenous Affairs. These 
reforms are documented and analysed at length in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Justice Commissioner’s Social Justice Report for 2004, 2005 and 2006.  
 
These arrangements, which continue today, have substantially changed the operating 
landscape in which any National Indigenous Representative Body will operate.  
 
Under these new arrangements, policy and service delivery at the federal level is the 
responsibility of mainstream government departments. All Indigenous specific 
programs have been retained and sit alongside mainstream programs within these 
departments. 
 
There have also been a range of mechanisms established within government aimed at 
delivering a more coordinated, holistic or ‘whole of government’ response to 
Indigenous affairs. These include the establishment of: 
 
• A Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs that is chaired by the Minister 
for Indigenous Affairs, and involves Ministers with relevant portfolios across 
the government. Its purpose is to provide high level direction to the Australian 
government on Indigenous affairs as well as reporting to Cabinet on policy and 
expenditure. 
 
• A Secretaries Group on Indigenous Affairs that is composed of the heads of 
Australian government departments, chaired by the Secretary of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, and which provides support to the Ministerial Taskforce and 
reports annually on performance across the whole of the federal government on 
Indigenous affairs. 
 
• A National Indigenous Council (NIC) that was an appointed council of 
Indigenous experts to advise the Ministerial Taskforce on policy program and 
service delivery issues. The NIC’s status as a hand-picked body with no ability 
to independently consult with Indigenous people meant that it enjoyed very little 
credibility with Indigenous people. Its mandate expired in December 2007, 
when the new government decided not to continue with it. 
 
• An Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC) that coordinates 
government policy development and service delivery in Indigenous affairs, 
across the whole of government. 
 
• A network of regional Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICC) that co-locate 
staff across federal government departments in regional offices to coordinate 
whole of government responses to Indigenous issues on a regional level. The 
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location of these offices is in the same regions that had been adopted by the 
ATSIC Regional Councils. 
 
• A ‘Single Budget Submission for Indigenous Affairs’ whereby all items relating 
to Indigenous affairs are considered by the Ministerial Taskforce in a single 
budget document to promote integrated whole of government activities and 
allocation of funding.50  
 
Policy development is guided by a national framework of principles for government 
service delivery to Indigenous peoples agreed by the Councils of Australian 
Governments (COAG). Since 2005, there have been a series of commitments made by 
COAG that guide Indigenous affairs. Most notably, in 2007 COAG adopted a series of 
targets to close the gap in Indigenous disadvantage and agreed to a reform agenda 
through COAG.  
 
The COAG commitments and new arrangements at the federal level were also reflected 
in bilateral agreements between the federal Government and State and Territory 
governments. 
 
It is notable that in the absence of a National Indigenous Representative Body, the 
commitments through COAG and bilateral agreements that set the basis for the 
relationship between governments and policy directions for Indigenous affairs, have 
been made without any Indigenous participation or consultation. Indigenous 
representative structures at all levels are needed to partner governments in planning and 
determining appropriate service delivery arrangements. 
 
Lessons learnt from existing mechanisms for representing Indigenous 
peoples at the national, State, Territory and regional levels 
 
The range of national, State/ Territory, and regional level outlined above demonstrate 
that a diversity of Indigenous representative bodies is currently in existence in 
Australia.  However, none of these bodies or the combination of them can adequately 
provide the comprehensive representation that would be met by a National Indigenous 
Representative Body.   
 
Each category of bodies illustrates strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to 
representation that can be usefully drawn upon in developing a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body. This includes understanding how the different models 
are structured, what functions they fulfil, how their membership is constituted, and the 
processes for electing the representative body.  
 
The national peak Indigenous bodies commonly represent different sectoral interests of 
Indigenous service delivery organisations. While some of them may have a role in 
representing the interests of their Indigenous membership, it is often restricted to the 
specific sector that they primarily work in. Within their relative areas of interest the 
peak bodies can be a valuable source of information and input. It will be important to 
consider how the new Representative Body can ensure these peak bodies will interact 
                                                 
50 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2005, Social Justice Report 2004, 
HREOC Sydney, pp79-80.  
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and inform the work and decision making of the new National Indigenous 
Representative Body. In terms of membership, it may be useful to consider if there 
should be a special category of membership for these bodies, particularly for those that 
are elected by an Indigenous membership. 
 
The Land Councils and Native Title Representative Bodies are limited in their scope for 
representation as they only generally represent Indigenous groups that can demonstrate 
traditional ownership of areas covered by the land council or NTRB. They are, 
nevertheless, important bodies in the wider landscape of Indigenous representation, 
particularly at the local and regional level, particularly as a source of information and 
input.  
 
The Torres Strait Regional Authority is a useful model to look to in terms of how to 
structure the membership and functions of a representative body. It also can be a guide 
on how to resolve the tensions of having multiple functions of representation, policy-
making and administrative elements within the one body.  
 
Importantly, the new National Indigenous Representative Body will have to consider 
how to interface with this regional body in terms of ensuring Torres Strait Islander 
participation at the national level. It will also be important to consider how to separately 
include the representation of mainland Torres Strait Islanders in the national body.  
 
The recent development of a representative group in the ACT and advisory committees, 
such as in South Australia and Victoria, are initiatives that have not existed previously, 
even during the era of ATSIC. There has been a lack of clarity in past national 
Indigenous representative bodies on their relationships with States and Territory bodies 
and mechanisms. It will be critical to ensure that consideration is given to how the new 
National Indigenous Representative Body will interface with these State/ Territory 
mechanisms. 
 
A National Indigenous Representative Body will also have to bear in mind the current 
administration mechanisms for Indigenous Affairs that were put in place post-ATSIC.  
These arrangements relate primarily to program delivery required to meet government 
commitments. A key feature of these arrangements is the devolution of service delivery 
to the regional level, through the ICCs and mechanisms such as the SRAs and RPAs.  
Another key feature of the new arrangements is the transfer of Indigenous specific 
programs to mainstream departments. A new National Indigenous Representative Body 
will have to consider structures for informing all mainstream departments on 
Indigenous Affairs.51 It will be important for the new National Indigenous 
Representative Body to ensure that clear and consistent mechanisms are in place with 
the relevant bodies (i.e. COAG Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs, Secretaries 
Group on Indigenous Affairs, the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination and 
regional Indigenous Coordination Centres). This will be important for ensuring 
consistency between program delivery by these bodies and the work of the new 
                                                 
51 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner has also noted that in the 
context of  mainstreaming Indigenous service delivery, consideration needs to be given to the recruitment 
and retention of Indigenous staff, cultural awareness training for agencies and appropriate recruitment 
processes for staff working in Indigenous service delivery areas. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner, 2004, Social Justice Report 2004 , HREOC, Sydney, p126 
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National Indigenous Representative Body, particularly in terms of linking national 
policy development with regional level program implementation. 
 
A new National Indigenous Representative Body will have to determine how to 
effectively engage and link with these regional and State/ Territory representative 
bodies, to ensure complementary and supplementary relationships are established.  
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Section 3: National Indigenous Representative Bodies in other 
countries – some comparisons 
 
This section of the Issues Paper provides examples of Indigenous Representative 
Bodies that have been established internationally. These include:  
 
• the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) in Canada; 
• the National Congress of the American Indian (NCAI) of the USA;  
• the Sami Parliament of Sweden; and  
• Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) of New Zealand.  
 
The perceived strengths and weaknesses of these different models are considered. The 
critical difference between the models is whether self-governance is aspired to and 
what ‘purchase’ or persuasiveness these structures have with government.   
 
The National Congress of American Indians: United States of America 
 
The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) was founded in 1944 to facilitate 
unity and cooperation among tribal governments for the protection of their treaty and 
sovereign rights. It strives to inform the public and Congress on the governmental 
rights of American Indians and Alaska Natives. It now comprises 250 member tribes 
from throughout the United States. NCAI monitors federal policy and has input into 
federal decisions that affect tribal government interests.52 
 
The NCAI provides a forum for policy development among tribal governments to: 
 
(1) Protect and advance tribal governance and treaty rights; 
(2) Promote economic development and health and welfare in Indian and 
Alaska Native communities; and  
(3) Educate the public toward a better understanding of Indian and Alaska 
Native tribes.53  
 
Membership is made up of tribes, organisations and individuals. It includes the Alaskan 
Native tribes. 
 
Tribal members must be an identifiable group who have substantial numbers of their 
members living on the same reservation or general locality. They must maintain a 
unified tribal organisation which does not fission. They must be recognised as a tribe by 
the US Department of Interior, Court of Claims, the Indian Commission or a State.54  
 
Any individual with Indian ancestry is eligible for membership. Such individuals must 
be a member of a recognised tribe. Non-Indians may be admitted as non-voting 
associate members on payment of an annual fee. Organisations may also be admitted as 
                                                 
52 National Congress of American Indians Constitution, By-Laws and Standing Rules of Order as 
amended February 28 2007, viewed 3 June 2008 at http://ncai.org/NCAI.org/Home.9.0.html.  
53 National Congress of American Indians Constitution, By-Laws and Standing Rules of Order adopted 
November 14, 1944, current as amended February 28, 2007.  
54 NCAI Constitution Art. II. Sec. B. la-b 2007.  
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members on the same terms. The Executive Director may confer membership to 
applicants, subject to review by the Executive Council.55  
 
The NCAI is currently addressing a range of issues that range from:  
 
• Service programs for Indian families, targeting Indian Youth and elders;  
• Promotion and support of Indian education; 
• Enhancing health care, including reducing substance abuse and HIV-AIDS; 
• Support of environmental protection and natural resources management;   
• Protection of Indian cultural resources and religious freedom Rights; 
• Promotion of the Rights of Indian economic opportunity; and 
• Protection of the Rights of Indian people to decent, safe and affordable housing. 
 
Nature and Extent of Mandate and Decision-Making Authority 
 
The supreme powers of the Congress reside with the members meeting in General 
Assembly. The General Assembly meeting of members may delegate its powers to the 
Executive and Officers of the NCAI.56  
 
There are two official meetings of the Congress each year – the Annual Convention and 
the Mid-Year Conference. 
 
The officers of the Congress are divided into two categories:  
 
a) the Administrative Board Officers (ABO) which consists of the President, 
First Vice-President, Recording Secretary and Treasurer, and 
 b) 12 Regional Vice-Presidents.  
 
The Administrative Board officers are elected by secret ballot on nomination from the 
floor at the Annual Convention. The Regional Vice-Presidents are elected by regions 
(according to procedures established by each region) meeting in caucus at the Annual 
Convention at a time appointed after the election of the ABO members. Only tribal 
government officials or delegates in good membership standing can qualify for 
nomination, election or office in the Congress.57  
 
Individual Indian members are entitled to one vote and tribal members are allocated 
between 100 to 180 votes according to size; e.g. tribes with up to 500 members get 100 
votes while tribes consisting of more than 7500 members get 180 votes.58 All officers 
are elected for two year terms and can only serve two consecutive terms.59 Elections 
take place each odd numbered year. 
 
The NCAI also has an Executive Council which comprises the Administrative Board 
Officers, the 12 Regional Vice-Presidents and one delegate from each member tribe. 
                                                 
55 NCAI By-Laws Art. VIII 2007.  
56 NCAI Constitution Art. II. Sec. D 2007.  
57 NCAI Constitution Art. II. Sec. F. 2007.  
58 NCAI By-Laws Art. III. Sec. B. ld. 2007.  
59 NCAI By-Laws Art. IV. Sec. H. 1. 2007. 
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This Council meets once in annual conference although the Constitution does provide 
for additional meetings in certain circumstances.60  
 
The powers of the Executive Council include administration of the organisation’s 
affairs under the Constitution, management of funds and bona fide contributions, to 
enable policies consistent with the Annual Convention.61  
 
The NCAI also has an Executive Committee which comprises the Administrative Board 
Officers and the 12 Regional Vice-Presidents. It has power to employ the Executive 
Director and has the full authority to act for the Executive Council between meetings of 
the Council. This Committee reports in writing to the Council. The Executive Director 
is the administrative head of the Congress and is subject to the direction and policy set 
out by the Executive Committee.62  
 
The President is authorised to appoint committees and sub-committees. Examples 
include:  
 
• The Human Resources Committees, which has various sub-committees 
including Education, Health, Indian Child and Family Welfare, and Elders;  
• The Litigation and Governance Committee which has sub-committees on Tribal 
Gaming and Taxation and Human Religious and Cultural concerns; 
• The Veterans Committee; and  
• The Rules and Credentials Committee.63  
 
The NCAI has 250 member tribes and thousands of individual members from 
throughout the United States. There are said to be over 550 recognised tribes in the 
USA and this may impact on the Congress’ ability to provide broad representation. 
 
The NCAI has developed a Policy Statement which provides direction on tribal 
sovereignty, treaty rights, federal trust responsibility, health, housing, education, 
environmental quality, and physical, spiritual, traditional, and cultural customs and 
practices.64 These stem from the NCAI’s key objectives: respect for tribal governance 
and the federal trust relationship; support for healthy Native communities and people, 
and preservation of human dignity and cultural integrity.  
 
The NCAI pursues these objectives as follows: 
 
• Respect for tribal governance and the federal trust relationship: Effective USA 
and tribal government dialogue and consultation (including Alaskan Native 
tribal governments and Native Hawaiian rights); the exercise of tribal self-
determination and governance; the acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty and 
receipt of adequate resources for Indian programs and land management.   
 
                                                 
60 NCAI Constitution Art. III 2007.  
61 NCAI Constitution Art. III. Sec. D. 2007.  
62 NCAI By-Laws Art. IV Sec. G. 2007.  
63 NCAI By-Laws Art. VII. Sec. A. 2007.  
64 National Congress of American Indians Constitution, By-Laws and Standing Rules of Order as 
amended February 28 2007, viewed 3 June 2008 at http://www.ncai.org.  
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• Support for healthy Native communities and people: The development of 
appropriate, sustainable and diversified economies on Indian Land; training 
opportunities on reserves; accessible housing, transportation infrastructure and 
information technology; support for a tribally-driven health care system; 
commitment to Indian education; tribal law enforcement and sentencing; child 
protection; and development of tribal resources.   
 
• Preservation of human dignity and cultural integrity: Ensuring the maintenance 
and transmission of practices and language; protecting Indian tangible and 
intangible cultural heritage; recognition of the wider rights of indigenous 
peoples; and the ending of racially discriminatory practices.   
 
Relationship with State governments 
 
When Indian lands were ceded to the United States the government’s ensuing legal 
commitment was codified in treaties, federal law, executive orders, judicial opinions, 
and international doctrine. Three general obligations were created by this:  
 
• protection of Indian trust lands;  
• protection of tribal self-governance; and  
• provision of basic social, medical, and educational services for tribal members.  
 
The NCAI and the states through the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
have reached agreement on a State-Tribal Relations Project to promote cooperation 
between the tribal and state governments. 
 
This Project acknowledges that States and Indian tribes have a broad range of common 
interests and shared responsibilities to use available public resources wisely and 
effectively. The Project aims to coordinate and realise the objectives of 50 state 
governments and 550 tribal governments with respect to education, health, economic 
development, law enforcement and cultural and environmental maintenance. It also 
aims to avoid state-tribal litigation due to jurisdictional disputes.65  
 
How the Organisation is Funded 
 
The NCAI is funded through annual membership dues. These dues are payable at the 
Annual Convention of each year for the following year until the next Annual 
Convention. 
 
An individual voting member pays $40.00 and can pay $1,000.00 for life membership. 
Tribal membership dues are calculated according to the annual income of the tribal 
government. Those with less than $500,000 annual income are at the bottom of the dues 
scale and pay a membership of $110.00 per annum. Those at the top of the scale are 
those with an income of $30 million or more and they pay $25,000 per year. An 
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individual associate member pays $40.00 whilst organisation Associates pay $500.00 
annually.66  
 
Members of the Executive Committee are not entitled to any salary, fees, remuneration 
gratuities or other form of compensation from the NCAI for serving on the 
committee.67  
 
The Assembly of First Nations – Canada  
 
The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) is the national organisation representing First 
Nations citizens in Canada. The AFN represents all citizens regardless of age, gender or 
place of residence. The Assembly of First Nations is a national aboriginal advocacy 
organisation. 
 
There are over 630 First Nation’s communities in Canada. The AFN is intended to 
present the views of the various First Nations through their leaders in areas such as: 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, Economic Development, Education, Languages and 
Literacy, Health, Housing, Social Development, Justice, Taxation, Land Claims, 
Environment, and a whole array of issues that are of common concern to Aboriginal 
Canadians which arise at any given time. 
 
The Chiefs meet annually to set national policy and direction through resolution. The 
National Chief is elected every three years by the Chiefs-in-Assembly.  
 
The Chiefs meet between the annual assemblies every three to four months in a forum 
called the ‘Confederacy of Nations’. The membership of the Confederacy consists of 
Chiefs and other Regional Leaders chosen according to a formula based on the 
population of each region. First Nations’ Chiefs in Canada are elected in accordance 
with Indian Act regulations or by traditional governance practices of the country’s First 
Nations.  
 
History of the Assembly of First Nations 
 
The origins of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) are rooted in the post-World War I 
activism of Indian veterans returning from the war. The League of Indian Nations of 
Canada fought against assimilation from the early 1920’s and into the 1930’s. The 
League laid the foundations for the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB). The 
Brotherhood consisted of the presidents of provincial and territorial organisations.  
 
After the Second World War, First Nations again attempted to form a national lobby 
group. The North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) was established in the late 
1940’s, but like its predecessor, the NAIB’s efforts were hindered by a lack of nation-
wide support and suppressive government actions, causing it to be disbanded by the 
early 1950’s.  
 
In 1961, the National Indian Council was formed to represent three of the four major 
groups of Aboriginal people in Canada. However, the National Indian Council found 
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the task of uniting all of the various First Nations people’s interests into one national 
lobby to be challenging.68 
 
In 1969 the federal government introduced a White Paper which called for the 
assimilation of all First Nation peoples into the mainstream of Canadian society. The 
National Indian Council joined forces with the federally appointed National Indian 
Advisory Council to defeat the White Paper. Their efforts were coordinated through an 
executive – the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB).  
 
In 1970 the Indian Association of Alberta produced a Red Paper replacing the White 
Paper. In the same year the first nationally elected President was chosen for the NIB.  
In the late 1970’s the Canadian government decided to patriate the Canadian 
constitution from Britain, which galvanised the NIB and first nations leaders into action 
to ensure Aboriginal rights were recognised and protected in any new constitution. 
Their efforts were realised in the Canadian Constitution Act 1982.  
 
Prior to that, in December 1980, an assembly of chiefs adopted the Declaration of First 
Nations which established the foundations for the formation of the Assembly of First 
Nations. From being an ‘organisation of representatives from regions’ the AFN became 
an Organisation of First Nations Government Leaders.69  
 
The NIB corporate structure provides secretariat and administrative functions to the 
AFN. The National Chief and 10 Regional Chiefs are elected, through the AFN 
process, then soon after go through a routine administrative process of being ‘elected’ 
in an NIB General Assembly. The NIB Board of Directors also hires an Executive 
Director, who also is the AFN Chief Executive Officer.  
 
In 2003 discussions began regarding the responsibilities and objectives of the AFN and 
in January 2004 the AFN Renewal Commission was established to conduct a review of 
the AFN.  
 
The AFN Renewal Commission delivered a report in September 2005 including 47 
recommendations relating to accountability, new structures, relationships and 
administrative improvements.70  
 
The overall structure of the AFN is based on the Charter of the Assembly of First 
Nations, which was adopted in July 1985. Regional Chiefs are elected/appointed within 
ten defined regions of Canada. The principal organs of the Assembly of First Nations 
are:  
 
• the First Nations-in-Assembly;  
• the Confederacy of Nations;  
• the Executive Committee;  
• the Secretariat (AFN/NIB); 
• the Council of Elders;  
• the Council of Women and 
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•  the National Youth Council.  
 
The Executive Committee is made up of the Regional Vice-Chiefs, the National Chief, 
and the Chairperson of the Council of Elders. Chiefs of their respective regions select 
the Vice-Chiefs.  
 
Effectiveness of Representation and in Promoting the Rights and Interests of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 
The AFN mandate is primarily to lobby government on behalf of First Nations in 
Canada. The AFN can use political and moral persuasion to influence government. 
Because the AFN is funded by the federal government, to some extent it is at the mercy 
of the government of the day. A hostile national government can make the ability to 
lobby difficult or limited. Much relies on the political experience and abilities of the 
National Chief.  
 
Sometimes, the AFN has been seen to be overtly political, and therefore less focused on 
policy matters that may have long term benefits for community members. This is partly 
a function of the structure of the AFN and partly a function of capacity and process.   
 
The effectiveness of the AFN almost entirely hinges on several factors: 
 
• The strategic skills of the National Chief and the leadership capabilities of that 
individual particularly in maintaining the focus on national issues by the 
Regional Chiefs; 
• The disposition of the federal government of the day; and 
• The capacity of the organisation to react to current major national issues. 
 
One of the biggest challenges faced by the AFN at the moment is in representing all of 
its members. In the past, the AFN has focused more on ‘on-reserve’ status members.  
However, at least 50% of all status Indians now resides in urban centres, especially in 
some of Canada’s larger cities.71  
 
The Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP) was established to represent so-called ‘non-
status’ Indians in Canada (that is, aboriginal people who do not have ‘status’ under the 
Indian Act).  By default, they represented Indians in urban Canada in meetings with the 
federal government. Today, CAP asserts that it represents both status and non-status 
Indians in urban areas. This creates the opportunity for hostile governments to ‘play 
off’ the different organisations. In this scenario AFN does not have a ‘monopoly’ on 
national representation. 
 
The dual accountability of Regional Chiefs to both their regional constituents and 
strategic national agenda policy items has been seen as a tension during meetings of 
both the Special and General Assemblies. The AFN Renewal Commission 
recommended that women’s organisations, treaty groups, Native friendship centres and 
other First Nation organisations be allowed to attend and participate in AFN 
                                                 
71 See for example: Annual General Assembly Resolution No. 22/2007 July 10, 11, & 12, Halifax, NS on the subject: 
First Nation Chiefs, the only legal and traditional representatives of all First Nations’ people. 
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Assemblies and be allowed to speak on specific issues concerning them 
(Recommendation 34).  
 
The Assembly of First Nations Renewal Commission  
 
The Renewal Commission was established by the AFN with a broad mandate to consult 
with First Nations communities and peoples across Canada about the renewal and 
restructuring of the AFN. The Commission’s recommendations were wide ranging and 
stressed that the AFN needed to change lest it risk becoming ineffective and also risk 
diminishing its claim to be representative of First Nations and its citizens.  
 
The key according to the Commissioners was for the internal structures and processes 
of the AFN to be responsive to the priorities and objectives of First Nations (see 
Resolution No. 58/2006). Almost two years after the production of the Report of the 
Renewal Commission the AFN has resolved that the National Chief and the Executive 
must now implement the recommendations.72   
 
Specific recommendations include the adoption of the Gender Balanced Analysis 
Framework; the development of a new Corporate Charter (and the dropping of the 
NIB); the election of the National Chief by First Nations Citizens; training for AFN 
chairs and co-chairs and a Universal Vote. There are present discussions about 
coordinating First Nation’s community elections with an election for National Chief 
and Regional Chiefs. At present the terms of regional chiefs vary from community to 
community, some are elected for two year terms others for three year terms and still 
others for four year terms. Some of the existing community arrangements are well 
entrenched and it may take some time to implement this recommendation across the 
country.  
 
The Sami Parliament – Sweden 
 
Sami comprise about 70,000 people and are spread across four countries; portions of 
Russia, Sweden, Norway and Finland. Around 20,000 Sami live in Sweden.73  
 
The Sami are renowned for their pastoralist reindeer herding having a long history of 
organising themselves into polities. The Sami parliament in Sweden is a publicly 
elected body.74 The Swedish Sami parliament was established in 1993 and is regarded 
as a State authority with the overall objective of achieving a living Sami culture.75 
Recently, the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish Sami parliaments endorsed a draft 
Nordic Sami Convention, which is currently under consideration by their corresponding 
States.76  
 
                                                 
72 Assembly of First Nations Resolution No. 21/2007 July 10, 11& 12, 2007, Halifax, NS.  
73 Josefson E 2007 ‘The Saami and the National Parliaments – Channels for Political Influence’, Galdu 
Cala Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No. 2, Guovdageaidnu/Kautokeino, Norway. p8.  
74 Ibid. p20.  
75 The Finnish Sami parliament was established in 1972; Norway’s was established in 1989.  
76 Ahren M, Sheinin M and Henrikson JB 2007 ‘The Nordic Sami Convention: International Human 
Rights, Self Determination and other Central Provisions’, Galdu Cala Journal of Indigenous Peoples 
Rights No. 3, Guovdageaidnu/Kautokeino, Norway.  
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The status of Sami as the Indigenous peoples of Sweden is not recognised in the 
Swedish Constitution however the establishment of the parliament provides this 
recognition in the Swedish State.77 The main purpose of the parliament is “…to 
monitor issues that relate to Sami culture in Sweden” rather than act an instrument 
self-governanc 78
for 
e.  
nt.  
                                                
 
The Sami Parliament has 31 elected members who meet three times per year and the 
President is the only full time employee of the Parliament. The meetings are known as 
the Plenary Assembly. The Parliament has some 20 staff.  
 
The Swedish State did not officially recognise the Sami as an Indigenous people until 
1977. The Sami Parliament reports annually to the Swedish Parliament and its 
operations are controlled by the Swedish Parliament. The Swedish Parliament does this 
through laws, ordinances and appropriation decisions.79  
 
Swedish Sami are entered on the Sami electoral register and are entitled to vote in 
general elections for candidates to the Sami Parliament. There are requirements to be 
eligible as an elector. Firstly, each elector is entitled to vote if they consider themselves 
to be a Sami, culturally and ethnically and secondly, if they speak a Sami language or 
have, or had, a parent or grandparent who spoke Sami. 
 
Sami identity and Sami culture has been bound up with pastoralism and reindeer 
herding and the Swedish state’s view of what constitutes a Sami. The early reindeer 
grazing laws (the first of which was the Reindeer Grazing Act 1886) sought to define 
the rights of the Sami people. The nomadic reindeer herders were considered the ‘real’ 
Sami and they were separated from the rest of the population to preserve ‘genuine 
Sami’ culture. As many Sami were forced out of herding and children were separated, 
the state established special schools for nomadic Sami children along assimilationist 
lines.  
 
New laws have changed this situation. The format of the Sami Parliament is tightly 
controlled by the Sami Assembly Act. The Sami parliament became both a publicly 
elected body and an authority that is controlled by the Swedish government.80 The 
Sami still have no political representation in the Swedish parliame 81
 
 
 
77 They are however recognised in Norway’s Constitution s110a which enforces a positive State duty to create 
conditions enabling the Sami to preserve and develop language, culture and way of life. In accordance with 
recommendations of the Sami Rights Committee Report 1984 and international law, the State interprets this as 
encompassing the material foundation or basis for culture (i.e. land, natural resources and other economic 
conditions): see Act No. 56 of 12 June 1987 and parliamentary debate on the Bill. 
78 Sametingslag [Sami Assembly Act] 1992: 1433 
79 Josefsen E 2007 ‘The Saami and the National Parliaments – Channels for Political Influence’, Galdu 
Cala Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No. 2, Guovdageidnu/Kautokeino, Norway. p15. p10, 15, 20-
21 
80 Ibid p15 
81 Sami have not yet been represented in the Finnish parliament (Aikio, P 1994, ‘Development and the political status 
of the Sami people of Finland’ in Majority-Minority relations, The case of the Sami in Scandinavia, Diedut No. 1.). 
Sami in Norway have no direct representation through fixed seats but have been elected to the Norwegian parliament 
and government via party and approved lists, and a national Sami People Party (Sámeálbmot bellodat) (Josefsen E 
2007 ‘The Saami and the National Parliaments-Channels for Political Influence’ Galdu Cala Journal of Indigenous 
Peoples Rights No. 2., Guovdageaidnu/Kautokeino Norway pp16-17).  
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How the Organisation is Funded 
 
The Sami Parliament is funded by the Swedish government. In 2004 the Parliament 
received 17 million SEK (about AUD 3.07million) to cover the operations of both its 
elected arm and its role as a public authority. In 2005 the budget was increased by a 
further SEK 3.0 million (about AUD 0.54million) to cover the work of the Sami 
Information Centre. A further SEK 14.5 million annually (about AUD 2.60million) is 
distributed by the Cultural Affairs Council of the Sami parliament. 
 
The Sami Parliament has also been able to access funding through the European Union 
(EU). One of the objectives of the EU is to maintain the diversity of cultures in Europe. 
The EU is also concerned to reduce the economic and social imbalances between the 
member states and the organisation has set up ‘structural funds’ for this purpose.  
 
The Sami Parliament has been able to access funds via allocations made by the EU to 
Sweden.82 Under the arrangements Sweden has to also make matching payments of 
between 30-50 percent of the total cost. These resources are used to promote Sami 
business and culture.83 
  
Sweden was also required to agree to a Sami Protocol as part of its conditions of 
membership to the EU and to recognise the domestic and international legal obligations 
and responsibilities Sweden has to Sami people in their country. The protocol states 
that Sweden is committed to preserving and developing the Sami people’s living 
conditions, language, culture and way of life – and specifically pastoralism and reindeer 
herding.  
 
Māori Representation – New Zealand  
 
Māori, the indigenous people of New Zealand make up 632,900 or 14% of the total 
population spread across the North and South Islands of the nation.84  
 
There are numerous ways in which Māori interests are represented across the political 
system. Distinct from their Australian, Canadian and Swedish bodies, the New Zealand 
scheme primarily revolves around the provision of guaranteed Māori seats in the 
legislative system as opposed to a separate National Indigenous Representative Body or 
indigenous parliament.   
 
The interests of New Zealand’s indigenous people are embodied in the Ministry of 
Māori Development, Te Puni Kokiri (TPK), a governmental advisory body that links 
the Crown with the Māori population. A branch of this body, the Māori Trusts Office 
exists to support Māori land and asset management. Importantly however, recent 
                                                 
82 A form of Sami business fund was created nationally in Sweden (Target 1), as well as an ‘all-Sami’ fund (Interreg 
III) where Norway, Finland, Sweden and Russia are working jointly for the development and reinforcement of Sami 
business and cultural life. 
83 With the support of the EU’s subsidiarity principle, an improved form of self-determination has been achieved as a 
result of the Swedish Sami parliament and other publicly elected bodies being responsible, and making decisions, for 
the use of the funds, as well as prioritising work to undertake. 
84 Te Puni Kokiri (2007) Statement of Intent 2007-10, available online at: http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/in-print/our-
publications/corporate-documents/soi-2007/page/5/, accessed 26 June 2008; Statistics New Zealand (2007) 
Communities: Maori, available online at: http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/3E2AAEF9-1E77-4591-B047-
09028D6F29EB/23497/MaoriPopEstAt30Jun1.xls, accessed 26 June 2008.  
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consultations by the New Zealand Government with Māori groups have proposed that 
the Trust become independent of the TPK and be required to report on an annual basis 
to Parliament. The proposed changes are likely to be embodied in legislation sometime 
in 200885.  
 
Māori Electorates  
 
In 1867 the New Zealand Parliament established four Māori electorates, an enduring 
and distinctive feature of the State’s ‘first past the post’ electoral system. This was 
initially a temporary measure to accommodate the opposing demands of members of 
the North and South island but was solidified with the passing of the Māori 
Representation Act 1867 and became permanent in 1876.86. Despite criticism and 
recommendations for their abolishment, Māori seats were retained under the State’s 
new ‘mixed member proportion’ voting system instituted in 1993. The number of seats 
Māori now occupy fluctuates according to the results of the regular Māori electoral 
option. Of the 120 existing seats in the House of Representatives, seven are designated 
for Māori representatives, although Māori persons may also run for and occupy non-
reserved seats. Notwithstanding the existing seven Māori seats, they currently hold a 
further 15 seats, bringing the overall Māori participation rate to approximately 18% of 
the entire parliament.87.  
 
Ministry of Māori Development, Te Puni Kōkiri  
 
The Ministry of Māori Development, Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK), is the principal 
government body that advises on policy and legislation regarding Māori wellbeing. It 
currently has no service delivery role but acts as an intermediary between government 
agencies and other external organisations to ensure that ‘Māori succeed as Māori’88 and 
that their concerns are reflected in policy development.  
 
A Chief Executive is at the head of its organisational structure, with three Deputy 
Secretaries of Support Services, Relationships and Information, and Policy, and a 
Māori Trustee. Importantly, the Relationships and Information branch of TPK focuses 
on developing and maintaining relationships between Māori and those stakeholders 
pertinent to this process. This is facilitated by the 10 regional offices of TPK which 
provide a direct and vital link with Māori communities.  
 
The Ministry, or TPK, formulates policy and amendments to legislation and 
subordinate legislation that fall within the Māori Affairs portfolio. In particular, one of 
TPK’s primary functions is its statutory responsibility in accordance with the Ministry 
                                                 
85 Te Puni Kokiri (2007) About Us: Maori Trust Office, available online at: http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/about/mto/, 
accessed 26 June 2008.  
86 Mc Gill, G., (1997) ‘Reserved Seats in Parliament for Indigenous Peoples: the Maori Example’, Research Note 51, 
1996-7, available online at: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/RN/1996-97/97rn51.htm, accessed 25 June 2008. 
And Waitangi Tribunal (1994) ‘Maori Electoral Optional Report’, pp, available online at: http://www.waitangi-
tribunal.govt.nz/reports/viewchapter.asp?reportID=C04FF009-8245-455E-9BF2-A8998413132F&chapter=1, 
accessed 25 June 2008.  
 
87 Joseph, P., (2008) The Maori Seats in Parliament, New Zealand Business Roundtable May 2008; Tahana, Y., 
(2008) Abolish Maori Seats, Roundtable Urges, New Zealand Herald, 30 May 2008, available online at: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=252&objectid=10513372, accessed 25 June 2008.  
88 Te Puni Kokiri (2007) Statement of Intent, available online at: http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/about/strategic/, 
accessed 25 June 2008.  
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of Māori Development Act 1991, which provides an avenue for monitoring the 
effectiveness of government policies towards Māori inhabitants.  
 
It is also responsible for providing independent policy advice to, and coordinating the 
legislative obligations of, the Minister of Māori Affairs. A policy framework (‘Māori 
Potential’) was developed by the TPK which informs and coordinates the Māori Affairs 
portfolio and the development and implementation of Māori public policy. The focus of 
their Māori Potential framework is on building knowledge and skills (mātauranga), 
strengthening Māori culture, leadership and decision-making (whakamana) and on the 
development and use of natural, financial and physical resources (rawa).  
 
Maori Trust Office 
 
The Māori Trust Office, currently independent of the Crown and accountable to 
landowners and the Māori Land Court, exists to assist Māori to manage land and assets 
by acting as trustee or agent for owners of Māori land and assets. Part of its mandate is 
to minimise the adverse effects of fragmented and multiple ownership. This entails 
collection and payment of income (such as rental income in the context of leasing land) 
and the investment of trust monies. Legislation to establish the Māori Trustee as a 
stand-alone organisation, separate from TPK, will be introduced in 2008 following 
government consultations in 2007 with Māori. The office will thereafter be responsible 
for regular review and adjustment of the interest rate paid on trust funds and required to 
report annually to Parliament. 
 
Treaty of Waitangi and the Waitangi Tribunal 
 
An additional point worth noting is that TPK are charged with the responsibility of 
facilitating Treaty of Waitangi settlements. The Treaty of Waitangi is a founding 
document in New Zealand history that affirms the status of Māori as its indigenous 
inhabitants. Signed in 1840, the document represents an agreement between the British 
Crown and the Māori people of New Zealand encapsulated within three main articles. 
The first is that concerning the right of the British to govern Māori people, the second 
to the rights of indigenous peoples to the land and natural resources, and the third to 
affirm the right of Māori to the enjoyment of the same rights as their non-indigenous 
counterparts.89Although not enforceable at law, there are three fundamental ways in 
which the principles of the Treaty are given effect. To this end, both the Crown and the 
Courts can apply the principles to legislation where possible and otherwise have a 
moral obligation to resolve other conflicts where necessary.90  
 
However, the primary means of implementing the principles is through the Treaty of 
Waitangi Tribunal. It is through this mechanism, which was established in 1975 under 
legislation of the same name that grievances between the Crown and Māori are 
addressed. The Tribunal has non-binding power to make recommendations on breaches 
of the Waitangi Treaty principles and means of redress as well as the ability to hear 
current and past claims. An equal distribution of pakeha (non-indigenous) and Māori 
                                                 
89 New Zealand Treasury (2007) Economic and Financial Overview 2007, available online at: 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/overview/2007/02.htm, accessed 25 June 2008; Office of Treaty Settlements 
(2002) Healing the past, Building a future: A guide to Treaty of Waitangi Claims and Negotiations with the Crown, 
p12.  
90 Ibid p11.  
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persons comprise the 16 member Tribunal, all of which are appointed by the Governor 
General either on the advice of the Minister of Māori Affairs or from the Māori Land 
Court.  
 
A claim can be brought by any member of Māori community which generally involves 
the negotiation phase which establishes that a well-founded grievance exists, within the 
mandate of the Tribunal legislation. Matters outside this which can not be considered 
by the Tribunal include commercial fishing interests and matters between conflicting 
Māori claimants. The modern claims process provides assistance to resolve claims 
which have arisen after 21 September 1992. In particular, any grievances arising after 
that date may be brought before the Waitangi Tribunal so long as they fit within the 
mandate provided by section 6 of the Waitangi Tribunal Act 1975. Crown responses to 
contemporary claims are dealt with by the relevant governmental agency so that current 
policy is consistent with the Treaty as much as possible.  
 
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission  
 
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission or Te Ohu Kai Moana (TOKM) came 
about after an arrangement between the Crown and its Māori population between 1989 
and 1992 to establish a settlement which provided the basis for Māori ownership for a 
proportion of New Zealand’s commercial fishing industry.  
 
Developed under the Māori Fisheries Act 2004, TOKM has responsibility for 
enhancing the participation of Māori people in the fishing industry. In particular, 
TOKM is responsible for allocating assets to Iwi or tribal groups, 57 of which are 
recognised under the fisheries legislation. Importantly, the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Fisheries Claims Settlement) Act 1992 provided for a scheme whereby Māori people 
were entitled to 10% of the total allowable catch for each species of fish.91 However, 
the Fisheries Settlement process which began in 1989 has now seen Māori people 
control approximately one third of the fisheries industry where previously there was 
little to no control at all92. A major responsibility of the Fisheries Commission is to 
oversee this process. 
 
Lessons to be learnt from overseas experiences of Indigenous 
Representative Bodies 
 
It is encouraging that all developed nations have seen the need to provide a distinct 
voice to their Indigenous peoples, and have struggled so hard to devise appropriate 
structures. However, each country, in light of the differing historical and cultural 
contexts, has developed different forms of Indigenous representative bodies. 
 
The perceived strengths and weaknesses of the different models outlined demonstrate 
that the critical difference between the models is to what extent self-governance is 
aspired to and the purchase these structures have with government.  
 
                                                 
91 Office of Treaty Settlements (2002) Healing the past, Building a future: A guide to Treaty of Waitangi 
Claims and Negotiations with the Crown, p26.  
92 Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (2002) ‘what it means for you: Summarising the Report for Agreement’, 
available online at: teohu.maori.nz/archive/allocation/ahu_whaku_mua/ahu_whakamua_summary.pdf -, accessed 25 
June 2008.  
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The National Congress of American Indians model from the USA highlighted the 
advantages of having an entirely independent body that sits outside of government and 
is financially independent. While it is not involved in any service delivery, it has active 
dialogues with government and plays a strong role in advising on policy development 
and the promotion of Indigenous rights, as well as monitoring government policies.  
The membership base is limited to tribe members. The level of independence has in 
part been achieved because of the historical recognition of tribes’ independence through 
treaty processes. 
 
In contrast, the Assembly of First Nations from Canada is an independent advocacy 
body. The Assembly was born out of advocacy campaigns opposing assimilation 
policies hence advocacy has been the primary function of the body. Sometimes the 
focus on advocacy has been perceived to be at the cost of having a role in influencing 
policy. Its independence is limited to an extent because it is funded by the government. 
Its membership includes all First Nation citizens who elect representatives from their 
communities to the Assembly. The Assembly has tried to represent a diversity of First 
Nation people’s interests, including representing women’s interests, as well as the 
interests of both those living on reserves as well as those living in urban areas. 
 
The example of the Sami Parliament from Sweden is an interesting model of a parallel 
Indigenous parliament. However, its primary role is limited to monitoring government 
rather than acting an instrument for self-governance. It is both a publicly elected body 
and a public authority that is controlled and funded by the Swedish government. More 
recently the Sami Parliament has also received some funding from the European Union. 
 
Finally, the situation in New Zealand illustrates the possibilities of how representative 
mechanisms such as the Māori electorates can co-exist with non-representative 
government bodies such as the Ministry of Māori Development, Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK). 
The Māori electorates allows for Māori representatives to sit in Parliament. The TPK, 
while not being a representative body, is the principal government advisor on policy 
and legislation regarding Māori wellbeing. It has 10 regional offices, but has no service 
delivery role. In addition Māori interests are represented through other offices and 
commissions such as the Maori office trust, the Waitangi Treaty Tribunal and the 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission. These bodies have Indigenous members, but not 
necessarily elected members, and address issues of land and asset management, 
grievances between the Crown and Māori relevant to the Treaty of Waitangi, and 
management of fisheries, respectively.  
 
Clearly, each of the arrangements for national Indigenous representation described in 
this part of the Issues Paper is based on different historical, cultural and legislative 
circumstances. The manifestations of representation in each differ according to whether 
they have a policy or advocacy role, who their membership is and how they are 
structured across the national and regional level. The Australian experience is also 
unique. However, appropriately adapted, the indigenous bodies described here offer 
useful examples that can be referred to when considering the options for a new National 
Indigenous Representative body outlined in the next part of this paper.  
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Section 4: Key issues in establishing a sustainable National 
Indigenous Representative Body 
 
The previous sections of this paper have outlined existing and previous forms of 
representation of Indigenous peoples in Australia and internationally. It shows that 
there is a wealth of information available on the key issues that have been faced by 
representative bodies. It also provides some guidance on possible features and roles for 
a new National Indigenous Representative Body in Australia. 
 
This section of the paper identifies and discusses some of the key issues that will need 
to be addressed in formulating a new National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
At the outset it should be acknowledged that the intention here is to identify those key 
issues that relate to creating a sustainable basis for a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body. It is not intended to raise every possible issue that may need to be 
considered in establishing such a body, nor is it intended to propose a specific model. 
 
Accordingly, the intention is to assist in creating dialogue among Indigenous peoples 
and government about the key principles for a new National Indigenous Representative 
Body that draws on the experiences and lessons of other bodies to date.  
 
It will be up to Indigenous peoples to consider whether there are other issues that need 
to be addressed in formulating a new National Indigenous Representative Body, and 
indeed whether the issues raised here are the key ones. The list of key issues identified 
here should therefore not be seen as prescriptive or limiting in any way. 
 
The following key issues are addressed in the remainder of this paper: 
 
• Principles that should underpin the creation of a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body; 
• The functions of a National Indigenous Representative Body; 
• Structure of a National Indigenous Representative Body (including the 
mechanisms for representing Indigenous people at the regional, State/ Territory 
and national level); 
• Relationship with existing national Indigenous peak bodies and State/ Territory 
advisory bodies;   
• Membership of a National Indigenous Representative Body; 
• Relationship with governments and COAG; and 
• A secure resource base for a National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
In considering the key issues here, the following factors should also be borne in mind. 
 
First, the need for a National Indigenous Representative Body is understood and 
accepted. The reviews of the NACC and NAC occurred at a time where national 
representation of Indigenous peoples was not necessarily accepted as a positive 
development. Some Australians felt it was premature, as in their view Indigenous 
peoples were not sufficiently organised at the regional level and had not had sufficient 
experience as emancipated citizens to organise themselves nationally in an effective 
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manner. Others felt that a national organisation had no counterpart in Indigenous 
history and culture.93  
 
ATSIC’s fifteen year run in Indigenous representation and services can be credited with 
settling this aspect of the debate once and for all.94 Since the abolition of ATSIC there 
has been a sense that a vital component of the Indigenous polity is missing and that it 
will only be remedied when a strong national body (re)emerges. Regional and State/ 
Territory representation is clearly desirable both for government and for Indigenous 
peoples. 
 
A recent study by researchers in the School of Psychology at the Australian National 
University surveyed both Indigenous and non-Indigenous samples about support for an 
Indigenous representative body. They concluded that: 
 
a) There was strong support from Indigenous peoples for a new Indigenous 
decision-making body on behalf of Indigenous peoples. It also showed there 
was broad community support for the idea as opposed to purely sectoral 
interest groups; 
b) That there would likely be social-protest consequences of denying Indigenous 
peoples a say in political decision-making; 
c) That decisions of the Australian Government without Indigenous 
representative input are likely not to be perceived as neutral by both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples;  
d) That both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples felt that fairness requires 
the provision of unique voice to Indigenous peoples. This finding suggests 
that the non-Indigenous sample group appeared to have recognised the stake 
held in the debate by the Indigenous population, and were relatively 
magnanimous in their preference for an Indigenous voice.95  
 
Second, a new National Indigenous Representative Body will not be borne into a 
historical vacuum. With the extensive history of reviews and reports on representative 
structures in Australia (as well as examples overseas) it makes sense to build on the 
past, drawing on what has worked or not, as well accepting that times have changed. 
 
In particular, ATSIC was reviewed several times during its fifteen years of operation. 
The Hannaford review of 2003 had considered in depth the role of ATSIC as a National 
Indigenous Representative Body from first principles. There had been limited focus on 
the findings and recommendations of this review when ATSIC was abolished in 2004. 
There is certainly a lot of value in reconsidering the principles to underpin a National 
Indigenous Representative Body that were recommended by the review team (note: 
these are reproduced Text Box 5 below). 
                                                 
93 Weaver, SM 1983, ‘Australian Aboriginal Policy: Aboriginal Pressure Groups or Government 
Advisory Bodies Part II’, Oceania, Vol.54 No. 2. p9; Hiatt, LR et al. 1976, National Aboriginal 
Consultative Committee, Report of Committee of Inquiry, Parliamentary Paper 343/1976, Commonwealth 
Government Printer, Canberra. p75.  
94 Palmer, K 2004, ATSIC: Origins and Issues for the Future, a Critical Review of Public Domain 
Research and Other Materials, AIATSIS Research Discussion Paper 12, Research Programme, 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Canberra. p9.  
95 Peate, VG, Platow, MJ and Eggins, RA 2008 ‘Collective voice and support for social protest among 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians: Considering the role of procedural fairness in an intergroup 
conflict of interest’, Australian Journal of Psychology. pp1-11.  
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Third, a consistent experience in Australia of national Indigenous representative bodies 
to date is a gap between the outcomes of reviews and consultations on what is the 
optimal representative structure and the actions of government.  
 
A note of caution must be sounded here. It is a striking fact that none of the reviews 
mentioned here were wholly accepted by government or led directly to the optimal 
form of organisation envisaged. In her 1986 report pre-dating the establishment of 
ATSIC, Lowitja O’Donoghue wisely suggested that the government should set the 
parameters of the process by “…announcing guidelines within which it is prepared to 
see a new organisation established”.96  
 
Fourth, there will need to be a discussion of the role of Torres Strait Islanders within a 
new National Indigenous Representative Body. The NACC and the NAC were 
Aboriginal bodies. ATSIC recognised and gave a voice to Australia’s other Indigenous 
peoples, Torres Strait Islanders. This evolved into a unique measure of autonomy in the 
Torres Strait Regional Authority. Torres Strait Islanders, both resident on the Islands 
and on the mainland, clearly will need to discuss among themselves the form of their 
participation in a national body.  
 
Issue for discussion: Guiding principles for the establishment of a 
National Indigenous Representative Body 
 
Before considering the key features of a National Indigenous Representative Body, it is 
important to consider what principles should guide a representative body. 
 
Indigenous peoples’ vision of what they want from a representative body and the 
principles to guide its operation will have a significant impact on the design of a 
National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
There are some useful sources to look to for identifying foundational principles, which 
are outlined below These include the Themes and Ambitions from the Indigenous 
Stream of the 2020 Summit, the Principles and Vision for a National Indigenous 
Representative Body outlined in the Hannaford Review of ATSIC, and the objects of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth).   
 
Drawing on different sources and experiences of national Indigenous representative 
bodies both here in Australia and overseas, following are some foundational principles 
for a new National Indigenous Representative Body97: 
 
• In order for the representative body to be persuasive, it will need to have 
legitimacy and credibility with both government and Indigenous peoples.  
 
                                                 
96 O’Donoghue, L 1986, An Aboriginal and Islander Consultative Organisation, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra. p43.  
97 These principles are also reflective of the five principles (collaboration, regional need, flexibility, accountability 
and leadership) underpinning the ‘new arrangements’ for the administration of Indigenous affairs at the federal level 
post-ATSIC, cited in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 2004, Social Justice Report 
2004 , HREOC, Sydney, p84-85. 
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• A representative body will, therefore, require ‘two way’ accountability –to 
government and to Indigenous peoples and communities. 
 
• Such accountability will come from the representative body being transparent 
and accountable in its operations. This requires transparency in the mechanisms 
for determining membership or election; in its policy making processes; as well 
as financially.   
 
• The credibility of the representative body will come from it being regarded as 
truly representative of a diverse Indigenous polity This might be achieved 
through a variety of means, such as from ensuring participation of different 
groups of Indigenous people including stolen generations, traditional owners, 
Torres Strait Islanders, youth and women for example. 
 
• The credibility of the representative body will also come from having a 
structure that is internally consistent and ‘connected’, so that there is a clear 
relationship between the national body and Indigenous peak bodies, service 
delivery organisations and other representative mechanisms that may exist at the 
State, Territory or regional level. 
 
• The legitimacy of the representative body will also depend on whether it is seen 
as independent and robust in its advocacy and analysis. This was one of the 
most critical failures of the National Indigenous Council – it was seen to deal 
with an agenda set entirely by government.  
 
• A critical issue to be considered by Indigenous peoples is what is meant by 
independence. It can mean that the policy advice and advocacy is not restricted 
to occurring within the confines of the policies of the government of the day, 
but it may also extend to sustainable funding options to reduce the vulnerability 
of the organisation to the political process and the threat of budget cuts if the 
advice provided is not to the liking of the government.  
 
A National Indigenous Representative Body should do more than simply provide a 
‘consultation mechanism’ for government. It should also outline a clear vision for a 
positive future for all Indigenous Australians, and inspire action and partnerships for 
change. 
 
To achieve this, for example, the National Indigenous Representative Body might be 
expected to:  
 
• Play a leading role in forging a new partnership between governments and 
Indigenous people;  
• Ensure Indigenous peoples contribute and lead policy development on 
Indigenous issues;  
• Ensure that an Indigenous perspective is provided on issues across government 
(such as in relation to issues which have a broader impact or focus than just 
Indigenous peoples – for instance, debates about climate change, social 
inclusion or homelessness); 
• Advocate for the recognition and protection of Indigenous peoples rights; 
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• Seek to ensure that adequate and appropriate accountability mechanisms exist 
for the performance of governments on Indigenous issues; and 
• Ensure that commitments, such as Closing the Gap, are supported by 
comprehensive, long-term action plans that are targeted to need, evidence-based 
and capable of addressing the existing inequities experienced by Indigenous 
peoples.  
 
Text Box 5 sets out the proposed vision and principles for a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body as recommended in 2003 by the ATSIC Review Team. While the 
process of creating a new National Indigenous Representative Body is not about 
recreating or reviving the ATSIC structure, this vision and these principles nonetheless 
provide useful guidance. 
 
Text Box 5 – ATSIC Review Team’s vision and principles for a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body 
 
In the hands of the regions, the final report of the ATSIC Review proposed the 
following vision and principles to underpin a new National Indigenous Representative 
Body.  
 
The report sets out the following vision for a National Indigenous Representative 
Body. It should result in an organisation that:  
 
• Enables Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to build a future 
grounded in their own histories and cultures within the broader Australian 
framework;  
• Represents and promotes the views of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people, including their diversity of opinion;  
• Vigorously pursues the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people through partnerships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities, governments and other sectors of Australian society;  
• Influences priorities, strategies and programs at the national, State/ Territory 
and regional level;  
• Minimises and streamlines the government interface with Indigenous 
communities;  
• Promotes good Indigenous governance;  
• Recognises the complexity of relationships between Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander individuals, communities, organisations and governments and 
the values and limitations created by this;  
• Is an equal partner in all negotiations, resourced adequately to achieve this 
equality, and commands goodwill and respect;  
• Increases women's participation and expression of views;  
• Ensures that there is transparent accountability of all organisations that are 
funded to provide services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people;  
• Maintains its unique status;  
• Recognises that the representative body is a key player, but not the only 
player, that seeks to advance the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians with government and others. 
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The report also proposed that the new representative body be underpinned by the 
following principles:  
 
• It should be the peak State/ Territory and national body, which advocates for 
the development of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities;  
• It should have regional mechanisms to provide the State/ Territory policy 
interface with the governments co-coordinating regional activities;  
• Representatives from each State/ Territory should constitute the national body, 
achieving a direct relationship between the regional, State/ Territory and 
national levels;  
• The national body should provide the policy interface for the Australian 
Government setting and advocating a national strategic direction and 
monitoring progress against the representative body’s national plan to 
reinforce the accountability of program and service providers;  
• Its primary focus should be on building strong local communities through 
development and implementation of a needs-based regional plan;  
• State/ Territory and national programs should be informed by, and undertake 
activities consistent with, regional plans;  
• Strengthening Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities must not be 
based solely on the provision of welfare services; 
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people should be provided with equal 
access to health services and there should be an appropriate balance of 
preventative, environmental and public health policies, programs and services; 
• Health, education, training, skills development and employment are integral to 
building the local and regional economy on a long term sustainable basis; 
• Housing should be provided on the basis of ensuring access is available to 
those who need it and ownership is available to those who desire it; 
• All government funded programs should be subject to an independent 
assessment of outcomes; and  
• The role of elected officials should be clearly delineated from that of the 
administration.  
 
ATSIC itself had proposed to the ATSIC Review Team the following five guiding 
principles. These were also endorsed in the final report of the Review Team: 
 
 The right to self-determination based on inherent rights and the laws, 
traditions and cultures of the Indigenous peoples of Australia is central to the 
development of the national representative body as an organisation. 
 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples should be able to engage 
with governments on the basis of equality and mutual respect about policies 
and programs affecting them. 
 The goal of sustainable and equitable outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders peoples in respect of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
major priority in achieving social justice. 
 Flexibility of the national representative body’s structures and processes 
is important in order to reflect and represent the full diversity of Indigenous 
cultures and situations in Australia, whether at family, clan, community, 
language group or national level. 
 The rights of traditional owners and native titleholders needs to be 
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protected through negotiated agreements regarding new regional structures, 
developments and plans. 
  
 
Text Box 6 below provides an overview of the main themes to emerge from the 
Indigenous stream of the Prime Minister’s 2020 Summit earlier in 2008. These also 
provide useful guidance on the principles that might underpin a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
Text Box 6 – Options for the future of Indigenous Australia - Ambitions and 
Themes from the 2020 Summit 
 
The following ambitions and themes for Indigenous Australia were agreed at the 
Prime Minister’s 2020 Summit by the Indigenous policy stream.  
 
Ambitions 
 
The ambitions of the stream were discussed in each of the sub-groups, and a number 
of themes and aims were identified in plenary sessions: 
 
• Following the historic and significant Apology a new national, bipartisan 
dialogue between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and 
government should begin. 
• There should be a new form of engagement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people in public policy and planning that affects them, as well as 
formal national recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
and their place in the national identity and national story. 
• By 2020 we will have capable, productive and confident families, young 
people and children who are proud, independent and contributing members of 
society. 
• By 2020 there will be a high level of attention, energy and resources focused 
on the needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children. 
• By 2020 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people will have parity with 
other Australians across the spectrum of measures—most importantly, in the 
strength and wellbeing of their families and young people, safety and security 
for families and children, decent housing, good health and education. 
• By 2020 at least one person in each Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
household will be in ongoing employment. 
 
These points were summarised by some participants as follows: 
 
Our ambition is an Australia where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people have formal recognition in the Australian legal framework and 
Australia’s global identity is one that is recognised as being enriched by a 
living culture that is 50 000 years old. In this Australia in 2020, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people have the same health, education and 
economic participation opportunities and outcomes as other Australians, are 
able to realise their hopes and aspirations and are affirmed in their cultural 
identity. This can only be achieved by taking measures now to urgently 
transform society to nurture today’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
 67
youth and children. 
 
Themes 
 
The stream as a whole agreed on a number of priority themes, which were further 
explored by the smaller discussion groups during the summit: 
 
• Enshrine formal recognition of Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people. 
• Provide stronger support for families and their wellbeing and their role in 
keeping Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture and identity vibrant. This 
includes safe, private space in community life for families, so children can be 
nurtured and cared for and are able to get a good education. 
• Encourage a new form of engagement that harnesses Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander ability, knowledge and leadership. 
• Overcome the complex arrangements at the national, state and territory and 
local government levels in relation to funding, infrastructure and some service 
delivery—for example, housing. 
• Develop new, more comprehensive accountability arrangements. 
• ‘Close the gap’ in all areas and capitalise on links between formal recognition 
and achieving better social and economic outcomes. 
• Identify and maximise the interdependencies between housing, education, 
health and employment. 
• Provide to young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people an opportunity 
to be involved in developing policies and programs designed to assist them, 
recognising that these young people represent a substantial proportion of the 
Indigenous population. 
• Ensure that young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, in urban and 
regional areas, are involved in decisions that affect them, rather than being 
invisible to policy makers and planners. 
• Speed up the pace of economic development, redistribution of resources and 
clarification of property rights. 
• Expand partnerships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
entrepreneurs and business. 
• Place value on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and weave them 
into global identity. 
• Give due recognition to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander knowledge of 
country, and recognise the relevance of this knowledge to the response to 
climate change, water and sustainability challenges. 
• Confront racism. 
 
 
It is also worth noting that the following objectives are contained in the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth). This Act is the primary piece of legislation at the 
federal level for Indigenous affairs (and was previously called the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth)). 
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Section 3: The objects of this Act are, in recognition of the past dispossession and 
dispersal of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and their present 
disadvantaged position in Australian society: 
 
a) to ensure maximum participation of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait 
Islanders in the formulation and implementation of government policies that 
affect them; 
b) to promote the development of self management and self sufficiency among 
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders; 
c) to further the economic, social and cultural development of Aboriginal 
persons and Torres Strait Islanders; and 
d) to ensure co-ordination in the formulation and implementation of policies 
affecting Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders by the 
Commonwealth, State, Territory and local governments, without detracting 
from the responsibilities of State, Territory and local governments to 
provide services to their Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander residents. 
 
A National Indigenous Representative Body will have a significant role to play in 
realising these objectives. Consultations on a National Indigenous Representative Body 
may also reveal other objectives and principles that should also be reflected in the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth). This will particularly be the case 
should the new National Indigenous Representative Body be established or confirmed 
through legislation. 
 
Issue for discussion: Guiding principles for the establishment of a 
National Indigenous Representative Body 
 
What principles should guide the formation of a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body? 
 
What aspects of the following documents provide useful guidance in 
answering this question:  
 
• The Principles and Vision for a National Indigenous 
Representative Body outlined in the Hannaford Review of ATSIC; 
• The Themes and Ambitions from the Indigenous Stream of the 
2020 Summit; and 
• The objects in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 
(Cth)? 
 
Issue for discussion: Role and functions of a National Indigenous 
Representative Body  
 
A major issue that must be addressed in establishing a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body is what its role and functions should be. 
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A new National Indigenous Representative Body will not be born into an historical 
vacuum. It will build upon and inevitably be seen as a progression of previous forms of 
national Indigenous representation. It will also have to operate within or alongside the 
new system for whole of government service delivery at the federal level. 
 
The following potential functions of a new National Indigenous Representative Body 
are discussed in this section: 
 
• Delivery of government programs; 
• Advocacy; 
• Policy formulation and advice; 
• Coordinating long term planning processes at regional level; 
• Contributing to legal reform; 
• Review and evaluation of government programs; 
• Clearing house role; 
• International role; 
• Research; and 
• Facilitation and mediation. 
 
The issue of whether a new National Indigenous Representative Body should deliver 
government services is a threshold question that will significantly impact on the design 
of a representative body. Other potential functions are less contentious, but they need to 
be seen in the context of proposals for an organisation that delivers development 
programs or one that is simply representative and advisory.  
 
Government service delivery 
 
Ultimately, a new National Indigenous Representative Body must confront the ghost of 
ATSIC.  
 
The main distinction between ATSIC and its predecessors was that ATSIC was actively 
involved in the planning and delivery of (limited) programs to Indigenous communities. 
ATSIC had difficulty in reconciling its functions in advocacy, forming policy, 
program/service delivery and review.98  
 
This paper progresses on the basis that the functions of a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body should not include the delivery of government services.  
 
In preparing this paper, the new Australian Government has made clear that it does not 
support a new National Indigenous Representative Body having responsibilities for 
delivering government services and will continue to deliver services through a 
coordinated whole of government system. The Minister for Indigenous Affairs has 
stated that the new representative body will not be ‘a new ATSIC’. 
                                                 
98 It should also be recognised that ATSIC only ever had responsibility for a limited range of programs. The Senate 
Select Committee into the abolition of ATSIC in 2005 found that ATSIC often took the blame for programs it was 
not funded to provide (Senate 2005: 13). It lost responsibility for health programs in the early years of its operation. 
By 2005 only 15% of its $1.1 billion allocation was available for discretionary programs. The remainder was 
mandated by government and largely quarantined for the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) 
program and the Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP). In all, ATSIC accounted for less than half 
of all Commonwealth government expenditure on Indigenous programs (Senate 2005: 13-15).  
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It is notable that the national Indigenous representative bodies profiled in this paper (for 
example, in Canada, the USA, Sweden and New Zealand) also do not exercise service 
delivery responsibilities on behalf of government. 
 
This still leaves open a series of questions relating to the role of a National Indigenous 
Representative Body and government service delivery. These include what role (if any) 
should a National Indigenous Representative Body have in:  
 
• setting priorities for service delivery (This might include through a formal or 
informal role in determining priorities for the federal budget such as through 
participating in the Single Line Budget Submission Process and/or involvement 
in the Secretaries Group or Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs);  
• contributing to planning processes to ensure such services are appropriately 
directed and funded to levels capable of addressing the outstanding needs of 
Indigenous peoples; and  
• monitoring government service delivery. 
 
Views on whether a National Indigenous Representative Body should be directly 
engaged in service delivery tend to fall into two camps. There are those who argue that 
control of significant resources is the only way to assert power in political relationships 
with non-Indigenous Australia.99 They would argue, also, that self-determination 
requires that Indigenous peoples have their hands on the levers of their own 
development.100 This is seen as both a practical as well as a symbolic requirement, 
since Indigenous peoples have a privileged understanding of their own needs and local 
insight into the design of programs. 
 
On the other side of the discussion there are those that argue that the performance of 
ATSIC did not bear out any of these assertions. While it did exert some influence both 
nationally and internationally, the greatest power wielded by ATSIC occurred at the 
local and regional levels and mostly concerned only Indigenous peoples. The structure 
of ATSIC was often perceived to be overly bureaucratic. There was conflict, too, 
between the representative structure and the resource distribution function which led to 
suspicions of nepotism and lack of transparency.101   
 
The difference of views boils down to whether a National Indigenous Representative 
Body will assert more influence if it is in control of program funding, as against the 
view that service delivery is properly the province of government, gets in the way of 
advocacy and representation, and diverts attention from the main job of holding 
government to account.  
 
If Government were to ensure that the new National Indigenous Representative Body 
was mandated to have a significant role in program design as well as performance 
                                                 
99 Behrendt, L 2005, ‘Habeas Corpus’, Arena Magazine, Vol. 73, pp5,6,25; Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and 
Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission: Public Discussion 
Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, Canberra. p62.  
100 Behrendt, L 2005, ‘Habeas Corpus’, Arena Magazine, Vol. 73, p7.  
101 Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs, Canberra. p19.  
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monitoring and evaluation it is feasible that these conflicting approaches could be 
reconciled. In other words, it is feasible that the national body could exercise influence 
over program delivery without itself delivering the programs. 
 
Although ATSIC was a new departure in Indigenous control of some important 
development programs (CDEP and CHIP), actual service delivery was, and largely 
continues to be, carried out by local and regional community organisations (many of 
which are incorporated by the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations). These pre-dated 
ATSIC, in many cases by several decades.  
 
A national Indigenous body that engages with these service based organisations meets 
many of the arguments for Indigenous control of local development programs. It also 
meets the requirement of adequate democratic representation since these organisations 
are controlled and governed by their members. If the national body does not have a 
national program delivery function then the source of friction that existed between 
ATSIC and many of these organisations is removed, and attention can turn to the 
responsibilities of government. 
 
While this paper has proceeded on the basis that a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body will not have a direct government service delivery role, if national 
consultations uncover a firm belief that a national Indigenous-controlled organisation 
must be involved in program delivery then the tension that this creates between this 
function and other functions would then need to be addressed.  
 
Issue for discussion: The National Indigenous Representative Body 
and government service delivery 
 
How could the National Indigenous Representative Body influence 
program delivery without itself delivering services to Indigenous people 
and communities?  
 
For example, should the National Indigenous Representative Body have a 
role in the following:  
 
• setting priorities for service delivery;  
• contributing to planning processes to ensure such services are 
appropriately directed and funded to levels capable of addressing 
the outstanding needs of Indigenous peoples; and  
• monitoring government service delivery? 
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Advocacy 
 
Advocating an Indigenous perspective on issues is a key function of all national 
Indigenous representative bodies. Without advocacy there can be no representation. 
 
Accordingly, the main issues relating to an advocacy role of a National Indigenous 
Representative Body are not whether it should undertake such a role, but how to ensure 
such advocacy is robust, credible and effective. 
 
This will cover a raft of issues such as whether the representative body is located within 
or outside of government; how its funding is secured; and how it ensures that its 
advocacy is drawn through representative processes. These issues are discussed further 
in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Whether the representative body is located within or outside of government, will pose 
different advantages and challenges, depending on which path is chosen. 
 
ATSIC exercised its advocacy role from within government. Similar examples of 
bodies that advocate from within government include bodies such as:  
 
• The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) which has a 
broad mandate to advocate for the recognition and protection of human rights. 
The Social Justice Commissioner within HREOC, for example, has powers to 
promote awareness and understanding of the human rights situation facing 
Indigenous peoples and regularly review government compliance with human 
rights obligations. In doing so, the Commission may direct government agencies 
at all levels to provide requested information. Operating as an independent 
statutory authority, the government is not able to direct HREOC as to how it 
performs its functions or to restrict its findings and public comments to ones 
that are consistent with government policy. HREOC is, however, reliant upon 
the government financially through the regular budget process.  
 
• The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) which has a broad mandate 
to advocate for law reform, predominately through national inquiries. As the 
ALRC note on their website, ‘while accountable to the federal Parliament for its 
budget and activities, the ALRC is not under the control of government, giving 
it the intellectual independence and ability to make research findings and 
recommendations without fear or favour’.102 
 
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the Commonwealth Ombudsman are 
statutory offices with some similarities. 
 
A statutory authority model, underpinned by legislation that mandates the National 
Indigenous Representative Body to advocate for the interests of Indigenous peoples in 
policy processes and for government to consider such advice, is one way of proceeding. 
 
Most organisations that are focused on advocacy, however, tend to stand outside 
government. The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), for example, is part 
                                                 
102 ALRC Website available at: http://www.alrc.gov.au/about/index.htm 
 73
funded by government, statutorily independent, and draws its membership from State 
and Territory councils and other national organisations.103 The Federation of Ethnic 
Community Councils of Australia is another example (and similarly relies on a mix of 
government and non-government funding).  
 
ACOSS carries out its advocacy functions through the media, especially during the 
budget process, as well as through more discreet lobbying, and by its inclusion in 
government-sponsored policy forums. However, it has had a tense relationship with 
governments of both major political parties and this has sometimes led to its exclusion, 
and thus limited the effectiveness of its advocacy. 
 
Whether the National Indigenous Representative Body is positioned inside or outside of 
government, effective advocacy will also depend upon a robust representative structure 
indicating legitimacy, sound research, professional presentation, adequate resourcing 
and a trustworthy relationship with government, the public service and the media. 
 
Policy Formation and Advice  
 
Indigenous individuals have lifelong experience of conditions in Indigenous areas and 
practical understanding of the impact of a succession of government programs. Senior 
bureaucrats do not usually have this experience, nor do many ministerial advisers.  
 
Coming together in a National Indigenous Representative Body, Indigenous individuals 
have the opportunity to pool their experiences to reflect the diversity of conditions in 
Indigenous Australia. This too is a form of expertise currently not available to 
government.  
 
While it is often formally recognised that Indigenous peoples bring particular expertise 
to Indigenous questions, the actual process of policy formation tends to roll over 
Indigenous input with the weight of mainstream practice. No previous National 
Indigenous Representative Body has managed to take the predominant role in setting 
policy goals, implementation strategy and evaluation. Rather, they have been seen as 
one element in a consultative process which may or may not have influence when 
senior officials design the details of government programs. 
 
One school of thought in political science firmly supports this approach. It believes that 
policy originates in the senior ranks of the public service in touch with politicians, is 
delivered down through the ranks to the public, evaluated, and the evaluation passed 
back to the top to further inform policy. This is presented as the ‘policy cycle’.  
 
This approach has been challenged by other political scientists, such as Colebatch104, 
who see better policy outcomes resulting from the collaborative efforts of both 
government and non-government players.  
 
                                                 
103 Mendes, P 2006, Inside the Welfare Lobby: A History of the Australian Council of Social Service, 
Sussex Academic Press, Eastbourne (UK). pp1-6 
104 Colebatch, HK (ed) 2006, Beyond the Policy Cycle: the Policy Process in Australia, Allen and Unwin 
Crows Nest (NSW).  
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The experience of previous Indigenous bodies indicates there is a task ahead in 
convincing the Indigenous affairs bureaucracy of the value of this approach, and 
political leadership may be required. 
 
This has begun to be acknowledged by the federal government. In late 2006, the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet joined with the Australian National Audit 
Office to produce the Better Practice Guide on Implementation of Programme and 
Policy Initiatives. This emphasises the importance of ‘stakeholder management’ and 
emphasises the importance of adopting a consultative and participatory approach to 
policy development.105  
 
To this end it is notable that in his Apology speech and at the National Indigenous 
Health Equality Summit in March 2008 the Prime Minister has committed to:  
 
• A new partnership to achieve equality in health status and life expectancy 
between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and non-Indigenous 
Australians by the year 2030; 
• To developing a comprehensive, long-term plan of action, that is targeted to 
need, evidence-based and capable of addressing the existing inequities; and 
• To measure, monitor, and report on our joint efforts, in accordance with 
benchmarks and targets, to ensure that we are progressively realising our shared 
ambitions. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge that there have been significant international 
developments in recent years that support a more inclusive approach being taken to 
policy development, particularly in relation to Indigenous Peoples.  
 
For example, a human rights based approach to development has now become standard 
practice across the United Nations. This requires that in developing policy and 
delivering services, governments should: 
 
• recognize and accommodate the cultural distinctiveness and diversity of 
Indigenous Australians;  
• adopt a people-centred approach which values the full participation of 
Indigenous peoples in the process, from the very beginning of policy 
development, through to service delivery and monitoring and evaluation; 
• involve the development of agreed targets and benchmarks, so we have a 
clear picture of what it is exactly that is trying to be achieved; and 
• be supported by an evaluation framework to assess whether the rights of 
Indigenous peoples are being ‘progressively realised’, so that we can be 
confident that government efforts are effective, well targeted and taking place at 
the maximum level possible. 
 
We have also seen the emergence internationally of respect for the principle of free, 
prior and informed consent.  This principle is increasingly emerging as a practical 
                                                 
105 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Australian National Audit Office, Better Practice Guide: 
Implementation of Programme and Policy Initiatives – Making Policy Matter, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra 2006, Chapter 6. 
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methodology within the UN system for designing programs and projects, which either 
directly or indirectly affect indigenous peoples.  
 
The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations has commented on this 
principle as follows: 
 
Substantively, the right of free, prior and informed consent is grounded in and is 
a function of indigenous peoples’ inherent and prior rights to freely determine 
their political status, freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development and freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources - a 
complex (series) of inextricably related and interdependent rights encapsulated 
in the right to self-determination, to their lands, territories and resources, where 
applicable, from their treaty-based relationships, and their legitimate authority 
to require that third parties enter into an equal and respectful relationships with 
them based on the principle of informed consent.   
 
Procedurally, free, prior and informed consent requires processes that allow and 
support meaningful and authoritative choices by indigenous peoples about their 
development paths.106 
 
This will require a more open and collaborative approach to policy development by 
government departments. 
 
To be effective a National Indigenous Representative Body will need to have its own 
processes to debate and refine policy proposals based on evidence as well as 
aspirations. Sound structural arrangements for feeding policy proposals and advice to 
government are desirable, and some suggestions for these are made later in this part of 
the Issues Paper.  
 
Effective steering of the policy debate will depend most of all on well-founded 
proposals which are well-argued and presented, and inevitably in competition with 
others who present themselves as experts on Indigenous peoples. The national 
organisation will need to balance its broadly representative forums that harness the 
diversity of Indigenous experience and give it legitimacy, with more tightly focused 
arrangements for research and political lobbying.   
 
Contributing to Legal Reform 
 
ATSIC was often supportive of legal reform movements once these were underway, 
such as negotiating the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) or reviewing the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. It did little, however, to 
promote and drive reform from the start from its own resources. This is with the 
exception of its legal services funding stream that provided funding for test cases with 
significant precedent value for Indigenous people. 
 
                                                 
106 Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Standard-setting: Legal commentary on the concept of free, prior and 
informed consent. Expanded working paper submitted by Mrs. Antoanella-Iulia Motoc and the Tebtebba Foundation 
offering guidelines to govern the practice of Implementation of the principle of free, prior and informed consent of 
indigenous peoples in relation to development affecting their lands and natural resources, UN Doc: 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 14 July 2005, paras 56-58, p15. 
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The Aboriginal Legal Services, in general, have been limited to addressing criminal 
matters, rather than contribute directly to legal reform, due to limited resources or 
funding constraints. The result has been a patchwork of advances under a variety of 
legislative regimes, as well as limited follow up of significant reform processes such as 
those emerging from the Deaths in Custody Royal Commission.  
 
Indigenous peoples may consider this to be a priority area for a new National 
Indigenous Representative Body. 
  
Many ‘big picture’ issues remain to be addressed in Australia (such as the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), as well as smaller test cases of civil 
rights. As debate is renewed over an Australian republic the place of Indigenous 
peoples in the constitution and any recognition of sovereign rights needs to be 
addressed. The effectiveness of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) is under 
question after its suspension for the Northern Territory intervention. The existence of 
unextinguished mineral rights could be tested outside of the native title legislative 
framework. The removal of children from families without good cause and the 
misappropriation of the wages of state wards are also issues that are proceeding 
piecemeal across the country.  
 
This national discussion could consider whether a national body should actively pursue 
law reform and be involved in coordinating and otherwise supporting test cases in 
cooperation with existing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services, Family 
Violence Prevention Legal Services and Legal Rights Movements. 
 
Review and Evaluation of Government Programs 
 
An important role of a National Indigenous Representative Body would be to ensure 
that governments, both State/ Territory and national, are responsive to Indigenous 
needs. Responsiveness is encouraged where there is a sense of continuous well-
informed scrutiny.  
 
A national body with a robust regional structure would be well-placed to receive ‘field 
reports’ on government performance where at present government only reports to itself. 
This form of scrutiny from the member base is important to the functions of policy 
formation and advocacy, but it is also desirable that a national body be tied into formal 
evaluation and monitoring processes. To do so it would need some investigative 
authority. Some proposals for formal relations between government and a national body 
to review government performance are put forward in the ‘Relations with the 
Commonwealth Government’ section later in the Issues Paper. 
 
One issue for consideration will be how a National Indigenous Representative Body 
would work with existing monitoring and evaluation processes (such as the Office of 
Evaluation and Audit – Indigenous Programs in the Department of Finance). 
 
Clearing House Role 
 
A potential role for a National Indigenous Representative Body could be to undertake a 
coordination role or act as a ‘clearing house’ to share information between Indigenous 
representative organisations and service delivery organisations. As an example, the 
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Social Justice Commissioner has proposed that a national body could convene an 
annual congress on service delivery to Indigenous communities.  
 
Such a congress could be run along similar lines to the National Native Title 
Conference coordinated by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Studies. It would provide an opportunity for communities, Indigenous service 
delivery organisations, as well as regional representative Indigenous organisations, 
Indigenous Coordination Centres and State and Territory governments to share best 
practice examples in service delivery to Indigenous communities and in the formulation 
of agreements, and in improving whole of government coordination. This could also be 
conducted on a State/ Territory basis or be done on a thematic basis each gathering.  
 
The outcomes of such a Congress would provide valuable input to the formulation of 
advice and national policies by a National Indigenous Representative Body. It could 
also:  
 
• inform research into best practice examples, identifying success factors and 
strengths within communities;  
• identify opportunities for greater collaboration between Indigenous 
organisations and communities, or between communities and governments; and  
• identify opportunities for innovation and new solutions to existing, and often 
entrenched, problems faced at the community level.107 
 
International Role 
 
A further issue for consideration is whether or how a National Indigenous 
Representative Body might engage at the international level.  
 
Indigenous Australians, as with other indigenous peoples across the world, have a long 
history of engaging in the various forums and mechanisms of the United Nations. This 
includes through the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (which has now been replaced by the new Indigenous Expert 
Body which has its first meeting in October 2008); the Human Rights Council (and 
previously the Commission on Human Rights); human rights treaty committee system 
and various Rapporteurs of the human rights system; as well as in forums relating to 
biodiversity, climate change and intellectual property among others. 
 
The legitimacy of the participation of Indigenous peoples in international processes has 
long been accepted by the Australian government and among the international 
community. 
 
The participation of Indigenous Australians at the international level has been important 
in contributing to the development of human rights standards and learning from best 
practice to inform policy development in Australia. It has also played a key role in 
providing some accountability for Australia’s human rights performance.  
                                                 
107 The Social Justice Commissioner has also suggested convening an annual conference on service delivery to 
Indigenous communities, or even the establishment of a national Indigenous non-government organisation peak 
body, as other mechanisms for information sharing and achieving better linkages between regional representative 
structures and the national, (Source: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 2004, Social 
Justice Report 2004, HREOC, Sydney, p106-107). 
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Since the demise of ATSIC, HREOC has received limited funding from the federal 
government to support international engagement by Indigenous peoples. The Social 
Justice Commissioner has focused this limited funding on supporting attendance at the 
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and ensuring that participation in the 
Forum is coordinated and that feedback is provided once people return to Australia.  
 
There is a capacity building element to this process, with support and mentoring for 
youth participants, as well as an expert focus with participants supported who can 
provide expertise on the thematic issue under discussion in the Forum. 
 
Through this process, HREOC does not fund the full costs of participation of 
individuals at the international level. Instead, it makes a funding contribution and 
requires that the organisation that the person is representing also contributes. 
Participants also have to meet a series of obligations relating to activities prior to 
departing for the Forum, their participation while at the Forum, and the dissemination 
of information upon their return.  
 
The HREOC process responds to widespread concerns about a lack of accountability 
for international engagement that had existed towards the end of the ATSIC period. 
Feedback to date suggests that the process has resulted in a high quality engagement at 
the Forum sessions. 
 
The HREOC support only extends to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
although it may be extended to also cover the new Indigenous Expert Mechanism of the 
Human Rights Council in future years. It does not cover other relevant forums and 
processes which impact on Indigenous peoples rights and interests. 
 
The issue will be whether a new National Indigenous Representative Body has an 
overall coordinating role for international engagement to ensure strategic and well-
targeted participation. 
 
It may also be appropriate for HREOC to retain, as part of its educative role and due to 
its expertise on human rights, its current role in coordinating international engagement 
at the Permanent Forum and to also provide mentoring support to the new National 
Indigenous Representative Body to focus its engagement in such processes. 
 
Research 
 
Good research is essential to good policy and advocacy. The national body will need to 
consider whether it needs its own research coordination arm. This may require 
commissioning its own research as well as encouraging community based research in 
the regions, and expert reports. The community organisations that are currently 
facilitating unofficial evaluations of the Northern Territory intervention in Central 
Australia are an example of important and timely community-based research.  
 
Coordination with existing research centres is also important. The Cooperative 
Research Centre for Aboriginal Health (CRCAH) brings together experts from across 
the country under Aboriginal research leadership. Its work, and that of other leading 
research centres such as the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) 
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at ANU, the Desert Knowledge Centre in Alice Springs, and emerging institutes such as 
the United Nations University’s Centre on Traditional Knowledge, could be enhanced 
by a national body with a strong commitment to evidence based research. The 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), an 
Indigenous-controlled national statutory body, is another resource that could be tapped.   
 
Contrary to popular perception, researchers in Indigenous affairs mostly wish to see 
their work have practical effects in improving conditions for Indigenous peoples. To do 
this, they need leadership from those working at the coal-face of Indigenous policy. A 
national research coordination role for the national body could assist as a channel of 
communication between the two. The National Body could also be expected to be 
active in encouraging and supporting skills transfer to, and between, Indigenous 
researchers. 
 
Facilitation and Mediation 
 
There is a large unmet need for mediation between Indigenous peoples and non-
Indigenous interests where one impacts upon the other.108  
 
This is most obviously the case where the current resource boom expands mineral 
exploration and exploitation into Indigenous areas. Native title claims often provide the 
focus for mediation.  They often also bring up the need to mediate between, and 
facilitate decisions among, different Indigenous actors in the process.  
 
Mediation and facilitation are not only required where there are commercial interests at 
stake. Government plans and services frequently have only the most rudimentary form 
of consultation processes carried out by people whose main expertise may not 
necessarily lie in this area. These are cross-cultural and intercultural problems that 
require particular skills and experience.  
 
The realization of human rights also requires recognition of conflicts between 
competing rights and the designing of mechanisms for negotiation and conflict 
resolution. More specifically, human rights principles require the development of 
norms and decision-making processes that: 
 
• Are democratic and accountable and enjoy public confidence; 
• Are predicated on the willingness of interested parties to negotiate in good faith, 
and in an open and transparent manner; 
• Are committed to addressing imbalances in the political process in order to 
safeguard the rights and entitlements of vulnerable groups; 
• Promote women’s participation and gender equity; 
• Are guided by the prior, informed consent of those whose rights are affected by 
the implementation of specific projects; 
• Result in negotiated agreements among the interested parties; and 
• Have clear, implementable institutional arrangements for monitoring 
compliance and redress of grievances.109 
                                                 
108 See for example the research work of the Indigenous Facilitation and Mediation project at AIATSIS on this topic: 
http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/ifamp/.  
109 Extracted from: Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Standard-setting: Legal commentary on the concept 
of free, prior and informed consent. Expanded working paper submitted by Mrs. Antoanella-Iulia Motoc and the 
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The Social Justice Report 2005 and 2006 discussed the difficulties of negotiating 
Shared Responsibility Agreements between the federal Government and Indigenous 
communities due to the power and skills differentials. The former government had 
appointed a panel of experts to assist in negotiation processes for agreements. However, 
these panels could only be accessed at the request of the regional Indigenous 
Coordination Centre Manager and as an assistance mechanism for the ICC (i.e., for the 
government). A National Indigenous Representative Body could provide specialist 
mediation and facilitation assistance to Indigenous communities in developing 
community planning processes to be fed into a broader regional and State/ Territory-
wide planning process. 
 
A national body could support mediation training and possibly give accreditation to the 
best professionals and organisations in this area. If it is decided that the National 
Indigenous Representative Body should be an independent body, it would also be in a 
good position to provide negotiation, mediation and facilitation on a fee-for-service 
basis both to government and to private industry. 
 
Issue for discussion: Role and functions of a National Indigenous 
Representative Body 
 
What should be the roles and functions of a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body? 
 
Some options for discussion may include the following roles / functions: 
 
• Advocacy; 
• Policy formulation and advice; 
• Contributing to law reform; 
• Review and evaluation of government programs and service 
delivery; 
• Clearing-house / coordination role; 
• International role; 
• Research;  
• Facilitation and mediation; and / or 
• Other roles/functions? 
 
Issue for discussion: Structure of a National Indigenous 
Representative Body 
 
Identifying the overall structure of a National Indigenous Representative Body that will 
best meet the needs of Indigenous peoples will depend on many factors.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
Tebtebba Foundation offering guidelines to govern the practice of Implementation of the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples in relation to development affecting their lands and natural resources, UN 
Doc: E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 14 July 2005, paras 56-58, p15. 
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It will necessarily be influenced by decisions about the broad principles that should 
underpin the organisation, as well as the roles and functions that the National 
Indigenous Representative Body undertakes.  
 
Having decided these issues, there will then be a further threshold question which will 
need to be addressed in order to design the structure for the National Indigenous 
Representative Body. That is how many levels of representation should the national 
body have? In other words, should the national body just involve a national level 
structure; or should it also include State and Territory and/ or regional structures. 
 
As noted in section 1 of this paper, a key finding of every review of national Indigenous 
representation in Australia has stressed the importance of ensuring a connection 
between Indigenous people and communities at the local and regional level through to 
the State/ Territory and national level. 
 
This does not necessarily require formal representative structures at the regional and 
State and Territory levels. But if such structures are not part of the overall national 
body then the organisation will face significant additional challenges to ensure that it is 
truly representative and therefore legitimate and credible as an organisation. 
 
Ordinarily, organisations tend to be broad at the base and narrow at the top. The 
national discussion of a future Indigenous body needs to consider how a ‘narrow’ 
leadership be kept in touch with the ‘broader’ base. Much of the negative reaction 
against ATSIC related to the fact that it was seen as too top-heavy and ‘top down’ in its 
approach. 
 
This issue can be addressed in a variety of ways. Broadly speaking, these range from:  
 
• formal mechanisms whereby a National Indigenous Representative Body has 
components that exist at different levels (such as in each State and Territory and 
at the regional level);  
• a mixture of processes to engage different sectors of the Indigenous community 
(such as forums at different levels or membership processes for individuals and 
organisations); or 
• relatively informal processes whereby Indigenous peoples can have their say at 
a national congress or through other processes that draw people together on an 
expert or issue specific basis.   
 
It is important to note that the preferred option may involve a mixture of these 
mechanisms. These proposals are not mutually exclusive, and it may be desirable to 
seek to ‘mix and match’ from among the many options available, and to fine tune the 
way an organisation represents Indigenous peoples through establishing different 
forums, levels and functional units throughout the organisation, each which is 
representative and responsive in different ways.  
 
Issue for discussion: Ensuring that a National Indigenous 
Representative Body is representative of Indigenous peoples  
 
Should the National Indigenous Representative Body just involve a 
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national level structure; or should it also include State and Territory and/ 
or regional structures? 
 
Could a national body (without State, Territory or regional structures) 
effectively represent Indigenous peoples through the conduct of 
participatory processes and engagement (such as issue specific forums 
and advisory groups, regional or State/ Territory level planning processes, 
or the convening of a National Congress)?  
 
 
Mechanisms for representing Indigenous peoples at the regional level 
 
As noted above, Indigenous peoples could be represented at a regional level by a 
National Indigenous Representative Body through the existence of formal structures at 
the regional level, or through more informal processes.  
 
It is notable that the federal government’s arrangements for delivering services to 
Indigenous peoples post-ATSIC relies on a network of State Offices and Indigenous 
Coordination Centres that are regionally focused. These regions are based on previous 
ATSIC Regional Council boundaries. 
 
One option for a new National Indigenous Representative Body would be for it to 
include formal regional Indigenous mechanisms based on the same boundaries as the 
government’s Indigenous Coordination Centres. This approach was formally endorsed 
by the previous government, although the only regional structure established consistent 
with this was the Murdi Paaki Regional Assembly. 
 
As the Social Justice Commissioner has noted in the Social Justice Report 2006, there 
is a lack of capacity at the regional level for Indigenous peoples to ‘organise’ 
themselves into a regional structure that the government could then endorse and 
negotiate with. This approach of regional Indigenous mechanisms that operate parallel 
to the government’s ICC network will therefore require significant support to design 
appropriate regional mechanisms, as well as to resource them and make them 
operational.  
 
At the same time, the government has had ICC offices in operation for several years 
now and presumably has developed relationships with Indigenous communities and 
sectors within each region. The government therefore has in place the machinery to 
support the development of regional Indigenous representative arrangements should it 
so desire.  
 
A related option would be to support formal regional mechanisms that are drawn along 
different boundaries to the ICC network of offices. This has been done with a Regional 
Partnership Agreement with the Ngaanyatjarra Council in Western Australia. 
 
In this instance, the boundaries of regional mechanisms would be determined by 
Indigenous people. It could result in different mechanisms for representation, rather 
than a uniform system that is applied across all geographic areas. Such an approach 
may provide advantages in ensuring the legitimacy and credibility of the organisation 
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with Indigenous peoples. It may also result in disadvantages such as a multiplicity of 
regional mechanisms that are too small and accordingly more complex to administer 
(with reduced economies of scale) or which have to interact with the government’s 
regional structures that are drawn along different boundaries.  
 
A third, informal and more minimalist option would be for a National Indigenous 
Representative Body to convene regional forums and planning processes on a regular or 
cyclical basis. This could be done directly by the National Indigenous Representative 
Body or in partnership with governments (such as the federal government through the 
ICC; the state or territory government; and possibly also the local council). How such 
an approach would impact on the level of direct engagement with Indigenous peoples at 
the regional level would depend on what other processes for participation existed 
within the National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
Issue for discussion: Relationship between the National Indigenous 
Representative Body and Indigenous peoples at the regional level 
 
What mechanisms should exist for the National Indigenous 
Representative Body to engage with Indigenous peoples at the regional 
level? Should the National Indigenous Representative Body: 
 
a) Formally include regional representative mechanisms as part of 
its structure? If so, how should those regions and their 
boundaries be determined? 
b) Convene regional forums and planning processes on a regular or 
cyclical basis? If so, should the representative body seek to 
conduct these itself, or in partnership with governments at the 
local, State/ Territory and federal levels? 
c) A combination of the above? or 
d) None of the above – it should engage through some alternative 
process. 
 
  
Mechanisms for representing Indigenous peoples at the State or Territory level 
  
As with determining the appropriate interface at the regional level, it will also be 
important to consider whether formal mechanisms or other processes are needed at the 
State or Territory wide level. This is particularly given the significant responsibilities 
for Indigenous affairs exercised by this level of government. 
 
In the past, National Indigenous Representative Bodies have not usually dealt with the 
States/ Territories very well. They have largely depended on their State or Territory 
arms to feed into the national forum and attempted to influence states from there. 
 
The first government-sponsored national Indigenous organisation, the NACC, divided 
the country into electoral constituencies each of which directly elected a member to the 
Council. However, the members did little to organise their electoral regions and there 
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was no coordination at the state level. The NAC, which superseded the NACC, was 
more successful at organising regional programs, though this varied across the country, 
and did have some state presence, though state governments did not take this very 
seriously.  
 
ATSIC had no effective State/ Territory representative organisation but was usually 
effective at the regional level with its Regional Councils. The procedures for electing 
Commissioners, however, failed to reflect this strong local support base in the 
composition of the ATSIC Board. 
 
O’Donoghue’s minority report in the Hiatt inquiry aimed to deal with this issue by 
proposing that the replacement for the NACC should be based in regional organisations 
feeding into state advisory bodies that comprised both regional Indigenous 
representatives and state public officials.110 This model was not accepted when the 
NAC was established. When Coombs in turn came to review the NAC he also argued 
for strong regional assemblies, with a mixed delegate/electoral base. He felt that these 
should federate at the state level to deal with state governments.111 O’Donoghue’s 1986 
report advocated continuing discussions with state authorities about their relationship 
with the national body, but did find strong support for the concept of state components 
of the national body being able to influence state-based programs.112  
 
The lack of strong mechanisms for engaging the states with a national body is partly 
due to the states themselves stepping back from responsibility for Indigenous programs. 
Following the 1967 referendum there was an assumption by the states that the 
Commonwealth would fund and largely administer Indigenous development. It would 
do this in two ways. Firstly, it would devise and deliver its own programs, secondly it 
would subsidise the states to deliver services largely through their mainstream public 
programs.  
 
With the abolition of ATSIC this second tendency increased, though it had already been 
identified as an area for reform by the Howard government. Bi-lateral agreements for 
the delivery of services to Indigenous peoples have been signed with most States and 
Territories. One option would be for a new National Indigenous Representative Body to 
become a party to such agreements as trilateral agreements, appropriately renegotiated.  
 
At the federal level, mainstream departments are currently increasingly questioning 
their role in direct service delivery, especially in areas that are State or Territory 
responsibilities for non-Indigenous people. Essential and municipal services, housing 
and public health are areas where the states are being encouraged to take up a greater 
role, while education has always been a state responsibility. 
 
Greater state involvement in providing Indigenous services is administratively logical, 
given the constitutional responsibility of the states. It may also be desirable to have 
program administration closer to where the programs are delivered. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
110 Hiatt, LR et al. 1976, National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 
Parliamentary Paper 343/1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra. pp117-129.  
111 Coombs, HC 1984, The Role of the National Aboriginal Conference, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra. pp58-59.  
112 O’Donoghue, L 1986, An Aboriginal and Islander Consultative Organisation, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra. p32.  
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reform of state processes is also necessary in many areas. It is desirable for a National 
Indigenous Representative Body to play a part of this process.  
 
The states often do not have good systems in place for Aboriginal Affairs because the 
Commonwealth has been in charge for more than three decades. Nor do they have a 
good track record of accounting for Indigenous expenditure through their mainstream 
systems.113 In the current climate, there is a reasonable argument for a strong state 
based component of a national body both to render advice and to monitor performance.  
Whether a state component of the national body is directly elected or consists of 
delegates from communities and organisations, the state component’s relationship to 
the national body needs to be considered. 
 
It is notable that the new federal government has clearly expressed its intention to 
reform the relationship between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories and 
to end the ‘blame game’ across a range of activities and service delivery. The Council 
of Australian Governments is the primary vehicle for a reform agenda of 
Commonwealth-State relationships. It would be appropriate to consider whether a 
National Indigenous Representative Body could usefully play a role in advising and 
interacting with COAG on inter-governmental reform issues. 
 
The Commonwealth Government is also reviewing the system of Special Purpose 
Payments to the states and territories, including by including accountability measures 
such as specific Indigenous performance indicators, benchmarks and targets for service 
delivery by state and territory governments. Similar accountability measures are also 
being considered in the renegotiation of the Australian Health Care Agreements and 
will no doubt also be considered in the context of other bilateral arrangements for 
housing, education and other issues as those agreements arise for renegotiation. These 
may also provide an opportunity for the new National Indigenous Representative Body 
to advise the federal government in order to achieve improved outcomes at the state and 
territory level. 
 
Accordingly, some options for the relationship between the National Indigenous 
Representative Body and State and Territory governments may include: 
 
• State-based mechanisms being a feature of a new National Indigenous 
Representative Body, potentially drawing their representatives from regional 
representative mechanisms; 
• State-based mechanisms that are constituted through other means, such as direct 
election and/ or representation of organisations – these might, for example, be 
constituted outside the framework of the National Indigenous Representative 
Body such as with the new ACT Governments’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Elected Body; 
• The conduct of State-wide policy forums conducted on a regular, cyclical basis 
to feed into the National Indigenous Representative Body; or 
• A combination of these mechanisms. 
                                                 
113 Langton, M 1994, ‘Self-Determination: Overhauling the Administrative Practices of Colonisation’ in 
P. Jull, M. Mulrennan, M. Sullivan, G. Crough and D. Lea (eds), Surviving Columbus: Indigenous 
Peoples, Political Reform and Environmental Management in North Australia, North Australia Research 
Unit, Australia National University, Darwin. Pp133-134.  
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Issue for discussion: Relationship between the National Indigenous 
Representative Body and Indigenous peoples at the State or 
Territory level 
 
What mechanisms should exist for the National Indigenous 
Representative Body to engage with Indigenous peoples at the State/ 
Territory level? How might this influence the significant responsibilities 
and under-performance of State and Territory governments on Indigenous 
affairs? 
 
If such mechanisms are established, should they: 
 
a) draw their membership from regional representative 
mechanisms;  
b) be based on other mechanisms to be determined on a state by 
state basis (including existing state-based representative bodies 
and advisory boards); 
c) be based on the conduct of state-wide policy forums conducted 
on a regular, cyclical basis; or 
d) a combination of the above; or 
e) None of the above? 
 
Should a National Indigenous Representative Body seek to exert 
influence at the State and Territory level through a formal or informal 
role at the Council of Australian Governments, and/or by participating in 
or advising on the negotiation of inter-governmental agreements? 
 
The national structure of the National Indigenous Representative Body  
 
The above sections have addressed the key issues of how many levels of representation 
the national body should have as well as the roles and functions it would exercise. This 
will have a significant impact in determining the most appropriate national level 
structure for the representative body. 
 
Once consensus is achieved on a broad outline of what a National Body should do, and 
how it should look, then structural proposals can proceed.  
 
It is important to mention that it is possible to ‘mix and match’ from among the many 
options available, and to fine tune the way an organisation represents it membership 
through establishing different forums, levels and functional units throughout the 
organisation, each responsive to the membership in different ways. A significant issue 
to consider is how different forums or mechanisms within the national body would 
relate to each other to ensure internal cohesiveness.  
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The following are a range of issues to be addressed relating to a national structure for 
the new National Indigenous Representative Body: 
 
a) Whether the national structure should be directly drawn from regional and State/ 
Territory levels of the body with delegates nominated to the national structure 
through these mechanisms, or whether it should instead be based on a direct 
election model at the national level; 
b) Whether it should be a membership based organisation, whereby communities, 
organisations or individuals can join the organisation – representation in this 
model would then flow from the participation of individuals or representatives 
of organisations or communities, in the ordinary governance processes of the 
organisation; 
c) Whether the national structure be decided through a process of merit selection 
presided over by a panel of eminent Indigenous peers; 
d) Whether or how the national structure of the representative body should involve 
Indigenous peak bodies, other regional or state based Indigenous bodies and/or 
Indigenous service delivery organisations in its activities – for example, directly 
in its decision making or in an advisory role; 
e) Whether at the national level there should be an allocation of positions to a 
national board or executive of representatives for particular sectors of the 
Indigenous community – for example, stolen generations members, traditional 
owners, youth, and Torres Strait Islanders (on the mainland and in Torres 
Strait). Such positions could also be allocated to specific working groups or 
advisory panels to the national body;  
f) How at the national level the National Indigenous Representative Body can 
maintain a gender balance and ensure equal participation and representation for 
Indigenous women; and 
g) Whether there ought to be processes to enable the broad-based participation of 
Indigenous peoples in the national decision making process – such as through 
the convening of an annual policy Congress open to all Indigenous peoples (and 
possibly also Indigenous organisations and/or non-Indigenous organisations). 
 
One view may be that it is not necessary to re-invent the wheel, and discussion should 
start with improvements to the ATSIC experience, perhaps based on the Hannaford 
review.114 This would certainly allow for a narrowing down of the issues.  
 
The ATSIC Review of 2003 had recommended a revised two tier structure for “a new 
ATSIC”. It proposed that each regional representative organisation’s Chair would 
become a member of a national forum. That national forum would meet occasionally 
and would also elect an Executive Council from a smaller number of its members. The 
Executive Council would then make the decisions and run the organisation on a day to 
day basis.115 This may provide a starting point for how the new National Indigenous 
Representative Body may operate. 
 
                                                 
114 Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs, Canberra.  
115 Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs, Canberra. pp78-80.  
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Some of the issues to be addressed in relation to the options identified above include: 
 
• Whether representatives should be chosen by election or by delegation, or 
alternatively whether they should be chosen through a merit selection process 
presided over by a panel of eminent Indigenous peers; 
• Whether particular groups of Indigenous peoples should be directly represented 
on the national body’s structure (eg stolen generations, traditional owners, 
Torres Strait Islanders or youth); 
• How to ensure gender balance and equal representation of Indigenous women 
on a national representative body structure; and 
• The role of non-Indigenous organisations. 
 
• Representatives chosen by election or by delegation? 
 
Three distinct ways of reflecting the membership in a board, council or executive must 
be considered. By: 
 
• Direct election: Here members of the organisation participate as individuals.116 
They each have a vote for a representative.  
 
• Delegation: In this model, organisations, national Indigenous peak bodies, 
regional and/or state/territory level representative organisations could nominate 
a delegate/s to represent them in the National Indigenous Representative Body. 
The delegate can be selected in a number of ways; elected from within the 
organisation or group, or appointed by its Board, officers or elders.  
 
• Merit selection: In this model, the members of a national executive would be 
selected through a merit selection process by a panel of eminent Indigenous 
people. This process would be used during the establishment phase of the 
representative body. Once the representative body was in place and operating, 
the national executive could then establish its own procedure for the selection/ 
appointment of members in subsequent rounds. 
 
Election 
 
Both the NACC and the NAC held direct elections, while ATSIC had direct election to 
Regional Councils and then an indirect election model for other positions.  
 
ATSIC Regional Councillors were elected from local constituencies. Regional 
Councillors then elected the Chairs of the Regional Councils, as well as Commissioners 
on the national board (with Regional Councils grouped together into zones for the 
purpose of electing a Commissioner). The Commissioners then elected a Chairperson 
                                                 
116 It is also possible that, such as in the National Congress of American Indians, organisations also have 
a number of votes allocated to them. 
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and Deputy Chairperson.117 It was a complicated system and voter turn out overall was 
poor, although greater rates of voter turnout were achieved in remote areas.118 
 
In the reviews before the demise of each of the national organisations the principle of 
popular election was often challenged.119   
 
In relation to ATSIC, many electors were unaware of the intricacies of the ATSIC 
system beyond the election of Regional Councillors, which made this part of the 
process susceptible to political intrigue. The distribution of votes across the country 
also favoured remote areas to the disadvantage of Aboriginal people in urban and 
densely settled Australia.120 
 
The Hannaford review of 2003 found dissatisfaction with the uniformity of the electoral 
model.121. It did not allow for the adoption of different approaches in different regions.  
 
Delegation 
 
Several effective national representative bodies are based on delegates being nominated 
by member organisations.  
 
The Australian Council of Trades Unions (ACTU), for example, is constituted by its 
affiliated unions, its state branches, provincial Trades and Labor Councils, and its 
officers and executive members. It has a Congress which is made up of delegates from 
its constituent parts and its officers.122  
 
The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) is similar. There are Councils of 
Social Service in each of the States and Territories. The membership of state Councils 
differs from State/ Territory to State/ Territory, depending on the community service 
organisations that are active there.  
 
In addition, ACOSS members include national organisations representing those who 
need social services as well as those who provide them. It includes religious groups and 
relevant professional associations as members. It has more than seventy member 
organisations.  
 
                                                 
117 Hannaford, J, Huggins J, and Collins B, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission: Public Discussion Paper, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous 
Affairs, Canberra. pp24-26.  
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Indigenous Law, Policy and Practice, Sydney, pp37-38. 
119 Hiatt, LR et al. 1976, National Aboriginal Consultative Committee, Report of Committee of Inquiry, 
Parliamentary Paper 343/1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra. pp57-62; Coombs, HC 
1984, The Role of the National Aboriginal Conference, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra. pp20-23; Hannaford et al 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
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Affairs, Canberra. pp45-46.  
120 Behrendt, L 2005, Briefing Paper No 5: National Representative Structures, Ngiya Institute for 
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121 Hannaford et al, 2003, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission: Public 
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The eight State and Territory-based Councils each elect a delegate to the twenty-
member Board. The President and Treasurer are elected by the members at large. 
National organisations elect six Board members, two are elected by an Assembly of 
consumer groups, and the Board itself co-opts a further two members.123 This gives 
very broad representation of State/ Territory and national interests, service providers, 
service receivers and professionals. ACOSS does not directly represent its members, 
but advocates on behalf of their constituency, the poor and the disadvantaged.124 
 
No similar national body of Indigenous community service and representative 
organisations has been tried. This is despite recommendations for this model in each of 
the reviews since 1976. Hiatt did not personally accept the proposal, but included 
O’Donoghue’s recommendation for it.125 Coombs firmly believed it would be a more 
robust structure than the directly elected NAC that he was reviewing.126 O’Donoghue 
again, in the 1986 consultations that eventually led to ATSIC, proposed a mixed model 
of delegates from organisations and communities for regional assemblies, with national 
representatives directly elected,127 though she admitted there were some difficulties to 
be dealt with.128  
 
In these reviews it was particularly felt that coalitions of community councils and 
community service organisations would be effective as regional assemblies, which 
would be the legitimising basis of state and national representation. Gerry Hand, past 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, outlined his preference for Regional Councils to be 
based on member organisations in his policy paper Foundations for the Future in 1987. 
By 1988, when he introduced the first ATSIC Bill to Parliament, he had dropped it in 
favour of direct election. 
 
There are about 2,000 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations registered 
with the Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations, and possibly 
5,000 registered nation-wide under all Acts.129 There are also statutory organisations 
such as the Northern Territory and New South Wales land councils. All have elected 
Boards answerable to the membership at Annual General Meetings. Most can be 
recalled by Special General Meetings. This can be seen as a more direct form of 
democracy than national elections.  
 
The vast majority of these organisations are engaged in delivering some form of service 
to Indigenous clients. Normally they are effectively controlled by a board and senior 
officials with direct affinity with their local client base. They very often have a long 
history of service provision at the local and regional levels; some thirty years of service 
                                                 
123 Mendes, P 2006, Inside the Welfare Lobby: a History of the Australian Council of Social Service, 
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is not uncommon. They could offer an effective basis for a national organisation with a 
strong regional and state-based structure. 
 
One problem could arise if the national body is engaged in program delivery. Most 
often this will be done through community controlled organisations. When these 
organisations form the membership base and send delegates to the national 
representative body, questions of fair allocation of resources, evaluation and 
accountability arise. Internal quarantine of these functions from perceived 
‘interference’ from the Executive would be required. 
 
Merit selection by a panel of eminent Indigenous peers 
 
An alternative option to an election or delegate model is for the executive/ national 
structure of the representative body to be based on a merit selection process.  
 
In this model, a call for nominations would be made for people with particular 
experience or expertise to sit on the national body. Nominations would then be assessed 
by a panel of eminent Indigenous peers based on a series of criteria which may include 
factors such as the relevant expertise that the nominees could contribute to the 
representative body, geographical spread of nominees, gender and youth representation 
and so on. 
 
In order to promote a diversity of views it may be appropriate to limit nominees to 
sitting on the national body for a maximum number of terms. 
 
In the first instance, there will be a need for a process to select or appoint the eminent 
Indigenous peers who will conduct the nomination process. Importantly, once the 
representative body is operational the national board or executive could then be charged 
with the responsibility of establishing a selection process for subsequent terms on the 
body. On this understanding, and in the instance that the National Indigenous 
Representative Body is a government body, it may be appropriate for the Minister for 
Indigenous Affairs to appoint the panel for the first nomination process. In the event 
that the National Indigenous Representative Body is not a government body, then 
another process for selecting this esteemed peer committee will need to be decided. 
 
• Representation of distinct Indigenous groups on the National Body’s 
executive 
 
A National Indigenous Representative Body could also put into place structures to 
ensure that the voice of distinct groups of Indigenous peoples is heard in the national 
body.  
 
There are two main options here – first, it could designate positions on the national 
executive structure for distinct groups (e.g. stolen generations, traditional owners, 
Torres Strait Islanders, youth etc). Second, it could establish advisory/ expert panels 
that don’t directly make the decisions of the National Body but which are consulted on 
a range of specific issues. 
 
Special purpose committees to devise aspects of policy, or to investigate issues of 
concern, may be established. These could have non-Indigenous as well as Indigenous 
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expert advisors. Portfolio committees under the guidance of a particular Board or 
Council member may also help to spread the load of decision-making and produce both 
better policy proposals and advocacy.  
 
It is important, though, for the structure to balance the need for a broad base seeking 
wise input wherever it may be found, with the need for the main decision making body 
or executive to remain focused, effective and capable of swift action. 
 
There may be a number of distinct groups within the Indigenous population for whom 
some specific role should be considered. This section considers three such groups – 
traditional owners, stolen generations members and youth. 
 
Traditional Owners 
 
Each of the previous national representative bodies in Australia was set up before the 
decision of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No.2) in 1992. That case established 
the principle that Indigenous peoples in Australia had pre-colonial systems of land 
tenure that could be recognised by Australian common law.  
 
One important consequence of that recognition has been relatively neglected. Systems 
of land tenure cannot exist alone; they are inevitably bound up in systems of authority 
and governance, in political systems. These systems of governance may remain 
relatively intact in some areas of Australia, or they may need to be renewed in order to 
establish organisations that can hold and deal in native title, in line with overseas 
experience. A national Indigenous organisation may offer the opportunity to reinstitute 
the political dimension in native title.  
 
There is wide diversity in the ways that Indigenous peoples assert their traditional 
ownership. Some have been through formal statutory processes under Land Rights Acts 
in the Northern Territory, NSW and South Australia, and to a lesser extent Victoria. 
Each of these is quite different.  
 
Some groups establish their traditional rights through involvement in heritage 
protection procedures, often through informal agreement with states-based authorities. 
Others have fought out native title claims in court where quite precise details of cultural 
practice and descent are required. Consent determinations of native title tend to be less 
precise about the boundaries of group membership. Many groups are incorporated 
under legislation, while others remain unincorporated or are represented by several 
corporations.  
 
While there is a tendency across the country for Indigenous groups to describe 
themselves as nations defined by language, descent and territory, land and native title 
claims have often split groups that naturally belong together. Disputes over rights to 
land are also commonplace.  
 
There is, then, no single uniform formula to decide what a traditional ownership group 
is, who its members are, and precisely the geographical area it covers. A procedure for 
claims to membership of a traditional owner group would be required of a national 
traditional owner organisation, but it would be difficult to achieve one that is both 
simple and fair. Fairness in representation would also be difficult to achieve, since 
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some groups are large and others comprise only a handful of people. With the disparity 
in group sizes, experience, and current circumstances it could also be difficult to fairly 
recruit many effective individuals from some regions without passing over regions 
where there is a wealth of such individuals. 
 
The effectiveness of a ‘united nations’ of Indigenous Australia could also be 
questioned. While each nation may be able to contribute an effective regional voice, 
they would have difficulty dealing consistently with State/ Territory governments 
where the group crosses State/ Territory lines.  
 
Also, many Indigenous peoples do not live on their traditional lands. While they may 
not claim to be able to speak for the country where they reside, they usually do feel 
strongly about the provision of services in their local region. There is also a tendency 
for land-based groups only to develop interest and expertise in land and heritage issues, 
they do not usually concern themselves with health, housing or employment, for 
example.  
 
With these difficulties considered, if the national discussion does reveal that traditional 
ownership needs to be reflected in a national organisation, perhaps the formation of a 
traditional owner chamber or forum as part of a differently organised body would be a 
suitable option. 
 
Stolen Generations 
 
If it were the general view that traditional owners should be directly represented in the 
National Body’s executive there is a further issue that will need to be addressed. One of 
the impacts of the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families is that 
members of the Stolen Generations have often lost connection to their culture or 
traditional lands. Bringing them home notes the consequent difficulties for members of 
the Stolen Generations being able to be recognised within traditional owner groupings 
(such as being custodians of native title or holders of title under land rights 
legislation).130 Other such processes for recognition would also need to be put into 
place to ensure that stolen generations members are not further disadvantaged through 
the processes of representation in the new National Indigenous Representative Body. 
 
Youth 
 
The Indigenous population is an extremely young one, with more than half of the 
population under the age of 25 years of age. A National Indigenous Representative 
Body needs to grapple with issues facing Indigenous youth for this very reason. 
 
It can also be argued that ensuring the engagement of Indigenous youth in the 
representative structures of the National Indigenous Representative Body is important 
so as to ensure ongoing development of an Indigenous leadership and transitions 
between generations. It may be appropriate for mentoring opportunities to be provided 
to youth participants in a national body to nurture and support good leadership into the 
future. 
                                                 
130 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing them home, HREOC Sydney 1997, 
pp202-206. 
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Torres Strait Islanders 
 
The Torres Strait Islanders are a distinct Indigenous group within Australia, who also 
require adequate representation in a new National Indigenous Representative Body.  
The Torres Strait Islanders fall into two groups, the first are those living in the Torres 
Strait, and who are represented at the regional level through the Torres Strait Regional 
Authority (TSRA). The TSRA became an independent statutory authority by 
amendment to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) in 
1994. Post-ATSIC, the TSRA continues to be the principal Commonwealth agency co-
ordinating Indigenous affairs in the region.131 The new National Indigenous 
Representative Body will have to consider what mechanisms are needed to liaise with 
the TSRA, and how this group should be represented.  For instance representation could 
be through having a delegated representative of the TSRA on the new National 
Indigenous Representative Body, or it could be through the TSRA acting as an advisory 
group to inform the National Indigenous Representative Body.    
 
The second group of Torres Strait islanders consists of those living on the mainland.   
Although the ATSIC Act (1989) provided mechanisms to ensure the interests of 
mainland Torres Strait Islanders were represented, this group still faced problems in 
accessing funding bodies, programs and services. With the abolition of ATSIC these 
mechanisms no longer exist and the opportunities for participation by mainland Torres 
Strait Islanders in government processes have reduced even further. Given the 
marginalisation of this group among other mainland Indigenous groups, it is important 
to ensure that the new National Indigenous Representative Body also give consideration 
for establishing specific forms of representation for this group. This again could be 
through elected representation, to through the establishment of an advisory body.   
 
 
• Gender balance and ensuring equal participation and representation for 
Indigenous women at the national level 
 
A significant issue for a new National Indigenous Representative Body is how it will 
ensure gender equality in its operations. This is a significant issue that ATSIC did not 
grapple with well. It has been argued that there is a danger that women can become 
“merely a ‘special interest’ group … rendered invisible within the notion of ‘family.”132  
 
A lack of appropriate representation of women and youth in national Indigenous 
governance structures, including at the highest levels of office, can impact on the 
confidence and legitimacy of the representative body among its constituents.133 
 
The Hannaford Review of ATSIC emphasises the “irreplaceable perspective 
[Indigenous women] contribute.”134 It found that gender imbalance in ATSIC’s 
political structure was in part caused by insufficient recognition of the role of 
                                                 
131 For an overview of the TSRA see Chapter 2. 
132 Davis, M 2008 ‘Indigenous women’s representation and the proposal for a new national representative 
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Indigenous women and matters that impact significantly on them (such as substa
abuse, homelessness and family violence), as well as inadequate leadership 
development and a failure to involve women in formal decision-ma 135
nce 
king processes.   
 
Consequences included “distorted and flawed”136 policy and program design with 
limited capability to meet Indigenous women’s needs137 and a resultant lack of 
participation by women in such programs.  
 
Among the recommendations in the Hannaford review for redressing gender 
disadvantage and poor political representation were strategies developed with the 
Australian Electoral Commission and a taskforce addressing the reasons for under-
representation.138 Megan Davis has argued that a more deliberative democratic process 
is “not inimical to Indigenous culture”139 and is corroborated by international legal 
understandings of self-determination.140  
 
Evidence suggests that institutional structures properly representing the diversity of 
Indigenous political culture would be more sustainable.141  
 
Gender-balanced approaches or frameworks identify how social conditions affect 
experiences and access to political, economic and social institutions. The Canadian 
AFN Women’s Council Gender-Balanced Analysis 2007 suggests this sort of 
framework should be “overlaid with a diversity analysis that considers factors such as 
race, ethnicity, level of ability and sexual orientation”.142  
 
• The role of Non-Indigenous organisations 
 
As noted previously in this Issues Paper, the form of the organisation will depend on its 
functions. If it is to provide a uniquely Indigenous perspective then it cannot involve 
non-Indigenous people in its core representative structure.  
 
An issue is whether there ought to be capacity for Associate Membership of the 
representative body open to non-Indigenous organisations. This could take the form of 
contributing to specialist committees and forums (as for example, can happen in the 
National Congress of American Indians in the USA). 
 
Issue for discussion: National structure of a National Indigenous 
Representative Body  
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Should the national structure of the National Indigenous Representative 
Body: 
 
• be based on a delegate model, where regional and state/territory 
levels of the body nominate their representatives to the national 
structure; 
• be based on a direct election model whereby Indigenous peoples 
themselves directly elect representatives to the national structure; 
• be based on a model of merit selection by a panel of eminent 
Indigenous peers; 
• involve Indigenous peak bodies and possibly other organisations 
nominating representatives to the national structure, or alternative 
provide for the participation of these bodies in a purely advisory 
capacity; 
• allocate dedicated positions on the national structure for 
designated segments of the Indigenous community – such as 
stolen generations members, traditional owners, youth or Torres 
Strait Islanders;  
• be required to have an equal representation of Indigenous women 
and men on the national structure;  
• provide for the participation of non-Indigenous organisations in an 
advisory capacity;  
• a combination of the above; or 
• address other factors not mentioned here? 
 
 
Issue for discussion: Formal relationship between the National 
Indigenous Representative Body and the federal government and 
Parliament 
 
A National Indigenous Representative Body will need to work closely with all levels of 
government if it is to be effective in representing the interests of Indigenous peoples. 
As noted at the outset, such effectiveness will most likely come from the body being 
seen as credible and legitimate by the government as well as by Indigenous peoples.  
 
Ultimately, however, the issue will emerge as to whether the new National Indigenous 
Representative Body should be established as a Commonwealth government entity 
(such as a statutory authority) or should be established through some other means, such 
as being a non-government organisation either with or without government funding 
assistance. 
 
Since 1972, with the beginnings of the NACC, it has been assumed that a national 
Indigenous organisation should be part of the formal advisory mechanisms of 
government.  
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Both the NACC and the NAC were established as committees of Aboriginal affairs 
administration. ATSIC was a statutory Commonwealth body regulated by its own Act 
of Parliament. Each of these organisations struggled to assert its independence while at 
the same time remaining part of the fabric of government.  
 
Arguably, a statutory body can meet the requirements of both independence and 
privileged access to government.  
 
The fundamental reason for establishing a statutory commission is to improve the 
quality of governance of an area of public concern by operating at arms length from 
executive government. At the same time, being established by government charter, it 
should also have a privileged ability to steer these same areas of public policy.  
 
In practice, the experience of ATSIC did not bear this out. Government rarely sought its 
advice, and rarely took it when offered.  
 
This is no reason to reject this approach entirely, however. Some statutory authorities 
such as HREOC, the ALRC, the Productivity Commission, Privacy Commission, 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission do indeed have authority and are influential with government. A better 
designed Indigenous Affairs Commission might be more effective than ATSIC.  
 
Issue for discussion: Establishment of the National Indigenous 
Representative Body  
 
Should the National Indigenous Representative Body be established by 
government, for example as a statutory authority, or be established 
independent of government? 
 
 
Regardless of whether the organisation itself is to be a governmental statutory authority 
or established independently, a tighter relationship with government than has 
previously existed must be found. This is particularly important for two of the national 
body’s proposed functions: policy advice to government and review of government 
performance.  
 
There are a range of options for how a new National Indigenous Representative Body 
might operate so as to have a closer relationship to government. For example: 
 
• It could have ex-officio membership of the Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous 
Affairs as well as the Secretaries Group on Indigenous Affairs, and therefore 
have a ‘seat at the table’ where the major decisions on Indigenous affairs are 
made at the federal government level.143 Alternatively, it could operate as an 
advisor to these bodies. 
 
                                                 
143 This could draw on the experiences of the Council for Aboriginal Development (CAD) established as 
a subsidiary body of the NAC in 1977(as discussed in section 1 of this paper) as well as the lessons from 
the current Ministerial Taskforce and Secretaries Group. 
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• It could be invited to participate in discussions of the Council of Australian 
Government (COAG), as well as the various committees of COAG such as the 
Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
(MCATSIA). It must, however, be noted that it would be a very unsatisfactory 
outcome for the new National Indigenous Representative Body to only be 
invited to participate in MCATSIA due to its lack of influence on the overall 
COAG agenda over the past decade. 
 
The National Indigenous Representative Body could also seek to establish a direct 
relationship with the federal Parliament, in addition to the government of the day. A 
direct relationship with the Parliament will be extremely important in seeking to 
establish a bipartisan approach and long term commitments to Indigenous affairs.   
 
If it were established as a statutory body, the National Indigenous Representative Body 
would have a direct reporting relationship with Parliament through its annual report.  
 
It may be useful for the representative body to also have statutory powers to enable it to 
table reports and advice in Parliament from time to time.  
 
A further possibility is for a new National Indigenous Representative Body to have a 
role in the committee systems of the Parliament. There are two possibilities here: a 
formal role participating in Budget Estimates hearings (that occur usually twice per 
year and where Department are held to account for their expenditure and activities); and 
a formal role on parliamentary committees of review (such as a parliamentary 
committee on Indigenous affairs). 
 
In Senate Estimates committees, Senators question government departments over their 
performance in the context of the estimates for their budgets. This is often effective in 
targeting problem areas, but it is fragmented. There are some limitations to this process 
– in particular, departments and ministers can only be questioned on operational matters 
and not on matters of policy. 
 
Similarly, Indigenous programs are spread over several departments. The Senate 
Estimates process itself is divided among eight committees. When an Indigenous affairs 
responsibility changes portfolios, it can also change the committee that examines it. 
When responsibility for Indigenous affairs moved from the Department of Immigration 
to the Department of Families and Community Services its scrutiny passed from the 
Legal and Constitutional Committee to the Community Affairs Committee. Arguably, 
neither of these is appropriate.  
 
Senators have varying degrees of background in Indigenous affairs and cannot divide 
their time effectively across all of these committees to get an overview of the many 
strands of Indigenous program delivery.  
 
Nonetheless, the power of Senate Estimates committees to call the government and 
bureaucracy to account is something that many Indigenous peoples would like to 
emulate. This power, though, is fragile. The committees are renewed by resolution at 
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the beginning of each Parliament, and they are regulated by a standing order of the 
Senate that itself could be rescinded or amended by the Senate.144  
 
A second option is a regular committee of review on Indigenous issues. When the 
Senate reviewed the Bill to abolish ATSIC and ATSIS the majority recommended that 
a Senate Standing Committee be established to regularly consider the government’s 
performance in delivering Indigenous development programs.145 The minority report, 
by government Senators, recommended instead that the current House of 
Representative Standing Committee on Indigenous Affairs should become a joint 
Parliamentary Committee of both the House of Representatives and the Senate.146  
 
Both proposals suffer some drawbacks from the point of view of meaningful, rather 
than merely symbolic, Indigenous input into the process. These committees are 
populated by politicians, and thus sometimes mere political instruments. The political 
party with control of the chamber may amend or rescind the regulations. They may 
control the matters referred to the committees, the frequency of sitting days, and 
responses to requests from the committee. The fragility of these arrangements for the 
operation of a democratic Parliament, let alone for a single contentious area such as 
Indigenous affairs, has been roundly criticised by the Clerk of the Senate.147 
 
More robust committees, which are established by Acts of Parliament and given 
defined functions, do exist. They are less susceptible to direction by the government of 
the day. The examples of the Public Accounts and Audit Committee and the Public 
Works Expenditure Committee, which reviews proposed infrastructure expenditure 
over $10 million, could be explored as models. These are both joint committees, 
reporting to both chambers of Parliament.  
 
These committees of the Parliament are powerful bodies. There is still a question how 
Indigenous peoples, through their national body, could exert influence on such 
committees.  
 
Importantly, there is nothing to say that a National Indigenous Representative Body 
could not be given a formal role in such a committee process.148 It is not a requirement 
of Parliamentary Committees that their members be parliamentarians. Members of the 
national body’s Executive, or their delegates, could comprise these committees in 
whole or in part. They could be invested with any legal power that the Parliament sees 
fit. This could include the protection of Parliamentary privilege, and the power to 
conduct hearings, summon witness and documents, and take evidence under oath. 
Similarly, the Parliament could provide for suitable remuneration, support staff and 
facilities. It would be desirable for the Indigenous members of such committees to have 
facilities in Parliament House to encourage active engagement with the day to day 
processes of government.  
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148 Sidoti, E 2007, ‘Indigenous Political Representation: A Parliamentary Option’ unpublished concept 
paper, Whitlam Institute, University of Western Sydney.  
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A University of Melbourne political scientist, John Chesterman, has alternatively 
proposed that the membership of such a committee could be elected by Indigenous 
peoples at the same time as a general election.149 An exclusively Indigenous committee, 
with democratically chosen representatives, and all the powers of Parliamentarians, 
would be a strong innovative development in Australian constitutional arrangements for 
dealing with Indigenous matters. It could evolve, effectively, into an Indigenous 
chamber of Parliament. 
 
Issue for discussion: Relationship of the National Indigenous 
Representative Body with government and Parliament 
 
What formal mechanisms should be built into the structure of a National 
Indigenous Representative Body to ensure that it has a direct relationship 
with the federal government and the federal Parliament?  
 
What role should the National Indigenous Representative Body have in 
the federal government’s whole of government arrangements?  
 
What formal mechanisms should be built into the structure of a National 
Indigenous Representative Body to ensure that it can inform and work 
with State/ Territory governments?  
 
 
Issue for discussion: Resourcing the National Indigenous 
Representative Body 
 
A critical issue will be deciding how the National Indigenous Representative Body is to 
be funded for its regular activities so that it has the capacity to undertake the roles and 
functions that are ultimately decided for the body. 
 
If the national body is to be a statutory arm of government it must be funded by 
government to perform its functions.  
 
If the body is a non-government organisation, then the government may still decide that 
it is valuable for it to allocate grants to the representative body even though it is not a 
government authority. ACOSS, for example, receives about 45 per cent of its funding 
from government.150  
 
Government funds may be useful, but they may come at a cost of the independence of 
the organisation. They may be tied to certain functions not seen as a priority by the 
membership, they can put an organisation in the position of being a proxy for 
government, they often come with conditions attached such as limiting the 
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organisation’s ability for public comment on certain programs, and if withdrawn they 
can pull the rug out from under the organisation. 
 
Some of these dangers can be managed by the allocation of block funding for 
significant periods with broad reporting requirements at realistic intervals. The 
experience of ATSIC and many community organisations with dependency on 
government funds may lead to a decision that the organisation needs to find the 
majority of its income from independent sources or to have the capacity to supplement 
government funding with independent sources of income.  
 
One source could be a foundation fund. The Indigenous Land Corporation and the 
NSW Land Council have used this model. An examination of these shows both benefits 
and drawbacks. 
 
The ILC draws much of its income from the statutory Indigenous Land Fund (or 
Account). Some of its income is from its own operations and investments separate from 
the Land Fund. For the first ten years of its operation, 1995 to 2006, the 
Commonwealth government provided $120 million per year, indexed for inflation, to 
the Land Fund. The indexation increased the payment to $145.7 million by the end of 
the ten-year period. After this the ILC was expected to fund itself from investment of 
the accumulated capital. By the end of 2004 the ILC was taking $54.7 million per year 
of the Land Fund allocation for its operations and the Land Fund stood at $1.42 
billion.151 
 
On the face of it this is a good model, but there are problems. In the first year of 
dependence entirely on the Fund the ILC was able to draw down only $4 million, when 
it had expected in the region of $45 – 50 million.152  
 
The ILC is bound by statute only to take the ‘realised real return’ of the fund. The first 
constraint on this return is the level of interest the fund may earn. The Fund is required 
to invest in a conservative manner, determined by Department of Finance rules. It 
seems to have chosen bank bills which in 2007 returned it 6%.153 To get the ‘real 
return’ it needs to compensate the fund for the effects of inflation, before the ILC can 
take what remains. The ILC legislation determines that inflation is measured using the 
‘non-farm product deflator’ index rather than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This 
type of inflation has been running high due to the resources boom and the rising price 
of commodities.  
 
In short, a high inflationary factor and a modest rate of return on the investment 
combined to provide much less cash than the ILC needed. In addition, there is a further 
difficulty with the way the draw down is calculated. The ILC is required to compute the 
real return over the previous two years performance of the fund. Taking the entire 
return in one year reduces the Fund’s profit in that year to zero for the purposes of the 
next year’s calculation.  
 
                                                 
151 Indigenous Land Corporation, 2004, Annual Report, Adelaide.  
152 Senate 2006 Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Hansard, May 30.  
153 Senate 2007 Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Hansard, May 28.  
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The lesson here is to be realistic about the funds investment strategy, balancing risk 
against the need for a robust return. Secondly, the formulas which are applied to adjust 
for inflation and to calculate the amount available must also be realistic. 
 
The NSW Land Council ran into difficulties for different reasons. The NSW Land 
Council was established by legislation in 1983 and funded by a levy of 7.5% of land 
taxes in the state, which lasted for 15 years. In each year, half of the amount collected 
was allocated to the operation of the Land Council and the remainder placed in an 
investment fund.154 When the 2005 review was undertaken the Land Tax levy had 
ended, the investment fund stood at about $550 million of which the NSW Land 
Council could draw about $20 million per year without affecting the viability of the 
fund.155 
 
The review found that this was not enough to meet the NSW Land Council’s 
obligations. In essence the NSW Land Council had heavy obligations in providing 
funding to a wide network of local Land Councils which had great disparity in needs 
and access to resources - many of which were struggling.156 The lesson here, clearly, is 
to be realistic about the true costs of the obligations of the organisation when 
establishing the fund. 
 
An option for building a foundation fund for the representative body, could be in the 
form of a statutory levy on production as restitution and compensation for the historical 
loss of Indigenous resources and productive capacity. This could be modelled on the 
NSW fraction of land tax, or some other tax equivalent. These funds should be 
sustainable, recurrent and indexed appropriately.  
 
Reconciliation Australia, which is the privately incorporated company that superseded 
the statutory Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, has also found that the size of its 
foundation grant from government in 2003 is not enough to meet its needs. It 
supplements its income with corporate and philanthropic donations, often tied to 
particular projects. It still negotiates with government for long term funding on the 
basis that it provides services of value to government policy objectives. 
 
Although a foundation fund is a useful option, its limits must be realised. It must be 
large because the returns are small relative to the size of the fund. Secondly, service 
organisations are always spending into an increasingly costly environment, with prices 
rising all the time. While the fund can be adjusted for inflation so that it always retains 
the same value in real terms, the organisation faces mounting costs with only a slight 
increase in annual income from the rising quantum of the fund. Businesses compensate 
themselves for inflation by raising prices. 
 
It seems inescapable that an organisation wishing to be substantially independent of 
government will need to raise at least some of its income elsewhere. This could be 
from:  
 
• Donations; 
                                                 
154 ALRAR Task Force, 2005 Structure, representation, Governance and Benefits, 2004-2005 Review of 
the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983, Issues Paper 2, unpublished report. P17.  
155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid. pp19-21.  
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• Membership fees; and/or  
• selling products and services. 
 
A credible and effective National Indigenous Representative Body could be granted 
charitable status so that donations to it are tax deductable. Donations could then be used 
to supplement its operational costs, for specific projects, or to supplement any 
establishment fund to contribute to the long term sustainability of the organisation.  
 
A further option for government funding may be for the funding level to be 
independently set by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, in the same way that 
Special Purpose Grants and General Purpose Payments are allocated to the states and 
territories.  
 
The organisation could also sell services to governments and private organisations. 
Such services could be research into particular issues which it would be in a unique and 
privileged position to carry out, consultations over policy proposals, development of 
policy papers, and facilitation and mediation between Indigenous peoples and private 
interest groups. 
 
Issue for discussion: Resourcing the National Indigenous 
Representative Body  
 
How should the National Indigenous Representative Body be funded so 
as to ensure it has a secure, ongoing source of funding? For example, 
should the body: 
 
• receive government funding; 
• be granted charitable status so that it can raise donations; 
• have an establishment fund to provide a capital base for the 
organisation; 
• charge membership fees to organisations and individuals; 
• charge for the delivery of services and products;  
• a mix of the above; and/ or 
• other options. 
 
Conclusion: Scoping a National Indigenous Representative Structure 
 
In crafting a new national Indigenous voice there is a solid foundation of experience to 
build on from FCAATSI to ATSIC. This Issues Paper has provided some background 
on these experiences while putting up possible forms that a future national Indigenous 
representative structure might take. Some of the suggestions in this paper may not be 
supported. Equally, some ideas not canvassed here will be forthcoming in the national 
discussion process that this paper has aimed to contribute to.  
 
The Issues Paper does not promote any particular model over another, and after 
discussion much work will remain to be done on the detail of formal structural matters. 
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If this Issues Paper stimulates and channels Indigenous energy towards a strong and 
effective new national voice, then it will have served its purpose.   
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